Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

Department 78 

¿ 

RFP No. 16: “All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning or relating to any internal analysis or investigation by YOU or on YOUR behalf regarding the ENGINE DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE. [This request shall be interpreted to include, but not be limited to, any such investigation to determine the root cause of such ENGINE DEFECT, any such investigation to design a permanent repair procedure for such ENGINE DEFECT, any such investigation into the failure rates of parts associated with such ENGINE DEFECT, any cost analysis for implementing a proposed repair procedures, any savings analysis not implementing a proposed repair procedures, etc.]” 

RFP No. 17: “All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning or relating to any communications YOU have had regarding ENGINE DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.” 

RFP No. 18: “All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning or relating to any decision to issue any notices, letters, campaigns, warranty extensions, technical service bulletins and recalls concerning the ENGINE DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.” 

RFP No. 19: “All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning customer complaints, claims, reported failures, and warranty claims related to ENGINE DEFECT, including but not limited to any databases in YOUR possession with information from dealers, service departments, parts departments, or warranty departments, and all documents concerning YOUR response to each complaint, claim or reported failure.” 

RFP No. 20: “All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning failure rates of vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE as a result of ENGINE DEFECT.” 

RFP No. 21: “All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to electronically stored information and electronic mails, concerning or relating to any fixes for ENGINE DEFECT in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  

The term “ENGINE DEFECT” is defined as “premature failure of ignition switch circuit; illumination of check engine light; reduced and/or low engine power on acceleration; reduced engine power; illumination of malfunction indicator lamp; faulty throttle body; TSB PIT5994; TSB 22-NA-224; and any other concern identified in the repair history for the subject 2020 Chevrolet Equinox; Vehicle Identification Number 3GNAXHEV7LS734318.”  

GM objected to each request under, more or less, the following grounds: the requests are not limited to the subject vehicle, relevance, burdensome and oppressive, attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information. GM did not produce any documents to Request Nos. 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21. The only request which GM provided at least a partial response is to Request 18, in which GM provided it would “comply in part” and produce “copies of the bulletins for every field action, including any recalls, that GM issued for the SUBJECT VEHICLE as identified in the image below; and a list of TSBs and ISBs for vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE. After it has produced the lists of TSBs and ISBs, GM will – at Plaintiff’s request – search for and produce, if located, copies of a reasonable number of TSBs and ISBs, if any, that Plaintiff has identified as relevant to the conditions alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint.” 

GM argues that it has already produced documents relevant to Plaintiff’s breach of warranty claims, but that documents about complaints from other consumers and other vehicles are not relevant to Plaintiff’s claim. Pertaining to lemon law cases, where a plaintiff is seeking civil penalties under the Song-Beverly Act, the court will allow discovery that has the tendency to show willfulness.¿To establish willfulness, a plaintiff may show that: (1) the manufacturer knew the vehicle had not been repaired within a reasonable period or after a reasonable number of attempts, and (2) whether the manufacturer had a written policy on the requirement to [repurchase] or replace. (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 3 Cal. App. 4th 112, 136.)¿ So, general internal policies, similar complaints, and practices that hid defects from consumers may be circumstantial evidence of willfulness.¿(Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1105.) Further, pursuant to this department’s guidelines, it lists as discoverable any claims, internal analysis, investigation, communications, and any customer complaints regarding the same defects claimed by plaintiff in vehicles of the same year, make and model as the subject vehicle which were sold within the State of California.  

GM references Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216 in all its objections. In Calcor, the requirement is that the demanding party must “reasonably particularize each category of item.” (Id. at 222 [emphasis original].) The issue in Calcor is not present. Here, Plaintiff’s requests are limited “ENGINE DEFECT” that is has been defined and limited to specific defects, and further limited to the same Vehicle of the same year, make, and model to this action (except for Request No. 19). The Court intends to limit Request No. 19 to the same year, make and model as Plaintiff’s vehicle. Aside from this, it is not up to GM to decide what Plaintiff needs to prove his case, such that “Plaintiff does not need one single page more from GM.” (Opp. 1:26-27.) This ignores the liberal discovery standard that outside of a limited order by the court or an asserted privilege, a party may obtain discovery regarding any matter that may be admissible or may lead to admissible evidence. (CCP § 2017.010.)  

In terms of confidential/propriety/trade secret information, GM proffers the declaration of its Senior Manager/Senior Technical Consultant of Engineering Analysis Huizhen Lu (“Lu”). The party claiming the trade secret privilege has the burden of establishing that the information sought is actually a trade secret. (Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1393 (“[w]e therefore hold that the party claiming the privilege has the burden of establishing its existence”). Once that happens, the party seeking discovery has the burden to “make a prima facie, particularized showing that the information sought is relevant and necessary to the proof of, or defense against, a material element of one or more causes of action presented in the case, and that it is reasonable to conclude that the information sought is essential to a fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Ibid.) If that is done, the party claiming the privilege must show why a protective order is an insufficient remedy for its concerns. (Ibid.) Here, the Court finds that GM has established that some of the information sought may infringe upon propriety or trade secret information. The Court also notes that Lu attests it is his “understanding that GM LLC is filing a Motion for Entry of a Protective Order.” (Exh. A. Lu Decl. ¶7.) Notably, no such motion or a protective order has been filed to date. GM asserts it will produce all responsive documents subject to a stipulated protective order. In response, Plaintiff contends the parties entered into a stipulated protective order. 

The Court is unclear as to whether there is in fact a stipulated protective order between the parties as Plaintiff has not provided a copy of the stipulation referenced nor is there any on record. Nonetheless, the Court finds that GM has met its prima facie burden of the necessity of a protective order, and Plaintiff does not dispute that a protective order is a sufficient remedy to address GM’s concerns prior to production of all the documents requested. 

 

V. CONCLUSION 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to RPDs, Set One, will be GRANTED as to (1) Nos. 16-18 and 20-2, and (2) Request No. 19 but limited to same year, make and model as the subject vehicle in this action. The granting of the motion will be conditioned on a stipulated protective order. 

The Court may adjust this tentative accordingly once the parties clarify the ambiguity concerning the existence of a stipulated protective order. 

 

Moving Party is ordered to give notice. 

 

DATED: October 28, 2024 

__________________________ 

Hon. Michelle C. Kim 

Judge of the Superior Court 

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

• Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. 

• If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting. 

• Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. 

• If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.