SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

 

I. Background 

Plaintiff Donna Lopez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Kathy Tepa, Julie Anne Miranda (“Julie”), and Does 1-25 for damages arising from an automobile incident.  Trial is currently set for March 6, 2024.  On August 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint naming Rachel Anne Miranda (“Miranda”) as Doe 1.   

Miranda now moves for an order dismissing the Amendment to Complaint pursuant to CCP § 474 and 581(m). Plaintiff opposes the motion.  

  

II. Motion for an Order Dismissing Amendment to Complaint  

CCP §474 provides:  “When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, or the affidavit if the action is commenced by affidavit, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly…”   

In order to be a proper DOE amendment, the plaintiff must have been genuinely ignorant of the DOE defendant’s identity at the time the complaint was filed.  (Woo v. Supr. Ct. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176 (citing Optical Surplus, Inc. v. Supr. Ct. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 776, 783-784).) The “relevant inquiry when the plaintiff seeks to substitute a real defendant for one sued fictitiously is what facts the plaintiff actually knew at the time the original complaint was filed.”  (Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1170.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 474 is to be liberally construed.”  (Ibid.) 

Moreover, "if the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the defendant's identity, the section 474 relation-back doctrine applies even if that ignorance is the result of plaintiff's negligence." (Woo, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at 177.) While reasonable diligence may be material to the determination of the accrual of a cause of action, it is irrelevant to the determination of whether a DOE amendment is timely. (Dover v. Sadowinski (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 113, 116 ["there is no requirement placed upon a plaintiff to exercise reasonable diligence prior to filing the complaint to discover the defendant's identity or the facts giving him a cause of action against defendant"].)   

Upon compliance with applicable procedural requirements, a CCP § 474 amendment identifying a person or entity as a “Doe” defendant “relates back” to the commencement of the action for statute of limitations purposes.  (See Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co. (1977) 18 Cal.3d 932, 935.)  Designating a defendant by a fictitious name is proper only if plaintiff alleges in the complaint that he or she is “ignorant of the name of a defendant.”  (CCP §474.)  A plaintiff's requisite “ignorance” of the defendant's name has been expansively interpreted to mean either plaintiff was unaware of defendant's identity; plaintiff was unaware of defendant's culpability (facts giving rise to a cause of action against the defendant); or the law did not give plaintiff a right of action until after commencement of the action.  (See Marasco v. Wadsworth (1978) 21 Cal.3d 82, 88; Snoke v. Bolen (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1427, 1431.) 

“Ignorance of the facts giving rise to a cause of action is the ‘ignorance’ required by section 474, and the pivotal question is, ‘did plaintiff know facts?’ not ‘did plaintiff know or believe that he had a cause of action based on those facts?’  Although it is true that a plaintiff's ignorance of the defendant's name must be genuine (in good faith) and not feigned and that a plaintiff need not be aware of each and every detail concerning a person's involvement before the plaintiff loses his ignorance, it is equally true that the plaintiff does not relinquish his rights under section 474 simply because he has a suspicion of wrongdoing arising from one or more facts he does know.”  (McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 368, 372 (trust beneficiary should have known that he had cause of action against law firm for mismanagement of trust where undisputed evidence established that trustee used law firm’s address and firm letterhead for years when conducting trust’s business).)  “If the identity of the Doe defendant is known but, at the time of the filing of the complaint the plaintiff did not know facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that liability is probable, the requirements of section 474 are met.”  Id. at 374 (quoting Marasco v. Wadsworth (1978) 21 Cal.3d 82).    

It is Miranda’s burden on this motion to prove that Plaintiff knew of her identity, and the facts giving rise to Miranda’s liability when Plaintiff filed her complaint.  (See Fuller, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at 1173; see Banke and Segal (Rutter Group 2020 Update) Cal. Prac. Guide:  CPBT Statute of Limitations, ¶8:106.)  Miranda argues Plaintiff knew of her identity because Plaintiff could have obtained a copy of the Traffic Collision report earlier, and that Miranda stated to Plaintiff and law enforcement at the time of the incident that she was not the owner of the vehicle. This is insufficient to meet Miranda’s burden demonstrating Plaintiff knew of her identity at the time Plaintiff filed her complaint. 

Plaintiff argues she was under the mistaken belief that Rachel Anne Miranda, the driver of the vehicle, was the same person as Defendant Julie Anne Miranda, the owner of the vehicle, because they shared the same middle and last name. Up until receipt of discovery responses on June 8, 2023 with the Traffic Collision Report, Plaintiff was under the mistaken belief that Defendant Julie Anne Miranda had operated the motor vehicle in the underlying incident. Further, Plaintiff avers she testified at her deposition that she is unable to read and has a learning disability impacting her reading and writing. Even if Miranda stated she was not the owner of the vehicle at the time of the incident, Plaintiff contends she was not capable of taking down this information because of her inability to read or write. Further, Plaintiff disputes that she had any conversation with Miranda at the scene of the collision. Section 474 does not impose an onerous standard upon Plaintiff or duty for a Plaintiff exercise reasonable diligence to obtain facts that she “should have known.” (Hahn v. New York Air Brake LLC at 900.) The test is simply whether “the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action” without regard as to whether there was a subjective understanding of the facts’ legal significance. (Ibid.) 

Miranda relies on Barrows v. Am. Motors Corp. (1983) 144 Cal. App. 3d 1 asserting that Plaintiff was aware of the identity of the Doe defendant and unreasonably delayed in filing an amendment to complaint. However, as stated above, Miranda has not met her burden demonstrating Plaintiff was actually aware of her identity. Further, the Court finds Plaintiff did not unreasonably delay in substituting Miranda as a Doe defendant. Plaintiff discovered the true name of Miranda as the driver of the vehicle on June 8, 2023, and filed an amendment to complaint naming Miranda as Doe 1 within two months of discovery on August 9, 2023. Here, the Court finds Plaintiff was genuinely ignorant of Miranda’s identity at the time the complaint was filed. Regardless of whether Plaintiff could have obtained the Traffic Collision Report pre-lawsuit and discovered the facts earlier is not relevant. Ignorance of the fact is not based on what could have been discovered, but what was actually known at the time of the filing of the complaint. “Ignorance of the facts is the critical issue, and whether it be due to misinformation or negligence is not relevant.”  (Dover, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at 116.) The only requirement is that the ignorance be “real and not feigned.” (Ibid.)   

 

Based on the foregoing, Miranda’s motion dismissing the Amendment to Complaint naming her as Doe 1 is DENIED.  

 

Moving Defendant is ordered to give notice.   

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

Dated this 29th day of November 2023