SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

 

1. Background  

Plaintiffs Miracle Adkins by and through Guardian Ad Litem Delorise Polk, and Paige Adkins by and through Guardian Ad Litem Delorise Polk (“Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendants Susan Hannaford (“Hannaford”), Marquessa Margolin (“Margolin”), Norma Parry, Palazzo Beverly Hills, LLC, Kennie D. Leggett, Juggalot Company LLC, and Rahkeim Crawford (collectively, “Defendants”) for wrongful death arising from a shootout on Defendants’ property.  

 

At this time, specially appearing Defendants Hannaford and Margolin move to quash service of the summons and complaint on Hannaford and Margolin. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, and Hannaford and Margolin filed a reply.    

 

2. Legal Standard  

“A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .”  (CCP § 418.10(a).)   

Filing a proof of service by a registered process server creates a rebuttable presumption that service was proper.  (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390; Evid. Code, § 647 [“The return of a process server registered pursuant to . . . the Business and Professions Code upon process or notice establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return”].)  However, the presumption only arises if the proof of service complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.  (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441-1442.)  Proof of service of summons may be impeached by evidence that contradicts it.  (City of Los Angeles v. Morgan (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 726, 731.)  When a defendant moves to quash service of summons, the plaintiff has “the burden of proving the facts that did give the court jurisdiction, that is the facts requisite to an effective service.”  (Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 866, 868.) 

Personal service may be accomplished by personally delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the person to be served.  (Code of Civ. Proc., § 415.10.)  If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person being served, substitute service may be effected by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s “dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address . . . in the presence of . . . a person apparently in charge . . . and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail . . . to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.”  (Code of Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b).)  Reasonable diligence is typically satisfied where there are “two or three attempts to personally serve a defendant at a proper place” (Espindola v. Nunez (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1389, 1392), or there are a “number of honest attempts to learn defendant’s whereabouts or his address by inquiry” and use of public records (Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Ham (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 330, 337).   

Substitute service is a secondary method of service (Evartt v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 795, 799) and in order to obtain personal jurisdiction through any form of constructive service, there must be strict compliance with statutory requirements (Stamps v. Superior Court (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 108, 110).  “To be constitutionally sound, the form of substituted service must be ‘reasonably calculated to give an interested party actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard . . . in order that the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice implicit in due process are satisfied.’  [Citation.]”  (Zirbes v. Stratton (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1416.) 

“A defendant is under no duty to respond in any way to a defectively served summons. It makes no difference that defendant had actual knowledge of the action. Such knowledge does not dispense with statutory requirements for service of summons.”  (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶4:414, p. 4-67 citing Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466 (Kappel) and Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808 (Ruttenberg)) “[N]otice does not substitute for proper service. Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant.”  (Ruttenberg, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 808.)  “[I]n California, ‘…the original service of process, which confers jurisdiction, must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void.”'  (Id. at p. 809.) 

 

3. Discussion   

Here, Hannaford and Margolin contend that process server’s declaration of due diligence and accompanying declaration of mailing are fraudulent, and the proof of services falsified.  

More specifically, for Hannaford, the proof of service indicates that Hannaford was served at 848 N. Rainbow Blvd #2778, Las Vegas, NV 89107 by substituted service, with the documents served upon a “John Doe Clerk of the Mail Link.” George Sano of GSI purportedly mailed the summons and complaint, and other related documents, to 848 N. Rainbow Blvd #2778, Las Vegas, NV 89107. Hannaford contends that this fails to comply with Cal. Civil Code 415.20(b), in which if a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, then the summons may be served by leaving a copy at the person’s dwelling, usual place of abode, place of business, or usual mailing address. Hannaford declares that no documents had ever been mailed to her, that the address is not Hannaford’s usual mailing address, and there has never been a “John Doe” authorized to accept service on her behalf.  

As for Margolin, Pradip Kissoondyal (“Kissoondyal”) of GSI purportedly served Margolin by substituted service at 865 Comstock Ave., Apt 6b, Los Angeles, CA 90024, with the documents served upon “Jorge Torres Building Security Authorized To Accept Service.” Kissoondyal’s declaration of due diligence provides that “Andre called the subject. She was informed of the nature of the documents and she asked him to accept the papers.” Margolin contends that the only building security guard is located at the contractor’s service entrance on Wilshire Blvd., not on 865 Comstock Ave. Furthermore, Margolin avers that there has never been a security guard named “Andre,” and instead the security guard’s name is Eric. Furthermore, Margolin contends that no person named “Andre” called her to inform her of the documents, that doormen do not have the ability to make outbound telephone calls, and that the internal building phone system connecting the units to the doorman in the lobby was dismantled over two years ago. Margolin avers that she was at the Wynn Hotel in Las Vegas at the date and time of the alleged call, and having dinner with family. Margolin contends that aside from not being in California at time of Kissoondyal’s alleged service, she never spoke to any person about service of documents at any time. Furthermore, Margolin contends that there has never been a security guard by the name of “Jorge Torres” at 865 Comstock Ave.  

Hannaford and Margolin sufficiently rebut the presumption that service was proper. Therefore, the burden is on Plaintiff to prove facts requisite to effective service.  

Firstly, Plaintiffs contend that they were not served with the notice and motion to quash. However, the Court notes that the specially appearing Defendants filed a proof of service indicating that the notice of motion and motion to quash was served upon Plaintiffs’ counsel on July 27, 2023 by electronic service and by personal service.  

Secondly, Plaintiffs contend they completed service of summons on Hannaford and Margolin by substituted service. However, as authoritatively cited by Plaintiffs, reasonable attempts at personal service must first be made prior to substituted service. There is no evidence that any attempts were made to personally serve Hannaford prior to resorting to substituted service. Furthermore, Plaintiffs only conclusory argue that 865 Comstock Ave, Apt 6b, Los Angeles, CA 90024 was Margolin’s last known mailing address and that substituted service was proper, and that Plaintiffs obtained Hannaford’s last known address through Mail Link. This is insufficient to demonstrate a “number of honest attempts to learn defendant’s whereabouts or his address by inquiry” and use of public records. (Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Ham (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 330, 337). Moreover, Plaintiffs also do not directly address specially appearing defendants’ contention that the proof of services were fraudulent, or provide any competent evidence in affidavits or authenticated documents that service was proper to meet their burden. 

Lastly, Plaintiffs’ contention that the Court should deny the motion to quash because Hannaford and Margolin’s have actual notice of the summons and complaint, regardless of any procedural defects, is not well-taken. Defendants’ knowledge of the action does not dispense with statutory requirements for service of summons.  (Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466.) “‘Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.’ [Citation.]”  (AO Alfa-Bank v. Yakovlev (2018) 21¿Cal.App.5th 189, 202.)  “To establish personal jurisdiction, compliance with statutory procedures for service of process is essential.”  (Kremerman v. White (2021). 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 371.)   

 

Based on the foregoing, the motion to quash is GRANTED.  

 

Moving parties are ordered to give notice.