Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

Department 78 

¿ 

 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Angela Taylor (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendants Mothers In Action, Inc. (“MIA”), Taste of Soul Festival, and Does 1 to 50 for damages arising from a trip and fall on October 15, 2022 at 3650 W Martin Luther King Jr Blvd, Los Angeles, CA 90008. Plaintiff alleges she was walking on the premises when her foot became tangled on exposed wires that were connected to the stage at the Taste of Soul Festival hosted by Mothers In Action, Inc., which caused her to fall. (Compl. p. 5.) The complaint sets forth two causes of action for general negligence and premises liability. 

MIA now demurs to the complaint on the grounds that each cause of action fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against it.  

Plaintiff opposes the motion, and MIA filed a reply. 

 

II. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT 

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.¿ (CCP § 430.41(a).)¿¿¿ 

The Court finds MIA has fulfilled this requirement prior to filing the demurrer. (Decl. Channing, ¶¶ 2-3.) 

 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings.¿ It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint).¿(CCP §§ 422.10, 589; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Id. at 994.) 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994.)¿No other extrinsic evidence can be considered.¿(Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862 [disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287] [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].) 

 

IV. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

MIA requests the Court take judicial notice of (1) Plaintiff’s complaint, (2) Taste of Soul’s Website, (3) MIA’s Secretary of State Statement of Information, (4) MIA’s Restated Articles of Incorporation, (5) The City of Los Angeles’ Street Closure Permit, (6) Petition Late Claim in Case No. 23STCP04102, (7) Los Angeles County Metro Transit Authority’s (“LACMTA”) Opposition to Late Petition in in Case No. 23STCP04102, (8) Minute Order Re: Ruling on Petition in Case No. 23STCP04102, (9) Meet and Confer email exchange. Except for Request 1, Plaintiff objects to the remainder of MIA’s requests. 

Requests 1 and 6 are granted. (Cal. Evid. Code § 452(d).) 

Requests 2, 5, and 9 are denied as not being subject to judicial notice. Requests 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 are denied due to its lack of relevance. (Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal. App. 3d 296, 301 [Judicial notice “is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.”].) 
 

V. DISCUSSION 

MIA argues that the loss location was owned by LACMTA and that the location was under construction at the time of injury. MIA contends Plaintiff submitted a claim to LACMTA, and therefore Plaintiff cannot allege that MIA owned or controlled the property. 

MIA’s argument that this is a sham pleading because Plaintiff made a government tort claim to LACMTA in a separate case is not particularly relevant. (See Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 666, 690 [Generally, complainants may plead, in the alternative, inconsistent facts or theories.].) MIA relies on Cantu v. Resol. Tr. Corp. (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4th 857, which  is illustrative of how the rule against sham pleading can reach complaints filed in different cases.  

In Cantu, there had been a dispute over certain funds held in a bank account. (Id. at 870-871.) The bank had filed an interpleader action against Mr. Cantu and several persons who had contacted it regarding the account. (Id. at 871.) Mr. Cantu filed pleadings in that case which contained extensive arguments in an attempt to negate the claims made by one of the other parties to the dispute. (Id. at 871-872.) After the interpleader action settled (without Mr. Cantu’s participation) and was dismissed, Mr. Cantu filed a lawsuit against the bank and its lawyers for malicious prosecution, on the grounds that there actually were no competing claims to the funds, and therefore there was no need for an interpleader. (Id. at 869-870, 872, 877.) 

The Court of Appeal found this claim barred by the doctrine of sham pleading. The panel held that Mr. Cantu could not have participated in the interpleader action, and filed pleadings disputing the various claims on their merits, without knowing that there were competing claims to dispute. (Id. at 878-879.) “There is no doubt that Cantu filed this action with full knowledge that competing claims for control of the Nosotros accounts existed at the time [the bank] filed the interpleader action…Cantu asserted [in the interpleader action], and therefore conceded [in this action], that Mr. Zamora, a named claimant in the interpleader action and the former president of Nosotros, claimed a right to control the Nosotros accounts separate and apart from, and in contrast to the claims of Nosotros and its officers… it is clear that the [bank’s lawyers] had identified at least one party who asserted a claim to control of the Nosotros accounts other than Nosotros itself and Mr. Cantu. Cantu's attempt to escape and plead around the import of his own admissions is transparent.” (Ibid.) 

Applying the analysis and rule of Cantu to this case is problematic. The sham pleading doctrine is intended to enable courts “‘to prevent an abuse of process.’” (Amid v. Hawthorne Community Medical Group, Inc. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1383, 1390-1391.) The main premise of the rule against sham pleading is that a party which contradicts itself is probably engaging in outright deception. It is not necessarily contradictory for Plaintiff to plead that more than one party owned, controlled, or maintained the subject premises, such that this complaint against MIA would be considered an inconsistent allegation.  

Further, the Court will not consider MIA’s arguments that it does not own or is not responsible for the subject location of the trip and fall. The function of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint, not the truthfulness of the allegations, and the facts as pled are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at 994; see also Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1144 [“‘[D]efendants cannot set forth allegations of fact in their demurrers which, if true, would defeat plaintiff's complaint.’”].) It is sufficient that Plaintiff’s form complaint alleges that she tripped and fell on exposed wires at 3650 W Martin Luther King Jr Blvd, Los Angeles, CA 90008, and that “All Defendants” negligently owned, maintained, managed, and operated the premises. (Compl. p. 5; Prem. L-2). 

 

VI. CONCLUSION 

MIA’s demurrer to the complaint is OVERRULED. 

 

Moving Party is ordered to give notice. 

 

DATED: September 3, 2024 

__________________________ 

Hon. Michelle C. Kim 

Judge of the Superior Court 

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

• Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. 

• If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting. 

• Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. 

• If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.