Judge: Michelle C. Kim, Case: 23STCV27983, Date: 2024-07-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV27983    Hearing Date: July 16, 2024    Dept: 78

 

Superior Court of California¿ 

County of Los Angeles¿ 

Department 78¿ 

¿ 

NAREK VARDANYAN, 

Plaintiff(s), 

vs. 

CHRISTOPHER MANDALIAN, et al., 

Defendant(s). 

Case No.:¿ 

23STCV27983 

Hearing Date:¿ 

July 16, 2024 

 

 

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 

 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Narek Vardanyan (“Plaintiff”) filed a verified First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against defendants Christopher Mandalian (“Defendant”) and Does 1 through 25 for alleged false statements that Plaintiff engaged in harassing and criminal behavior. Plaintiff sets forth two causes of action for (1) defamation and (2) malicious prosecution. The FAC includes a prayer for punitive damages. 

Defendant now moves to strike the following: (1) paragraph 15 and 16 (Comments on Evidence of Judge in Restraining Order Hearing) (2) paragraphs 21, 30, 34, and 35 (Punitive or Exemplary Damages), and (3) paragraph 3 on page 7 (Prayer for Punitive or Exemplary Damages). 

  1. Moving Argument 

Defendant contends the comments made by Superior Court Judge Jannet Perez Santiso concerning the allegations of Defendant in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23STRO06631 criticizing Defendant’s credibility and commentary on the video of the confrontation is improper and irrelevant, and that the opinions of the evidence presented at that hearing is not admissible at trial. Additionally, Defendant argues Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages based on the factual allegation that Defendant told law enforcement that Plaintiff stared, clenched his fist, and got in Defendant’s way while Defendant was walking.  

  1. Opposing Argument 

Plaintiff acknowledges that Judge Santiso’s findings from the restraining order hearing are not essential to the elements of defamation. However, Plaintiff argues that the judicial findings are relevant to the background information regarding the facts and circumstances of the lawsuit. Plaintiff further asserts that punitive damages is proper because of the allegations of false reporting and allegations of intentional conduct. 

  1. Reply Argument 

Defendant argues this Court granted the Anti-SLAPP motion as to the second cause of action for malicious prosecution on March 6, 2024, leaving only the first cause of action for defamation. Defendant reasserts that the judge’s commentary at the restraining order is irrelevant, and that the allegations do not rise to the level of despicable conduct. 

 

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE¿ 

Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of (1) Plaintiff’s initial verified complaint, and (2) Plaintiff’s FAC in this action. The requests are granted. (Cal. Evid. Code §452(d).) 

 

III. LEGAL STANDARD¿ 

  1. Procedural Requirement 

Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who has filed the pleading subject to the motion to strike and file a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).) 

The Court finds Defendants fulfilled this requirement prior to filing the demurrer. (Valenzuela Decl. ¶6.) 

  1. Striking Punitive Damages 

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) 

 

IV. DISCUSSION 

As Defendant avers, the Court indeed granted Defendant’s special motion to strike the second cause of action for malicious prosecution. (Min. Order, March 6, 2024.) Plaintiff, in opposition, concedes that Judge Santiso’s findings from the restraining order hearing are not essential to the elements of defamation, which is Plaintiff’s sole remaining cause of action. The Court agrees that another judge’s express findings are not relevant to the pleading. Therefore, the motion to strike paragraph 15 and 16 of the FAC is granted. 

As to whether the FAC alleges sufficient facts to maintain a claim for punitive damages, the FAC alleges, in relevant part, that “Defendants reported to 911 operators that Plaintiff had confronted Defendant CHRISTOPHER MANDALIAN on October 2, 2023, stopped and clenched both fists as if preparing to fight, stood still with his hands clenched staring in the direction of Defendant, and forcibly blocked Defendant from his path of travel.” (FAC ¶ 9.) On October 3, 2023, Defendant reported the same to Detective Hanson of the Glendale Police Department. (Id. at ¶ 10.) On October 3, 2023, Defendant filed a Request for Civil Harassment Restraining Order declaring that Plaintiff physically assaulted Defendant on August 17, 2022, and that Plaintiff confronted Defendant on October 2, 2023. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges all the allegations made by Defendants were false, and that they had actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements. (Id. 12-13.) 

 Here, the mere recitation of the elements for defamation and intentional conduct regarding the reporting is not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  [Citation.]  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.) “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’  [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.) 

Further, “[a]s amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.)  Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)  Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.” (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.) The allegation that Defendant falsely reported that Plaintiff engaged in harassing and criminal behavior is insufficient to rise to the level of outrage as contemplated by Civil Code section 3294. 

 

V. CONCLUSION 

The burden is on Plaintiff to show in what manner he or she can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742.)¿Plaintiff does not provide any additional facts demonstrating he is able to maintain a claim for punitive damages. 

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to strike paragraphs 15, 16, 21, 30, 34, 35 and paragraph 3 on page 7 is GRANTED without leave to amend. 

  

 

DATED: July 15, 2024 

__________________________ 

Hon. Michelle C. Kim 

Judge of the Superior Court 

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

• Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. 

• If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting. 

• Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. 

• If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.