Judge Michelle C. Kim, Case 22STCV06790 2023-03-24 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Maria Del Consuelo Bustos Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Malachi Rashid Mapps (“Mapps”) and Mia Marie Ballantyne (“Ballantyne”) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

As relevant to this proceeding, on September 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed a proof of service of the summons and complaint alleging Mapps was served by substituted service at 72 Roosevelt Irvine, CA 92620-3604 when the documents were left with “Kenya Burks - Mother, Co-occupant.”

On December 8, 2022, Mapps filed the instant motion to quash service of the summons. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and Mapps filed a reply.

“A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .” (CCP § 418.10(a).)

“ ‘On a motion to quash service of summons, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that all jurisdictional criteria are met. [Citations.] The burden must be met by competent evidence in affidavits and authenticated documents; an unverified complaint may not be considered as supplying the necessary facts.’ [Citation.]” (Brown v. Garcia (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1198, 1203; see also Sheard v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 211 [“[W]here a defendant properly moves to quash service of summons the burden is on the plaintiff to prove facts requisite to the effective service.”].)

“A defendant is under no duty to respond in any way to a defectively served summons. It makes no difference that defendant had actual knowledge of the action. Such knowledge does not dispense with statutory requirements for service of summons.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶ 4:414, p. 4-67 citing Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466 (Kappel) and Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808 (Ruttenberg)) “[N]otice does not substitute for proper service. Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant.” (Ruttenberg, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 808.) “[I]n California, ‘…the original service of process, which confers jurisdiction, must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void.”' (Id. at p. 809.)

If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.

“Statutes governing substitute service shall be ‘liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold jurisdiction if actual notice has been received by the defendant.... [Citation.]’ ” (Ellard v. Conway (1992) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.) “The liberal construction [of the statute], it is anticipated, will eliminate unnecessary, time-consuming, and costly disputes over legal technicalities, without prejudicing the right of defendants to proper notice of court proceedings.” (Pasadena Medi–Center Associates v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 773, 788.)

Here, Mapps contends that delivering the summons and complaint to his mother, Kenya Burks (“Burks”), was an improper attempt at service because Mapps did not live at the Irvine address or use it as his regular mailing place. Mapps asserts that there is no evidence that Burks was entitled to accept service on Mapps’ behalf.

When a defendant files a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that service of the summons and complaint was proper. (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.) In this case, Plaintiff asserts that she properly served Mapps at his current mailing address. Plaintiff asserts that multiple reliable skip traces were recently conducted that showed that Mapps receives his mail at the Irvine address. (Opp. Exhs. 1-2.) Further, Plaintiff asserts that the process server’s declaration of due diligence attached to the September 1, 2022 proof of service shows that while Burks stated that Mapps did not live at the address, she refused to state that he did not receive mail there. (Opp. Exh. 3.) Plaintiff’s evidence shows that she served the summons, complaint, and related documents on Burks at Mapps’ usual mailing address, which is sufficient to effectuate substituted service. (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal. App. 4th 540, 546.)

While Mapps challenges Plaintiff’s evidence, Mapps does not otherwise submit any competent evidence to show that the Irvine address was not his usual mailing address. For example, in support of the motion, Mapps submits a declaration from defense counsel which contains hearsay statements from Burks.

Based on the foregoing, Mapps’ motion is denied. Mapps is ordered to file a responsive pleading within 30 days.

Hon. Michelle C. Kim

Judge of the Superior Court