Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

Department 78 

¿ 

 

I. BACKGROUND 

On February 9, 2023, plaintiff Joyce Hopson (“Plaintiff”) filed this lemon law action against defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, et al. alleging that she purchased a certified pre-owned 2016 Land Rover Discovery from Hornburg Jaguar Land Rover in Santa Monica, California. The purchase came with the remaining time/mileage balances of Jaguar Land Rover’s warranties along with additional warranties from its status as a certified pre-owned vehicle. The vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff with serious defects with the vehicle’s acceleration, coolant, lights, transmission, ECO stop start mode, brakes, gear shift, and other nonconformities. After Land Rover Encino could not repair the vehicle, defendants failed to repurchase or replace the vehicle. 

On May 12, 2024, defendants Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC and Terry York Motor Cars LTD. d/b/a Land Rover Woodland Hills f/d/b/a Land Rover Encino (collectively, “Defendants”) filed their Answer to the complaint. 

On February 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement. 

On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorney fees and costs. 

On August 2, 2024, Defendants filed their opposition. 

On August 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. 

 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Attorneys’ fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).)  In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act. (See Civ. Code, § 1794(d).)  

 

Section 1794 provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794.) 

Thus, the statute includes a “reasonable attorney’s fees” standard.  The attorney bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” (Ibid.) 

A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) “In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) The Court has discretion to reduce fees that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395.) 

In determining a reasonable attorney fee, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.)  The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Ibid.) These facts include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ibid.) 

 

III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff moves for an award of attorney fees in the amount of $36,411.50, in addition to $2,569.09 in costs as the prevailing party in this action. Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable amount in attorney fees. 

A. Reasonableness of Fees 

i. Reasonable Hourly Rate 

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [her] court.” (Ibid.) 

Plaintiffs seek to recover attorneys’ fees for four different attorneys who worked on the case. Their hourly rates are as follows: 

(1) Michael Saeedian: $695/hr; (2) Adina Ostoia: $695/hr; (3) Christopher Urner: $525/hr; and (4) Jorge Acosta: $350/hr and $250/hr (law clerk). For each attorney, Mr. Saeedian attests to their legal experience and the reasonableness of their rates. (Saeedian Decl. ¶¶ 2-6.) 

Defendants argue the billing rates for Mr. Saeedian and Ms. Ostoia at $695.00 per hour, and the rate for Mr. Urner at $525.00 per hour, are unreasonable. Defendants aver this is especially so in light of the amount of work these attorneys performed for a straightforward and uneventful lemon law case, in which no depositions or expert designations had occurred for this action that settled about a year after its filing. 

The Court agrees and finds the rates to be excessive. Mr. Saeedian’s declaration provides that his firm has accepted lemon law cases since 2022, but he does not explain how long he has been working in the field of lemon law, nor any other reason to justify a high $695.00 per hour rate. Further, Mr. Saeedian provides that Ms. Ostoia joined his firm in November 2023 as a trial attorney, but does not provide how long she has been in the practice of lemon law or her position in the firm to justify billing $695.00 an hour for contingency work. Either way, the Court finds the rate of $695.00 for both Mr. Saeedian and Ms. Ostoia, in and of itself, to be excessive for the relevant legal community. (See 569 E. Cnty. Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 436–437 [“The courts repeatedly have stated that the trial court is in the best position to value the services rendered by the attorneys in his or her courtroom [citation], and this includes the determination of the hourly rate that will be used in the lodestar calculus. [Citation.]”]) As for Mr. Urner, Mr. Saeedian declares he joined the firm in May 2022 as a managing attorney, and has been involved in 10+ lemon law trials. The Court finds the rate of $525.00 per hour for a non-partner to be excessive.  

Accordingly, the rates will be reduced as follows. Mr. Saeedian’s hourly rate is reduced to $525.00; Ms. Ostoia’s hourly rate is reduced to $450.00; and lastly, Mr. Urner’s hourly rate is reduced to $425.00. 

  ii. Reasonable Hours Incurred 

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) 

Plaintiffs seek to recover attorneys’ fees for 75.1 hours spent litigating this matter: Mr. Saeedian for 28.2 hours, Ms. Ostoia for 4 hours, Mr. Turner for 14.8 hours, and Mr. Acosta for 7 hours as an attorney and for 21.1 hours as a law clerk. A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) Defendants argue that the bills should be reduced by one half because Plaintiff’s counsel has years of lemon law experience, and that no more than a few hours of time should be reasonable. The Court disagrees. The Court has reviewed the billing entries and does not find any particular entry to be duplicative, nor is there any compelling reason to reduce the amount of time billed by one half or by three quarters as argued. The Court already reducing the billing rates as provided above. For the same reasons, the Court will not cut Plaintiff’s estimated time to bring the instant motion, review the opposition, draft a reply, and to attend the hearing. 

B. Costs 

Allowable costs “shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) Any items not specifically mentioned by statute “may be allowed or denied in the court's discretion.” (Id., subd. (c)(4).) The Beverly-Song Act allows a successful plaintiff to recover both “costs” and “expenses.” (See Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) 

'“If the items appear to be proper charges the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the defendant [citations], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting party].' [Citation.]” (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)   

Plaintiff requests a total of $2,569.09 in costs and expenses. The cost items appear to be proper. Defendants did not challenge the costs. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ request for $2,569.09 in costs is granted. 

 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff is awarded the reduced amount of $30,620.00 in attorneys’ fees, and costs in the amount of $2,569.09. 

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice. 

 

DATED: August 14, 2024 

__________________________ 

Hon. Michelle C. Kim 

Judge of the Superior Court 

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

• Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. 

• If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting. 

• Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. 

• If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.