SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 

 

 

“On or about December 21, 2022, Plaintiff was a lawful passenger on Defendants’ LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY....bus (Bus No. 8819, Line 66) on 8th St. near Alvarado St.. Defendant JOHN DOE, suddenly and without warning, abruptly applied the brakes as the bus was in motion and caused Plaintiff to fall off her seat and sustain serious injuries and damages. The actions of the Defendants and/or its employees was below the standard of care and was the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. 

 

… 

 

This claim is brought pursuant to Government Code Section 815.2; Vehicle Code Section 17001. 

 

Therefore, Defendants LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY….are statutorily liable for the negligent acts of the Defendants’ employee while he/she was operating the subject vehicle. 

 

Defendants, LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; and DOES 1 through 50, were served with a claim for damages pursuant to Government Code Section 911.2 on or about June 9, 2023 and has not been rejected by an agent for Defendants LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.” 

 

(Compl. at p. 7.) 

LACMTA argues that the complaint fails to identify a statutory liability against it, or plead with particularity any factual allegations as to what exactly its employees did wrong. Indeed, there is no common law tort liability for public entities in California, including negligence. (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal. App. 4th 1450, 1457.) However, contrary to LACMTA’s assertions, Plaintiff does plead the statutory basis against LACMTA, which are Gov. Code § 815.2 and Veh. Code § 17001. Gov. Code § 815.2 provides that a public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by its employee within the scope of his employment, except where the employee is immune from liability. Veh. Code § 17001 provides that a public entity is liable for the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by an employee acting within the scope of his employment. The factual premise is that LACMTA’s employee John Doe abruptly applied the brakes of the bus, thereby causing Plaintiff to fall. Complainants are not required to identify employees in order to specifically allege vicarious liability against a governmental entity. (Tom Jones Enterprises, Ltd. v. County of L.A. (2013) 212 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1292-93.) 

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the existence of a claimed duty and liability arising from an identified statute. (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal. App. 3d 792, 802.) In terms of LACMTA’s argument that the pleading is uncertain, "A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures."  (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)  "A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond –i.e., he or she cannot reasonable determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her."  (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) § 7:85 (emphasis in original).) For the purposes of the demurrer, the complaint adequately alleges facts that LACMTA is vicariously liable for the actions of its bus driver, John Doe. 

Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED.  

 

III. MOTION TO STRIKE 

LACMTA moves to strike the allegation that it entrusted the motor vehicle on the grounds that LACMTA is not liable for the negligence of its employees. However, as already analyzed above, a public entity may be held vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of its employees committed within the scope of employment. The complaint specifies the statutory grounds for the causes of action and provides that the factual basis of liability is LACMTA’s employee applying the bus brakes suddenly and without warning. At the pleading stage, LACMTA has not demonstrated that the factual allegation is irrelevant, false, or improper.  (CCP §§ 435; 436(a); see also Duffy v. Campbell (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 662, 666 [noting that courts must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the pleading when considering a motion to strike].)   

 Accordingly, the motion to strike LACMTA from the first cause of action, and to strike the word “entrusted”, is DENIED.