Judge: Michelle C. Kim, Case: 24STCV03770, Date: 2024-09-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV03770    Hearing Date: September 16, 2024    Dept: 78

Defendant 1460 35^th St, LLC’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.

Factual Background

This is a landlord-tenant habitability action. The Complaint alleges as follows:

In 2019, Plaintiffs Carolyne Chandler and Joanne Outram for themselves and their family, entered into a residential lease agreement with Defendant 1460 35^th St, LLC’s predecessors in interest to rent 1460 W 35^th St, Los Angeles, CA 90018 (“Subject Property”) for $2,205 per month. (Compl., ¶¶12, 20.) Soon after taking possession of the Subject Property, Plaintiffs began to experience multiple instances of substandard conditions, resulting in habitability issues. (Compl., ¶¶21-24.) Defendant had actual notice that the Subject Property as a whole has an extensive history of substandard conditions and habitability issues. (Compl., ¶15.) Plaintiffs made numerous complaints and Defendant failed to respond. (Compl., ¶25.)

procedural history

On February 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Complaint asserting five causes of action:

1. Breach of Warranty of Habitability

2. Breach of Warranty of Quiet Enjoyment

3. Nuisance

4. Violations of Civil Code Section 1941.1, et seq.

5. Negligence

On June 13, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Strike. On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. No reply has been filed.

DiscussioN

I.               MOTION TO STRIKE (NOT ANTI-SLAPP)

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).)  

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) 

A.   Meet and Confer

Prior to filing a motion to strike, moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5.)¿¿ 

Defendant 1460 35^th St, LLC did not provide a meet and confer declaration. Further, there is no indication in the motion that meet and confer efforts were made prior to the filing of the instant motion. The Court will exercise its discretion and review the motion on the merits as Plaintiff’s opposition substantively responds to the arguments raised in the moving papers. However, Defendant is admonished to comply with statutory requirements moving forward.

B.   Merits of Motion to Strike

Defendants move for an order striking all claims for punitive damages at paragraphs44, 61, 69, and prayer for relief paragraphs 4 from Plaintiff’s Complaint. This motion is made on the grounds that the aforementioned portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint are irrelevant and improper because the claim for punitive damages is unsupported by the allegations of the Complaint.  

To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that the¿defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042. The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of any factual assertions are insufficient. Id. A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud or oppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 53, 63.¿) However, “Subdivision (b) thus authorizes the imposition of punitive damages on an employer in three situations: (1) when an employee was guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, and the employer with advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, (2) when an employee was guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, and the employer authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct, or (3) when the employer was itself guilty of the oppression, fraud or malice.” (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1151.) 

“Malice” is defined in section 3294(c)(1) as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” “Oppression” is defined in section 3294(c)(2) as “despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” The term “despicable” has been defined in the case law as actions that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 847, 891.¿¿“Fraud” is defined in section 3294(c)(3) as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”¿ 

To prove that a defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,” it is not enough to prove negligence, gross negligence or even recklessness. Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, 87. Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that “the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that he [or she] knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others.” (Id. at 90). Further, the allegations must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant’s conduct was “despicable” defined as “base, vile or contemptible.” College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 725. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint states specific facts sufficient to support Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages. Here, the Complaint alleges cockroaches nested inside of Plaintiffs’ furniture, electrical appliances, clothing, contaminated their food, deposited excrements throughout the Subject property, crawled Plaintiffs’ bodies while asleep, caused rashes, skin eruptions, and other ailments. (Compl., ¶24.) The Complaint further alleges rats would eat up the electrical cables and wires. (Id.) The Complaint further alleges Plaintiffs’ made several complaints to Defendant about these conditions and habitability issues including to Defendant’s agent Ramon Posas. (Compl., ¶¶25, 27.) The Complaint also alleges Defendant failed to respond to these complaints and Mr. Posas would say the “plaintiffs are the problem” and threatened they would be evicted and homeless “pretty soon.” (Id.) The Complaint also alleges the Department of Housing Code Enforcement Division and Department of Building and Safety issued notices and order for Defendant to get the Subject Property code complaint but the substandard conditions remain. (Compl., ¶¶29-34.) Reading the Complaint as a whole and taking the allegations as true, a reasonable jury could infer from the allegations pled in the Complaint that Defendant was on notice of the unhabitable conditions of the Subject Property numerous times, their agent Mr. Posas disregarded these complaints, and Defendant have disregarded the government notices and orders to fix the habitability issues. As such, a reasonable jury cold infer Defendant’s conduct done with a conscious disregard to Plaintiffs’ tenant rights to have a habitability dwelling.

Therefore, Defendant 1460 35^th St, LLC’s Motion to Strike is DENIED.

Moving Party is ordered to give notice.

DATED:  September 16, 2024 

           ________________________________

Hon. Michelle C. Kim

Judge of the Superior Court