I. Background 

Plaintiff Mina Han (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants John Doe and the County of Los Angeles (“County”) for damages arising from an automobile incident. The complaint sets forth a single cause of action for negligence, and includes a prayer for punitive damages.   

The County now moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages. As of February 21, 2024, no opposition was filed.  

II. Legal Standard 

Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).) 

Here, the County’s counsel sent a single correspondence to Plaintiff’s counsel, and filed the instant motion after receiving no response. Although the Court finds the County has fulfilled the requirements of this section. However, an insufficient meet and confer process is not grounds to grant or deny a motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a)(4).) Therefore, the Court will consider the motion the merits.  

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) 

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)  “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)  “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’  [Citation.]”  (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.) 

“As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests.  The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.”  (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) (emphasis added.)  The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”  (Ibid.)  Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.  Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’”  (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)  Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.”  (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.) 

Here, the County seeks to strike the Prayer for Relief, 6: “For punitive damages” from Plaintiff’s complaint. The complaint alleges, in relevant part, that the County supervised and entrusted the motor vehicle to John Doe (Compl. at ¶ 9), and that “On FEBRUARY 21, 2023, defendant JOHN DOE, and/or, negligently operated a certain automobile, UNDER THE INFLUENCE, (despicable conduct) and, as a proximate result of that negligent operation, collided with plaintiff's automobile.” (Id. at ¶ 11). A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)  Moreover, conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that defendant John Doe, driving under the influence, was despicable conduct is insufficient to rise to the level of conduct warranting punitive damages against the County. The Court agrees that the complaint fails to allege any facts that the County engaged in any conduct that constitutes malicious or oppressive conduct toward Plaintiff. 

Based on the foregoing, the motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages against the County is GRANTED.  

III. Leave to Amend 

The burden is on Plaintiff to show in what manner she can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading.¿ (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.)¿Because Plaintiff did not oppose the motion, Plaintiff necessarily fails to demonstrate in what manner she can amend the complaint.  

Therefore, the County’s motion to strike punitive damages against it is GRANTED without leave to amend. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.   

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

Dated this 4th day of March 2024