SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).) 

B. Premises Liability  

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.)  Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)  If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition reasonably safe for their use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.)  

Here, L.A. Arena does not make any arguments regarding whether a dangerous condition existed. Whether or not a dangerous condition existed, L.A. Arena argues there is no evidence that any condition of the property caused a drunken patron to fall on Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff’s contention is purely speculative. “ ‘[C]ausation ... is ordinarily a question of fact which cannot be resolved by summary judgment. The issue of causation may be decided as a question of law only if, under undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Kurinji v. Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 853, 864.) Causation must be established by nonspeculative evidence. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 774; Montague v. AMN Healthcare, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1515, 1525, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 123 [“speculative inferences do not raise a triable issue of fact”].) Kaney v. Custance (2022) 74 Cal. App. 5th 201, 212, review denied (Apr. 27, 2022).  

The parties do not dispute the following facts. Plaintiff was watching a concert at the “Staples Center” (now known as “Crypo.com Arena”) when an overly intoxicated man suddenly fell on her. Plaintiff does not know why the unidentified man fell on her. The man who fell on Plaintiff provided no explanation as to why he fell. Indeed, "to demonstrate actual or legal causation, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's act or omission was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the injury." (Saelzler v. Advanced Grp. 400 (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 763, 774 (Saelzler).) Thus, L.A. Arena has met its prima facie burden that no condition caused the man to lose his balance and fall on Plaintiff.  

In opposition, Plaintiff primarily relies on her expert Avrit to support her contention that the subject area presented a substantial fall hazard for visitors based on the seating configuration. However, the Court finds that Plaintiff merely presents an abstract negligence claim pertaining to the seat design. The Court already sustained L.A. Arena’s objection to Avrit’s declaration on the grounds that he lacks foundation for his opinion. Avrit opines that the seats back-to-back measurement does not meet the 33-inch requirement in violation of the 1996 City of Los Angeles Building Code, because the rise between the rows was constructed at 24-1/8 inches. (Avrit Decl. ¶ 10.) Avrit’s declaration fails to provide any foundational support that the City of Los Angeles 1996 amendments “was in effect when the property was permitted for construction.” (Ibid.) No evidence or specific date was provided as to when the property was permitted for construction, when the property was built, or why this building code is even applicable beyond a broad unsupported statement. The copies of the 1994 edition and 1996 amendments to the Uniform Building Code highlight certain sections, yet there is no explanation tying its applicability to the subject property. Even if, in arguendo, the 1996 City of Los Angeles Building Code was applicable to the construction of Crypo.com Arena, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the seating height bore any causal connection to her injury even if a duty of care was breached. (Saelzler, 25 Cal. 4th 763 at 773.)  

In Saelzler, the California Supreme Court analyzed the issue of causation, and found Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. (1985) 168 Cal. App. 3d 912, Constance B. v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal. App. 3d 200, and Nola M. v. Univ. of S. California (1993) 16 Cal. App. 4th 421 to be particularly instructive. The California Supreme Court summarized the salient points of those cases as follows:  

 

“In Noble, the plaintiff was assaulted in a parking lot at Dodger Stadium and sued the stadium owner on the theory it failed to provide adequate security for its patrons. At trial, the plaintiff's expert witness opined that the owner should have employed more security guards to patrol the area, and the jury awarded the plaintiff substantial damages. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that “abstract negligence,” without proof of a causal connection between the defendant's breach and the plaintiff's injury, is insufficient to sustain the award. [Citation].” 

 

In Constance B., the plaintiff was assaulted at night in the restroom at a state highway rest area. The appellate court affirmed a grant of summary judgment in defendant state's favor, holding that the plaintiff, who saw her attacker watching her when she entered the restroom, failed to submit evidence showing that additional lighting would have prevented the attack. (Citation) The court observed that “If liability may be premised solely on this notion [that criminals are generally deterred by strong lighting], proprietors will become the insurers of the safety of persons on their premises, subject only to the caprice of particular juries. [Citation.]” (Citation) 

  

In Nola M., the plaintiff was raped on a college campus and sued the college on the theory it should have provided more campus security. On appeal from a judgment in the plaintiff's favor, the Nola M. court reversed. The court assumed for purposes of argument that the plaintiff had submitted sufficient evidence that the defendant breached a duty of care toward her, but concluded that she failed to prove the breach was a legal cause of the assault. (Citation.) The court observed that to demonstrate actual or legal causation, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's act or omission was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the injury. (Citations). Nola M. concluded that the plaintiff must do more than simply criticize, through the speculative testimony of supposed security “experts,” the extent and worth of the defendant's security measures, and instead must show the injury was actually caused by the failure to provide greater measures. (Citation.) The court observed that a different rule would “make the landowner the insurer of the absolute safety of everyone who enters the premises.” (Citation.)” 

 

(Saelzler, 25 Cal. 4th at 773–74.) 

 

Similarly, the Court finds that Plaintiff speculates that the seating caused the patron behind Plaintiff to fall on her. There is no evidence that any change to the seating arrangement would have prevented the unidentified intoxicated man from falling on Plaintiff, such that it would not cause her injury. To hold otherwise would essentially make L.A. Arena the insurer of the safety of all persons for any falls that occur at its stadium, especially in the absence of any evidence for the fall. Thus, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a triable issue of material fact that, “more probable than not,” a change in the seating measurement would have prevented the intoxicated patron from falling on her. (Saelzler at 776.) The mere possibility that it may have caused or contributed to the man falling is not enough to establish causation.  

 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, L.A. Arena Company, LLC’s motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff’s SAC is GRANTED.