CCP § 391(b) provides four bases upon which a plaintiff may be declared a vexatious litigant. The category relevant here is that a person may be deemed a vexatious litigant if, “In the immediately preceding seven-year period [the person] has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing.” (CCP § 391(b)(1).) 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that (1) Cases Nos. 23STCV17983, 23STCV11949, 23STCV11197, 23STCV11201 are still on-going because they are pending appeal, (2) Case Nos. 23STCV10566, 23STCV08059, 23STCV06006, 23CV1280 settled, and (3) 23CV912 and 21CV05320 were dismissed as part of a waiver process.  

The Court has reviewed all matters judicially noticed. Plaintiff’s appeal for Case Nos. 23STCV17983 and 23STCV11197 were denied. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Case No. 23STCV10566, and there is no record or evidence that this was due to a settlement. (Tokerud v. Capitolbank Sacramento (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 775, 779 [Voluntary dismissals still count for the purpose of the vexatious litigant statute].) 

Cases dismissed pursuant to a fee waiver review process do not count as “litigations” for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure § 391. (Garcia v. Lacey (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 402, 411-412.) Cases dismissed due to a negotiated compromise also do not count. (Tokerud v. Capitolbank Sacramento (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 775, 779.) As Defendant asserts, Case No. 23CV1280 was dismissed because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and Plaintiff offers no evidence otherwise that the dismissal was due to any settlement. As for Case Nos. 23CV912 and 21CV05320, Plaintiff presents no evidence that the dismissals were the result of Plaintiff applying for a fee waiver. Even if these two cases were dismissed as part of a fee waiver process, Defendant has provided other cases in which the action was determined adversely against him. For example, Case No. B338082, wherein it was noted that Plaintiff had previously been found to be a vexatious litigant and failed to demonstrate the merit of his action; the appellate court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal. Case No. 23STCV10602 was also voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff, and there is no indication that this was by way of settlement. 

Defendant has therefore established that Plaintiff has maintained, in propria persona, at least five litigations in the immediate preceding seven-year period that was determined adversely against him. The Court finds Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant per CCP § 391(b). 

As Defendant points out, Plaintiff has already been deemed a vexatious litigant in two separate cases in the Los Angeles Superior Court, namely Case No. 23STCV11197 and Case No. 23STCV17983. Indeed, the Hon. Stephanie M. Bowick issued a prefiling order prohibiting Plaintiff from filing new litigation without first obtaining leave on March 14, 2024, and the Hon. Jon R. Takasugi issued the same pre-filing order on May 28, 2024. The instant action against Defendant was initiated prior to these prefiling orders. Considering there is an existing pre-filing order pertaining to Plaintiff, the request for this Court to issue the same pre-filing order is redundant. The Court therefore finds this portion of the request moot. 

Defendant requests the action be dismissed. The vexatious litigant statutes provide “two distinct and complementary sets of remedies,” one applicable in “pending litigation” and the other applicable to “new litigation.” (Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1171.) The first remedy “is an order to furnish security” based on a finding that “the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant” and “there is not a reasonable probability that [the litigant] will prevail.” (Holcomb v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1499; CCP §§ 391.1-391.4, 391.6.)¿The second remedy “authorizes the court to ‘enter a prefiling order which prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state in propria persona without first obtaining leave of the presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed.’” (Holcomb, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at 1499-1500; CCP § 391.7.) These remedies may be used in tandem. (Ibid. [prefiling order “is in addition to the other remedies provided…”])  

Defendant provides no authority that dismissal of Plaintiff’s action is an available remedy under the vexatious litigant statutes. The request to dismiss the action is therefore denied. 

D. Additional Briefing Required Regarding Security 

Defendant’s last request is that Plaintiff be required to furnish security. As provided above, the Court has found that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant. The second prong is whether “there is not a reasonable probability that [the litigant] will prevail.” (Holcomb, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at 1499.)¿If a plaintiff is ordered to furnish security and fails, the action “shall be dismissed as to the defendant for whose benefit it was ordered furnished.” (CCP § 391.4.) In support of Defendant’s contention that there is no reasonable probability that Plaintiff will prevail on his action, Defendant submits video evidence of the Body Worn Video which it asserts contradicts Plaintiff’s claim that the LAPD failed to investigate his claim. 

“Security” is defined as “an undertaking to assure payment, to the party for whose benefit the undertaking is required to be furnished, of the party’s reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and not limited to taxable costs, incurred in or in connection with a litigation instituted, caused to be instituted, or maintained or caused to be maintained by a vexatious litigant.” (CCP § 391(c).) The judge is ultimately responsible for fixing an appropriate amount of security to cover the moving party’s reasonable expenses. (CCP § 391.3 (“the court shall order the plaintiff to furnish, for the benefit of the moving defendant, security in such amount and within such time as the court shall fix.”))  

Here, Defendant did not provide any information as to its reasonable expenses for the Court to be able to make any determination of the propriety of the $10,000 bond sought. Before this Court engages in the analysis regarding its findings of the submitted evidence, the Court requests additional briefing from Defendant regarding its reasonable expenses. 

V. CONCLUSION 

The Hearing on Motion to Declare Vexatious Litigant is therefore CONTINUED to February 21, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. Defendant is ordered to file its supplemental declaration/brief no later than February 14, 2025. No other briefing will be permitted. 

Additionally, the Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment will be continued to March 3, 2025 at 8:30 a.m., and Hearing on Demurrer - without Motion to Strike continued to March 4, 2025 at 8:30 a.m.