SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

 

1. Background 

Plaintiff Bryan Hong (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Mi Bang and Jennifer Chung (“Chung”) for injuries Plaintiff sustained arising from a motor vehicle incident in a parking lot.  

On June 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed proof of service of the summons and complaint on Chung alleging Chung was served via substitute service at an address located at 4726 Castle Rd, La Canada Flintridge, CA 91011 (the “Castle Road Address”), on May 26, 2023.  The documents were allegedly left with Defendant Mi Bang, a co-occupant.   

At this time, Chung moves to quash service of the summons and complaint.  Plaintiff opposes the motion, and Chung filed a reply.   

 

2. Motion to Quash Service of Summons  

“A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .”  (CCP § 418.10(a).)   

 

“ ‘On a motion to quash service of summons, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that all jurisdictional criteria are met. [Citations.] The burden must be met by competent evidence in affidavits and authenticated documents; an unverified complaint may not be considered as supplying the necessary facts.’ [Citation.]”  (Brown v. Garcia (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1198, 1203; see also Sheard v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 211 [“[W]here a defendant properly moves to quash service of summons the burden is on the plaintiff to prove facts requisite to the effective service.”].)   

“A defendant is under no duty to respond in any way to a defectively served summons. It makes no difference that defendant had actual knowledge of the action. Such knowledge does not dispense with statutory requirements for service of summons.”  (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶4:414, p. 4-67 citing Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466 (Kappel) and Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808 (Ruttenberg)) “[N]otice does not substitute for proper service. Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant.”  (Ruttenberg, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 808.)  “[I]n California, ‘…the original service of process, which confers jurisdiction, must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void.”'  (Id. at p. 809.) 

“The requirement of notice ‘is not satisfied by actual knowledge without notification conforming to the statutory requirements' [citation]; it is long-settled that methods of service are to be strictly construed and that a court does not acquire jurisdiction where personal service is relied upon but has not in fact taken place.”  (Kappel, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1466-67.)   

 

Regarding substitute service on a party, CCP § 415.20(b) provides: 

 

If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. 

 

Here, Chung contends that Plaintiff failed to serve her by an authorized method of service.  Chung asserts that she does not reside at the Castle Road Address, and that she has never resided at Defendant Mihwa Bang’s (sued as Mi Bang) Castle Road Address. Furthermore, Chung declares that since the automobile incident to the present date, she has only resided with her husband and three minor children; aside from Chung and her husband, there are no adults in her household who could receive service.  

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Chung was properly served by substitute service at the Castle Road Address because the vehicle registration title lists Chung’s address as the Castle Road Address. Plaintiff contends that Chung either falsified her residence on the vehicle title registration, or submitted a false declaration.  

In reply, Chung asserts that the address on the vehicle registration card is a mailing address, and not necessarily the residence of the title holder. Furthermore, Chung asserts that information listed on a vehicle registration is not necessarily the personal information of the vehicle’s owner. Additionally, Chung contends that she is need not disclose to Plaintiff her current address to show that she does not reside at the Castle Road Address. Chung has rebutted the presumption that service was improper, and therefore the burden is on Plaintiff to provide competent evidence that service was in fact proper. 

When a defendant files a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that service of the summons and complaint was proper.  (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.)  Plaintiff’s contention that the address listed on the DMV registration card must be Chung’s current residence does not meet his burden to show that the Castle Road Address was Chung’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address, as required under CCP § 415.20(b) at the time of service. The fact that the Castle Road Address is owned by defendant Bang is not sufficient to establish that substituted service there was proper on Chung at this address, and Plaintiff’s sole reliance on the address on the vehicle registration card is unpersuasive. Further, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence to suggest that Defendant Bang was authorized to accept service on behalf of Chung.  Finally, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence contradicting Chung’s declaration that she has never resided with Defendant Bang, or that she has never lived at the Castle Road Address.   

 

Therefore, defendant Chung’s motion to quash service of the summons and complaint is GRANTED.   

 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.