I. BACKGROUND 

On January 5, 2023, plaintiff Brandon Linares-Jaramillo (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Raul Sanchez Ortiz, Maria Gonzalez de Sanchez, Raul Sanchez, Jr. (Doe 1), and Does 2 to 10 for injuries arising from a December 4, 2021 motor vehicle collision.  

On January 30, 2023, defendants Ortiz, Gonzalez de Sanchez, and Raul Sanchez, Jr. (Doe 1) (collectively, “Defendants”) filed their Answer to the complaint. Defendants simultaneously filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff and Roes 1-25 for (1) declaratory relief, (3) apportionment of fault, and (3) implied indemnity.  

The Trial date is currently set for July 5, 2024.  

On April 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that each cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action against him, and that the relief includes a prayer for attorney’s fees. Defendants oppose the motion, and Plaintiff filed a reply. 

Plaintiff argues that the incident involves a two-car collision between Plaintiff and the vehicle driven by Raul Sanchez, Jr. Plaintiff argues the cross-complaint is inappropriate because, to be proper, the claims must be brought against a third party, and Defendants have already pled comparative negligence as an affirmative defense in their Answer.  

Plaintiff asserts the parties met and conferred, and that on April 3, 2024, defense counsel agreed to stipulate to withdraw the second cause of action for apportionment of fault only. Plaintiff argues the claim for implied indemnity must also be dismissed because Plaintiff is not a joint tortfeasor for this cause of action to apply. Plaintiff further contends that the cause of action for declaratory relief is improper because it does not seek any declaratory relief beyond opposing the allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint.  

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motion does not identify with legal support the basis of the claims, and that Defendants had asserted a negligence claim against Plaintiff by alleging that the incident was caused by Plaintiff. Defendants further contend that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer because no specific legal support was given for the motion aside from “hornbook law.” Defendants request leave to amend should the Court be inclined to grant the motion, and requests the motion be denied on procedural grounds.  

Plaintiff contends the opposition is devoid of any argument or authority, and that the cross-complaint would have no function if Plaintiff dismissed his complaint since all the allegations contained in the cross-complaint is contained in the Answer. Further, Plaintiff avers there has been over a year of repeated inquiries and discussions regarding the cross-complaint, and that Plaintiff will be prejudiced by having to defend against a harassing cross-complaint.  

II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 

“Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (CCP § 439(a).) 

Plaintiff avers his counsel attempted to meet and confer from March 6, 2023 and March 16, 2023, and also March 7, 2024 to April 5, 2024. (Marandjian ¶ 6.) The Court finds that the meet and confer requirement has been met. In terms of Defendants’ contention that it had not been met, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to grant or deny a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (CCP § 439(a)(4).) 

III. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 

A party may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.”  (C.C.P. §438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).) 

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 [Citations].)  The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322, citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)   

CCP § 428.10 states: 

“A party against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint or cross-complaint may file a cross-complaint setting forth either or both of the following: 

 “A cross-complaint is generally considered to be a separate action from that initiated by the complaint.” (Ohio Cas. Ins. Grp. v. Superior Ct. (1994) 30 Cal. App. 4th 444, 448–49.) Cross-actions “are still distinct and independent causes of action, so that when properly interposed and stated the defendant becomes in respect to the matters pleaded by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions pending between the same parties wherein each is at the same time both a plaintiff and a defendant.’ [Citations].” (Bertero v. Nat'l Gen. Corp. (1974) 13 Cal. 3d 43, 51–52.) “Dismissal of the complaint, for instance, does not affect the independent existence of the cross-complaint or counterclaim. [Citation].” (Id. at 52.) 

Because a cross-complaint is an independent action that is completely severable from the issues raised by the original complaint and answer, the Court’s review is limited to the face of the cross-complaint, and any matters it may incorporate, to evaluate whether it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Plaintiff. Here, the cross-complaint alleges that Plaintiff was injured on December 3, 2021 in civil action entitled 23STCV00235 entitled Linares-Jaramillo v. Sanchez Ortiz, et al. that was filed on January 5, 2023. (Cross-Complaint at ¶¶ 3-4.) The cross-complaint incorporates Plaintiff’s Complaint by reference and alleges that the incident and all injuries complained of were caused directly and proximately by cross-defendants, such that if Plaintiff was entitled to recover on the basis of the allegations alleged, then cross-defendants are entitled to recover against cross-defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.) 

The Court agrees that, on its face, the cross-complaint fails to state sufficient facts against Plaintiff. Defendants argue they are asserting a negligence claim against Plaintiff. However, there was no negligence cause of action brought against Plaintiff, in which the cross-complainants must plead that cross-defendants had breached a duty which caused cross-complainants damages. Rather, here the cross-complaint seeks declaratory relief, apportionment of fault, and implied indemnity in direct cross-reference Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendants negligently drove, owned, entrusted, and operated their motor vehicle as to collide it with Plaintiff’s vehicle and person, causing Plaintiff injury. On its face, the first cause of action seeking judicial determination and declaration as to the rights and duties of Defendants with respect to the damages claimed by Plaintiff, to avoid filing a separate action against Plaintiff for indemnification of sums Defendants may be compelled to pay to Plaintiff, makes no logical sense. The second cause of action seeking Plaintiff to pay Defendants an amount equal to the percentage of any judgment or verdict attributed to Plaintiff’s own fault should Defendants be obliged to pay Plaintiff also does not sound in logic. The third cause of action for indemnity seeking indemnity from Plaintiff if Defendants are held liable for Plaintiff’s own action against them, for the same reasons as above, is nonsensical on its face.  

A cross-complaint in an action must be as distinct and separate from the answer therein as any other independent pleading in the cause, and each must rest on its own merits. (Harrison v. McCormick, 9 P. 114, 114 (Cal. 1885), affirmed Harrison v. McCormick (1886) 69 Cal. 616.) A cross-complaint must allege, not only all the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action, but also all facts essential to show that the demand is a proper subject for cross-complaint. (Imperial Water Co. No. 4 v. Meserve (1923) 62 Cal. App. 593, 598.) As previously stated, the allegations contained in the cross-complaint are entirely reliant on the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants. (Dunham v. McDonald (1917) 34 Cal. App. 744, 749 [Allegations of cross-complaint are not to be helped out by allegations or admissions contained in main pleadings.].) If Plaintiff were to dismiss his action, Defendants’ cross-complaint would effectively be extinguished because it fails to state any cause of action against Plaintiff that would independently be able to stand on its own right.   

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The burden is on Defendants as the Cross-Complainants to show in what manner they can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.)  

Defendants’ opposition appears to contend that they are seeking to allege a negligence cause of action against Plaintiff. Therefore, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted with leave to amend. Defendants are granted ten (10) days leave to amend. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.   

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

Dated this 1st day of May 2024