Judge Michelle C. Kim, Case 22STCV32717 2023-05-23 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Stephanie Blanks (“Plaintiff”) sued defendants Donatello Stone Design Inc. (“DSD”), Wilmer Rolando Cruz Lopez (“Lopez”), and Babken Ovsepian for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident, specifically when she collided with a Ford F250 carrying concrete. She alleges negligence, negligent entrustment, and negligent hiring, retention, or supervision.

On January 26, 2023, Plaintiff moved the court for leave to amend to add punitive damages allegations. On March 17, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. The same day, Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint.

Defendants DSD and Lopez (collectively, “Defendants”) now demur to the second and third causes of action because they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute actions for punitive damages against DSD. Additionally, they move to strike allegations related to punitive damages, paragraphs 16-22, 35, 43, and paragraph 8 of the prayer, because Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts upon which punitive damages may be awarded against Defendants.

Defendants argue that the allegations of the First Amended Complaint, the gravamen of which is that DSD allowed an unlicensed driver to operate a vehicle, do not support a claim for punitive damages. Defendants contend that the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") is devoid of the particularity required to support a claim for punitive damages. Defendants also argue that corporate punitive damages liability is limited to those employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment over decisions that determine corporate policy, and that Plaintiff does not allege facts that specific management level personnel acted in a way that would support a claim for punitive damages.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that she alleges that DSD had direct knowledge that Lopez was not fit to operate a motor vehicle and that DSD made the conscious and intentional decision to have an unlicensed driver operate its Ford 250 for business purposes, placing its needs over the safety and the welfare of the public. Further, Plaintiff argues that she need not allege that an employee exercised substantial authority and judgment over decisions that determine corporate policy to hold a corporate employer liable.

In reply, Defendants contend that there are no allegations that DSD knew or should have known that Lopez was unfit to drive the subject vehicle such that DSD was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of allowing Lopez to drive. Defendants also contend that there are no specific allegations about the conscious and deliberate disregard of the safety of others or of fraudulent representations by DSD. In addition, Defendants contend that there are no specific facts of any despicable conduct that subject Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights.

Further, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not allege that DSD had advanced knowledge of the unfitness of Lopez, that DSD employed him with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, that DSD authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded, or that such conduct was on the part of an officer, director or managing agent.

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Pro., § 430.41(a).)

The court finds Defendant has fulfilled this requirement prior to filing its demurrer. (Demurrer Klein Decl. ¶ 3.)

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer, or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

A demurrer is not the appropriate vehicle to challenge a portion of a cause of action demanding an improper remedy. (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047 (“a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.”)

Because Defendants demurred to challenge the punitive damages allegations, the Court overrules their demurrer.

Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion to strike. (Code Civ. Pro., § 435.5(a).)

The court finds Defendant has fulfilled this requirement prior to filing its demurrer. (Motion to Strike Klein Decl. ¶ 3.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)

California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice ....” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., § 3294(c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., § 3294(c)(2).) “‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id., § 3294(c)(3).)

Punitive damages thus require more than the mere commission of a tort. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or “malice,” or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95.) The statutory definition of “malice” does not require an actual intent to harm to support an award of punitive damages, but instead a conscious disregard for the safety of others may be sufficient, where defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct, and he or she willfully failed to avoid the consequences. (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1299.) Specific facts must be pleaded in support of punitive damages. (See Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-92.)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff pleaded insufficient facts to support Plaintiff’s prima facie claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff alleges general statements that DSD acted willfully, recklessly, dangerously, and wantonly. (FAC ¶ 22.) Plaintiff also alleges that DSD knew that Lopez lacked a license to operate a motor vehicle and yet entrusted him with its vehicles, making a “conscious and calculated” decision that placed the needs of DSD over the safety and welfare of the public. (FAC ¶ 19.) Plaintiff further alleges that DSD knew that Lopez was never trained on how to operate the Ford F250, including how to operate a Ford F250 carrying concrete and other materials. (FAC ¶ 20.) However, Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to show that Defendant willfully failed to avoid the consequences of its actions. Specific facts must be pleaded in support of punitive damages, and Plaintiff’s pleading does not meet the standard required to establish that Defendant acted with malice and a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege punitive damages, the issue of corporate employer liability for punitive damages is moot.

Hon. Michelle C. Kim

Judge of the Superior Court