I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Armando Avalos (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Allied Universal Security Services Universal Protection Services LPP and White Memorial Medical Center (“WMMC”) for damages arising from security removing Plaintiff from the premises. The complaint sets forth four causes of action for (1) assault, (2) battery, (3) negligence, and (4) negligent hiring, retention, supervision and training.  

Defendant Allied Protection Service, LP dba Allied Universal Security Services Universal Protection Services LPP (“AUS”) moves to strike paragraphs 34 and 43 of the complaint, which alleges oppression, fraud, or malice to entitle punitive damages. Paragraph 24 is contained in the third cause of action, and paragraph 43 in the fourth cause of action.  

Plaintiff opposes the motion, and AUS filed a reply. 

II. MOTION TO STRIKE 

Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).)  

The Court finds AUS has fulfilled this requirement. (Egerer Decl. ¶ 4.) 

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) 

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)  “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]”  (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.) 

“As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests.  The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)  Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.” (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.) 

Here, the complaint alleges in relevant part that AUS is a corporation, and that each defendant is an agent, employee, and/or representative of each other defendant. (Compl. at ¶ 3, 6.) The complaint alleges the following. WMMC and AUS owns, manages, and/or operates the hospital and employed security for WMMC. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Security was called to remove Plaintiff from WMMC, and Does 26 through 50 (Individual Defendants) injured Plaintiff during the removal by hitting, punching, grabbing, pushing, and slamming Plaintiff, causing him to fall to the ground. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 11, 22.) Plaintiff alleges all defendants observed the assault and battery, and failed to intervene and/or failed to provide or obtain any medical aid for Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 13.) In particular, Plaintiff alleges that “Entity Defendants” (i.e. WMMC and AUS), failed to provide a safe environment by adequately hiring and training agents/employees as to avoid injury to patron invitees. (Id. at ¶ 29.)  

AUS contends the complaint fails to state sufficient facts to support the imposition of punitive damages against it. The Court agrees. The complaint pleads boilerplate allegations with no specific facts showing AUS acted with malice or oppression, or ratified or approved the conduct of Does 26 to 50.  “Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees.” (Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal. App. 4th 160, 167.) “[T]he law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation. Instead, the punitive damage statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the “officer[s], director[s], or managing agent [s].” (Ibid; Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) The rationale of confining liability is because malice of low-level employees does not reflect the corporation’s “state of mind” or intentions of the corporate leaders. (Ibid.) “ ‘[T]o award [punitive] damages against the master for the criminality of the servant is to punish a man for that of which he is not guilty.’ [Citations].” (Ibid.). There are no allegations or specific facts alleged showing which of or how AUS’ officers, directors, or managing agents had advance knowledge of Does 26 through 50’s unfitness and employed them with conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Nor are there any factual allegations showing how AUS’ officers, directors or managing agents authorized or ratified Does 26 through 50’s conduct. Plaintiff, in opposition, recites to portions of the complaint, arguing that AUS ratified the conduct. However, there are no allegations that AUS’ managing agents had actual knowledge of the malicious conduct to have ratified it.  (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 726.) 

Therefore, AUS’ motion to strike paragraphs 34 and 43 of the complaint is GRANTED.  

III. CONCLUSION 

The burden is on Plaintiff to show in what manner he or she can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.) In this case, Plaintiff merely refers to the allegations already contained in the complaint. Plaintiff has failed to show how the complaint can be amended to properly set forth a claim for punitive damages against AUS for the individual actions of security personnel. 

Therefore, AUS’ motion to strike is GRANTED without leave to amend. 

Moving party is ordered to give notice.   

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

Dated this 10th day of April 2024