Judge Michelle C. Kim, Case 22STCV12667 2023-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Doreen Alexander (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Lyft, Inc. (“Lyft”) and Adrian Mauro (“Mauro”) for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on or about June 4, 2021. On August 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint naming Jasmine Wong Yumori as Doe 1.

At this time, Lyft moves to compel arbitration and stay the action. This matter was originally set for hearing for March 10, 2023, but was continued to April 10, 2023 pursuant to Plaintiff’s ex parte application to continue the hearing date. (Min. Order, March 9, 2023.) Any opposition and reply briefs were due as set forth in CCP § 1005, and the parties were ordered to meet and confer to see if an agreement could be reached regarding the motion. To date, no opposition has been filed, and the motion has not been taken off calendar.

Lyft provides that Plaintiff used the Lyft application platform to arrange a ride with Mauro and was a passenger in Mauro’s vehicle at the time of the accident. Lyft asserts that Plaintiff is required to arbitrate her claims against because Plaintiff accepted Lyft’s Terms of Service, including its arbitration clause, on four separate occasions before the accident alleged in the complaint. Lyft argues that Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

In deciding a petition to compel arbitration, trial courts must decide first whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties, and then determine the second gateway issue of whether the claims are covered within the scope of the agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) The opposing party has the burden to establish any defense to enforcement. (Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 579 (“The petitioner, T–Mobile here, bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and the opposing party, plaintiffs here, bears the burden of proving any fact necessary to its defense.”); Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 [“The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.”].)

In California, there is a “strong public policy in favor of arbitration.” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9.) Accordingly, “doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues are to be resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak St. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 323.) Further, “under both the FAA and California law, ‘arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ ” (Higgins v. Sup. Ct. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.) This policy, however, is tempered by the recognition that arbitration must be based on an enforceable contract, as “[t]here is no public policy favoring arbitration of disputes which the parties have not agreed to arbitrate.” (Engineers & Architects Assn. v. Community Development Dept. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 644, 653.)

Moreover, the right to arbitration depends upon contract, and “[t]here is no public policy favoring arbitration of disputes that the parties have not agreed to arbitrate.” (Lopez v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (2004) 118 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1229.) There is a “ ‘strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution.’ “ (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 8-9) However, it is essential to the proper operation of that policy that “ ‘[t]he scope of arbitration is ... a matter of agreement between the parties' [citation], and ‘ “[t]he powers of an arbitrator are limited and circumscribed by the agreement or stipulation of submission.” ‘ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) An agreement that the FAA governs the parties’ dispute is binding and enforceable, and thus, the parties’ agreement is to be read and interpreted under the FAA. (See Gloster v. Sonic Automotive, Inc. (2014) 2016 Cal.App.4th 438, 446-47.)

Here, Lyft provides that a user like cannot access the Lyft platform to request rides without first creating a Lyft user account via the Lyft app, which requires the user to accept Lyft’s Term of Service, including its arbitration clause. Lyft attests that a person cannot complete the account creation process or purchase rideshare services through the Lyft app unless the person agrees to Lyft’s Terms of Service. Lyft contends that Plaintiff accepted Lyft’s Terms of Service on multiple occasions. First, Plaintiff created a user account through the Lyft app and accepted Lyft’s Terms of Service on August 11, 2017. Second, when Lyft updated its Terms of Service on August 26, 2019, Plaintiff accepted Lyft’s August 26, 2019 Terms of Service on November 13, 2019. Third, Lyft updated its Terms of Service on December 9, 2020, which Plaintiff accepted and agreed to be bound by on January 13, 2021. Lastly, after the accident, Lyft updated its Terms of Service on December 12, 2022, which Lyft provides that Plaintiff accepted on January 10, 2023.

In moving to compel arbitration, Lyft asserts that the applicable Terms of Services are the December 9, 2020 Terms. Lyft asserts that Plaintiff was presented with the full text of those terms in her Lyft app, which directed Plaintiff to scroll through and read the entire Terms of Service. At the bottom of the screen, under the text of the Terms, she was presented with a button that she was required to click to demonstrate her consent and agreement to the Terms of Service. Plaintiff could not have used the Lyft app to request any rides without accepting the Terms by clicking the consent button.

Clickwrap agreements are those in which website users are required to click on an “I agree” box after being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use. (Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 763 F.3d 1171, 1175-76.) “Clickwrap agreements require a user to affirmatively click a box on the website acknowledging awareness of and agreement to the terms of service before he or she is allowed to proceed with further utilization of the website. [Citations omitted] Clickwrap agreements ‘have been routinely upheld by circuit and district courts…” (United States v. Drew (C.D. Cal. 2009) 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 [internal quotations omitted].)

In agreeing to the December 9, 2020 Terms Plaintiff had to click a button to demonstrate her agreement to the Terms. (Mot. Sniegowski Decl. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff could not have used Lyft’s app without accepting the Terms. (Id. at ¶ 15.) This evidence shows Plaintiff took affirmative actions demonstrating agreement with the December 9, 2020 Terms of Service, which contained an arbitration agreement. (See Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., supra, 2016 WL 6476934 at *5; see also Cordas v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2017) 228 F.Supp.3d 985, 988-990.) Accordingly, Lyft has shown the existence of an arbitration agreement consented to by Plaintiff.

YOU AND LYFT MUTUALLY AGREE TO WAIVE OUR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS TO RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES IN A COURT OF LAW BY A JUDGE OR JURY AND AGREE TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE BY ARBITRATION, …

Except as expressly provided below, ALL DISPUTES AND CLAIMS BETWEEN US (EACH A "CLAIM" AND COLLECTIVELY, "CLAIMS") SHALL BE EXCLUSIVELY RESOLVED BY BINDING ARBITRATION SOLELY BETWEEN YOU AND LYFT. These Claims include, but are not limited to, any dispute, claim or controversy, whether based on past, present, or future events, arising out of or relating to: … the Lyft Platform, the Rideshare Services, … All disputes concerning the arbitrability of a Claim (including disputes about the scope, applicability, enforceability, revocability or validity of the Arbitration Agreement) shall be decided by the arbitrator, …

The arbitration clause is broad and covers any dispute or claim relating to the Lyft platform or rideshare services. Furthermore, while courts often decide issues of “arbitrability,” the “'parties can agree to arbitrate “gateway” questions of “arbitrability,” such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.”' (Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 891, quoting Rent–A–Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 68-69.) The agreement is clear that all issues concerning the arbitrability of a claim are to be decided by the arbitrator, not the Court. Lyft establishes there is an enforceable agreement to arbitrate with Plaintiff.

The motion to compel arbitration is unopposed and granted. Because there is a risk of conflicting rulings, the case is stayed pending arbitration.

Hon. Michelle C. Kim

Judge of the Superior Court