I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Olegaria Canuz Ruiz De Gomez (“Plaintiff”) filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“LACMTA”), Doe Manufacturer, and Does 1 through 20 for injuries arising from a trip and fall on a bus ramp, which allegedly began to lift as she was standing on it. The FAC sets forth four causes of action for (1) negligence against all defendants, (2) premises liability against LACMTA and Does 1 through 10, (3) common carrier liability against LACMTA and Does 1 through 10, and (4) strict liability against Doe Manufacturer and Does 11 through 20.  

LACMTA moves to strike paragraph 2, lines 4-9 of the FAC, which alleges that each and every defendant were negligent in the selection and hiring of each and every other defendant as an agent and employee, and ratified the acts, omissions, and representations of each and every remaining codefendant and their employees. Plaintiff opposes the motion, and LACMTA filed a reply. 

LACMTA does not dispute the bus operator involved was acting within the course and scope of his employment with LACMTA. However, LACMTA asserts that the allegations for negligent hiring and selection should be stricken because no facts were alleged to support a negligent hiring and selection theory.  

Plaintiff argues that she has not brought a cause of action for negligent hiring and/or supervision, and that paragraph 2 of the FAC is the general legal principal of agency and ratification. Plaintiff argues the language in the first cause of action is consistent with CACI for the elements of a tort asserted against the principal, ratification, and scope of employment. Further, Plaintiff argues that California is a notice pleading state.  

LACMTA argues that there is no such thing as “common language” in the complaint, and that Plaintiff admits she has no intention of seeking a cause of action for negligent hiring.  

II. MOTION TO STRIKE 

Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).)  

The Court finds LACMTA has fulfilled this requirement. (Su Decl. ¶ 5.) 

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) 

Here, the language containing the allegation that each defendant “was negligent in the selection and hiring of each and every other defendant” is contained within the first cause of action for negligence. Plaintiff’s assertion that California is a notice pleading jurisdiction is incorrect. California is a fact pleading jurisdiction, not a notice pleading jurisdiction like the federal courts, such that merely putting an opposing party on notice is not sufficient. (Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 561; see Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 244, 250.) Further, Plaintiff refers to CACI 3701, 3710, 3720 in support of the language, though none of the referred jury instructions published by the Judicial council of California contain any elements with language of negligent selection and hiring.  

However, there is no basis to strike the entirety of lines 4-9 in the second paragraph of the first cause of action since the remaining language of ratification and agency is not improper on its face. Accordingly, LACMTA’s motion is granted in part as to the language “was negligent in the selection and hiring of each and every other defendant as an agent and employee” contained in lines 5-6 of paragraph 2.  

III. CONCLUSION 

The burden is on Plaintiff to show in what manner he or she can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.) Plaintiff concedes there is no intention to seek a negligent hiring or training claim.  

Therefore, LACMTA’s motion to strike is GRANTED in part as to only the portion “was negligent in the selection and hiring of each and every other defendant as an agent and employee” (FAC at 2:5-6), without leave to amend. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.   

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

Dated this 30th day of May 2024