I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Patrick Martin (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants California Cemetery and Funeral Services, LLC, Neptune Management Corp. and Does 1 through 100 alleging labor code violations arising from his employment with defendants. The complaint sets forth four causes of action for (1) recovery of unpaid overtime wages, (2) failure to provide meal periods, (3) failure to provide rest periods, and (4) unfair business practices pursuant to Bus. & Prof. Code §17200. 

On January 5, 2024, the Honorable Jill Feeney granted the motion to compel arbitration filed by defendants California Cemetery and Funeral Services, LLC and Neptune Management Corp. (collectively, “Defendants”). The case was ordered stayed pending binding arbitration of the entire action. (Min. Order, Jan. 5, 2024.) 

On August 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking to vacate the order compelling arbitration, lift the stay, and for sanctions against Defendants. 

On October 9, 2024, Defendants filed an opposition. 

On October 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

CCP, section 1281.98(a) provides:¿ 

“(1)¿In an employment or consumer arbitration that requires, either expressly or through application of state or federal law or the rules of the arbitration provider, that the drafting party pay certain fees and costs during the pendency of an arbitration proceeding, if the fees or costs required to continue the arbitration proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date, the drafting party is in material breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel the employee or consumer to proceed with that arbitration as a result of the material breach.¿ 

(2) The arbitration provider shall provide an invoice for any fees and costs required for the arbitration proceeding to continue to all of the parties to the arbitration. The invoice shall be provided in its entirety, shall state the full amount owed and the date that payment is due, and shall be sent to all parties by the same means on the same day. To avoid delay, absent an express provision in the arbitration agreement stating the number of days in which the parties to the arbitration must pay any required fees or costs, the arbitration provider shall issue all invoices to the parties as due upon receipt. Any extension of time for the due date shall be agreed upon by all parties.” 

¿Further, CCP, section 1281.98(b) provides in pertinent part the following: 

“If the drafting party materially breaches the arbitration agreement and is in default under subdivision (a), the employee or consumer may unilaterally elect to do any of the following:¿¿ 

(1) Withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction. If the employee or consumer withdraws the claim from arbitration and proceeds with an action in a court of appropriate jurisdiction, the statute of limitations with regard to all claims brought or that relate back to any claim brought in arbitration shall be tolled as of the date of the first filing of a claim in any court, arbitration forum, or other dispute resolution forum.” 

III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff contends that within thirty days of the Order requiring Plaintiff to submit to arbitration, Plaintiff filed a Demand for Arbitration with Judicial Arbitration and Mediations Services ("JAMS") and paid $400. Plaintiff contends that the Mutual Resolution Process Agreement (“MRPA”) Plaintiff signed on May 8, 2019 requires that the parties conduct arbitration pursuant to “the then-current Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedure of JAMS, which are currently available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-employment-arbitration.” The parties were unable to agree upon an arbitrator, Plaintiff avers that Defendants did not want to utilize JAMS as the arbitration service provider and refused to pay for the arbitration. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have materially breached the Arbitration Agreement pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.98. Further, Plaintiff contends he is entitled to attorney fees and costs for the breach pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.99(a), and for evidentiary sanctions that Defendants be prohibited from conducting any discovery. 

In opposition, Defendants argue the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") preempts Code Civ. Proc. §1281.97, and that even if section 1281.97 applied, that Defendants had no obligation under the MRPA to which section 1281.97 could apply, and that relief under that section is barred by waiver and estoppel. Defendants assert that the MRPA required Plaintiff to first submit an arbitration demand to Defendants and then engage in negotiation to select an arbitrator. However, Plaintiff’s counsel instead submitted the dispute to JAMS before submitting a demand to Defendants or negotiation the selection of an arbitrator in violation of the MRPA requirements. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s counsel stopped substantively engaging in negotiations while also continually reassuring Defendants’ counsel that the parties were still in negotiations. After the deadline payment for JAMS lapsed did Plaintiff change his position and file the instant motion. Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s counsel has filed similar motions on behalf of other clients asserting the same arguments. 

In reply, Plaintiff argues the MRPA does not prohibit Plaintiff from filing with an arbitration service provider while concurrently serving a demand for arbitration. Plaintiff contends he was free to select JAMS, and that it was up to the first filer to select an arbitration service provider. 

It is undisputed that the MRPA is the relevant agreement between the parties, since the previous court had compelled Plaintiff to arbitrate the claims pursuant to the MRPA. (Ruling, Jan. 5, 2024.) The MRPA provides, in pertinent part, the following: 

“Arbitration shall proceed before a single arbitrator. The Parties will work together to jointly select an arbitrator. If the Parties agree to a single arbitrator, then there is no need for the Judicial Arbitration and Mediations Services ("JAMS") to administer the arbitration. If they cannot agree on an arbitrator within thirty days of receiving the initial Demand, the Parties will select an arbitrator utilizing the Arbitration Rules discussed in Section VII. A party starts this Program by giving the other party notice in writing (the “Demand”). The Demand will include the nature of all claims, the facts upon which such claims are based and the relief or remedy sought. The party will send the Demand to the other party by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested. To avoid ambiguity, the Demand must be labeled "Demand for Arbitration" in a conspicuous place.” (MRPA, VI.)  

“Subject to the terms of this Agreement, the Parties agree that the rules governing the arbitration will be the then-current Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedure of JAMS, which are currently available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-employment-arbitration. If any of the Rules are inconsistent with this Program, the terms of this Program shall govern.” (MRPA, VII.) 

In interpreting a settlement agreement, the general rules of contract interpretation are applied.¿(Belasco v. Wells (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 409, 420.)¿“The goal of contractual interpretation is to determine and give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.”¿(Id.) The court must first consider the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract was formed. (Civ. Code, § 1636.)¿ This initial inquiry is confined to the writing alone.¿ (Id. § 1639.)¿ The “clear and explicit” meaning of the provisions, interpreted in their “ordinary and popular sense,” unless “used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage,” (Id. § 1644), controls the court’s interpretation.¿ (Id. § 1638; see Griffin Dewatering Corp. v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 172, 204 (plain language is an important principle of contract interpretation).)¿ Therefore, if the meaning a layperson would give the contract language is not ambiguous, the court applies that meaning. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 608.) 

Here, the plain language of the MRPA provides that the parties are to work together to jointly select an arbitrator and “if” the parties agree, then there is no need for JAMS to administer the arbitration. In other words, it appears that JAMS would only be involved in the event that the parties cannot agree to a single arbitrator. Additionally, the MRPA expressly provides that a party “starts this Program by giving the other party notice in writing.” “Program” is defined as the MRPA, and that the terms of the MRPA “shall govern” should any JAMS Rules be inconsistent with the MRPA. Thus, straightforward reading of the MRPA expressly lays out an order of process which was not followed. As Plaintiff concedes, he did not submit the Demand for Arbitration prior to submitting the claim to JAMS. There is no provision allowing any party to skip the steps outlined in the MRPA and to unilaterally select an arbitration service provider, nor may Plaintiff add rights and conditions not provided for in the agreement. Accordingly, the Court cannot find that Defendants materially breached the arbitration agreement. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion To Vacate the Order Compelling Arbitration and to Lift the Stay is DENIED.  

Moving Party is ordered to give notice. 

DATED: October 22, 2024 

__________________________ 

Hon. Michelle C. Kim 

Judge of the Superior Court 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

• Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement.