Judge Michelle C. Kim, Case Number: 23STCV12656, Date: 2024-01-11 Tentative Ruling

On June 2, 2023, Plaintiffs, Behrad Girakhoo and Bianca Ignacio, initiated this action against Defendants, M-4 Apartments, L.P. (“M-4”), 13119 Moorpark, L.P. (“13119 Moorpark”), Valley Meadow Investments, LLC (“Valley Meadow”), Larr Investments, L.P. (“Larr”), Roger D. Friedman, and Linda A. Friedman, for failure to remedy uninhabitable conditions due to water intrusions in Plaintiffs’ rental unit. On November 15, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants for the following causes of action:

(12) Violation of Section IX of the County of Los Angeles COVID-19 Tenant Protections
Resolution.

On December 5, 2023, M-4, 13119 Moorpark, Valley Meadow, and Larr (hereafter, “Defendants”) filed this Demurrer to the Ninth Cause of Action and concurrently filed this Motion to Strike the punitive damages allegations from the FAC.

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face. (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and also consider matters which may be judicially noticed. [Citation.]” (Mitchell v. California Department of Public Health (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1007; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 [“the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be”].) Allegations are to be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) In construing the allegations, the court is to give effect to specific factual allegations that may modify or limit inconsistent general or conclusory allegations. (Financial Corporation of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 769.)

A demurrer may be brought if insufficient facts are stated to support the cause of action asserted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Where the complaint contains substantial factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty will be overruled or plaintiff will be given leave to amend. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.)

Defense counsel has satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (Declaration of Bonni S. Mantovani, ¶¶ 4, 5.)

The FAC alleges as follows: On January 10, 2023, after experiencing rain fall, Plaintiffs observed several uninhabitable conditions at the property, including, but not limited to, water intrusions in the primary bathroom through the heated lamp fixture on the ceiling, water intrusions in the living room rising from the hardwood flooring. Plaintiffs reported the same to Defendants and requested that the conditions be abated. (FAC, ¶ 23.) Defendants’ property manager, Alexis Keefe, inspected the rental unit. However, nothing was done to remedy the water intrusions. (FAC, ¶¶ 24-25.) On January 21, 2023, Plaintiffs inquired from Defendants about when the conditions would be abated. (FAC, ¶ 26.) Defendants again inspected the rental unit two days later but did not schedule any repairs. (FAC, ¶ 28.) On February 24, 2023, Plaintiffs observed water intrusions spreading throughout the downstairs living area. Plaintiffs again reported the same to Defendants and requested abatement of the conditions. (FAC, ¶ 29.) In response, Ms. Keefe notified Plaintiffs that the roof of the property required replacement, but that no repairs would be done until April 2023 or May 2023. No repairs were scheduled to abate the conditions in Plaintiffs’ rental unit. (FAC, ¶ 30.) On February 25, 2023, concerned about the ongoing water intrusions and the lack of abatement, Plaintiffs wrote a letter to Defendants reporting the conditions and requesting abatement. Plaintiffs further explained that they were concerned about their 17-month-old infant slipping on puddles of unsanitary water collecting throughout the downstairs living area. (FAC, ¶ 32.) In response, Defendants merely provided Plaintiffs with a wet/dry vacuum. The conditions were not abated. (FAC, ¶ 33.) On the same date, Plaintiffs also submitted a complaint to the Los Angeles Housing Department (LAHD). (FAC, ¶ 54.) On February 27, 2023, Defendants notified Plaintiffs that they could not resolve the ongoing water intrusions and offered to compensate Plaintiffs with a rent reduction of $500 for March 2023 in exchange for Plaintiffs signing a non-disclosure agreement. Plaintiffs rejected the offer. (FAC, ¶¶ 34-35.) In response, on March 1, 2023, Defendants informed Plaintiffs that technicians would begin working on Plaintiffs’ rental unit on March 2, 2023. The technicians arrived and began removing hardwood flooring and parts of the drywall affected by the water intrusions. (FAC, ¶ 36.) On March 3, 2023, Defendants sent Plaintiffs a letter stating, “we would be happy to let you vacate your apartment without any penalty,” and offered $500.00 rent credit towards Plaintiffs’ relocation expenses. (FAC, ¶ 38.) On March 5 and 6, 2023, the technicians installed new drywall and measured the area where the hardwood flooring needed to be replaced. (FAC, ¶ 39.) Thereafter, Ms. Keefe later notified Plaintiffs on two occasions that the flooring technician had to postpone the flooring installation. On March 15, 2023, the LAHD inspected Plaintiffs’ rental unit pursuant to Plaintiffs’ complaint. (FAC, ¶ 55.) On March 20, 2023, due to Defendants’ continued failure to abate the conditions within Plaintiffs’ rental unit, Plaintiffs notified Defendants of their intent to vacate the unit by March 31, 2023. (FAC, ¶ 51.) On the same day, LAHD issued Defendants a Notice and Order to Comply for various code violations within Plaintiffs’ rental unit, including the failure to maintain habitable room(s) free from dampness and failure to maintain safe and sanitary floor covering. (FAC, ¶ 56.)

The FAC further alleges that Defendants abused their position as landlords and acted in an outrageous manner by, among other things, knowingly ignoring and refusing to abate a dangerous and unhealthy nuisance; maintaining Plaintiffs’ Rental Unit in an unsafe, unhealthy, uninhabitable and untenable conditions; refusing to repair the premises in the face of complaints by the Plaintiffs; constructively evicting Plaintiffs by failing to repair the damaged, cracked and deteriorated roof, ceilings, walls and floors; failing to repair ongoing water intrusions and/or leaks in the primary bathroom through the heated lamp fixture on the ceiling; failing to repair ongoing water intrusions and/or leaks in the living room coming up through the hardwood flooring; failing to maintain plumbing facilities in good working order and in conformity with applicable law; failing to repair exposed concrete floors; failing to repair lock on front entry door; failing to hire properly qualified, trained and/or certified to inspect, maintain, install and/or repair the plumbing issues at the Subject Property; continuing to charge rent, and accepting rent payments from Plaintiffs while having knowledge of the deficiencies; and failing to disclose and/or warn of the deficiencies to Plaintiffs despite knowing or should have knowing that these above-mentioned deficiencies existed and that these deficiencies posed a public safety and health hazard to Plaintiffs; engaging in unfair and unlawful business practices; and violating health and safety codes, ordinances, regulations, and other laws. (FAC, ¶ 138.)

The elements of an intention infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim are: (1) that defendant’s conduct was outrageous; (2) that defendant intended to cause plaintiff emotional distress, or that defendant acted with reckless disregard of the probability that plaintiff would suffer emotional distress, knowing that plaintiff was present when the conduct occurred; (3) that plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress, and (4) that defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s severe emotional distress. (CACI No. 1600; Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-51.) “It is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903-904.)

Defendants argue that the IIED claim fails because the FAC does not sufficiently plead outrageous conduct. The Court finds that the issue is a factual question not suitable for a demurrer. “[T]he availability of a remedy for breach of implied warranty of habitability does not preclude a tenant from suing his landlord for intentional infliction of mental distress if the landlord's acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress.” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 922.) This is a factual question that cannot be determined as a matter of law at the pleading stage. (Id. at pp. 911, 922.) As detailed above, Plaintiffs reported water intrusions into their rental unit and requested abatement multiple times. (FAC, ¶¶ 23, 29, 32.) Plaintiffs also pressed Defendants for abatement because the water intrusions presented safety and health hazards to their young child. Yet, despite making repeated reports and requests, Defendants had yet to remediate the conditions more than two months later. (FAC, ¶ 51.) Further, the LAHD issued Defendants a Notice and Order to Comply for various code violations within Plaintiffs’ rental unit, including the failure to maintain habitable room(s) free from dampness and failure to maintain safe and sanitary floor covering. (FAC, ¶ 56.) As a result, Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress. (FAC, ¶¶ 139, 140.) The Court cannot say as a matter of law that these allegations fail to describe outrageous conduct. Rather, at the pleading stage, the Court accepts these allegations as true. (Mitchell, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 1007.) The FAC states a claim for IIED.[1]

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a motion to strike the whole pleading or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1322(b).) On a motion to strike, the court may: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a)-(b); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

In ruling on a motion to strike punitive damages, “judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the elements set forth in the punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Per Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) Under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), “[a]n employer shall not be eligible for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”

“[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a corporation is based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by virtue of the fault of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees. But the law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the officers, directors, or managing agents.” (Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [cleaned up].)

Defendants move for an order striking punitive damages allegations in the FAC.[2] The Court finds the motion to strike is meritorious. First, Defendants are corporate entities. As such, to hold Defendants liable for punitive damages, the FAC must allege malice among corporate leaders such as the officers, directors, or managing agents. The FAC is devoid of any such allegations.

The motion to strike is GRANTED. Leave to amended is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiffs may seek leave to file an amended complaint if more facts are uncovered in discovery that would support punitive damages allegations against Defendants.

Defendants M-4 Apartments, L.P., 13119 Moorpark, L.P., Valley Meadow Investments, LLC, and Larr Investments, L.P are to file and serve their Answer to the FAC within 20 days of this order.

[1] Defendants also request judicial notice of the fact that Los Angeles had newsworthy amounts of rain during the month of January 2023. (Mot., p. 7:1.) As the request is irrelevant to the Court’s disposition of the Demurrer, the Court declines the request.

[2] The punitive damages allegations are alleged at:

(1) Paragraph 63, page 15, line 24 referring to "malicious means";

(2) Paragraphs 65-68 in their entirety;

(3) Paragraph 78 relating to punitive damages in the First Cause of Action;

(4) Paragraph 100 relating to punitive damages in Third Cause of Action;

(5) Paragraph 122 relating to punitive damages in Sixth Cause of Action;

(6) Paragraph 128 relating to punitive damages in Seventh Cause of Action;

(7) Paragraph 135 relating to punitive damages in the Eighth Cause of Action;

(8) Paragraph 141 relating to punitive damages in the Ninth Cause of Action;

(9) Paragraph 147 relating to punitive damages in the Tenth Cause of Action;

(10) Paragraph 154 relating to punitive damages in the Eleventh Cause of Action;

(11) The third paragraph in the prayer for exemplary and punitive damages.