Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

Department 78 

¿ 

“The essential elements of a cause of action for assault are: (1) defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably believed she was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendant's conduct; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm.” (So, supra, Cal. App. 4th at 668–69.) “The tort of assault is complete when the anticipation of harm occurs.” (Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. Cal. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 232.) 

The complaint alleges that on September 15, 2023, Monturiol followed Plaintiff to his car and punched Plaintiff on the face with a closed first, causing bruises to Plaintiff’s face and an excoriation to Plaintiff’s forehead. (Compl. ¶¶6-7.) Plaintiff did not consent to Monturiol’s touch. (Compl. ¶ 13.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently enough facts to support the essential elements of these causes of action. The demurrer to the first and second cause of action is therefore overruled. 

2. Third C/A – False Imprisonment 

The elements are (1) nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief. (Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496; Lyons v. Fire Ins. Exch. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 880, 888; Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496.) “Restraint can be effectuated by means of physical force, threat of force or of arrest, confinement by physical barriers, or by means of any other form of unreasonable duress.” (Aldrich v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n (2020) 484 F. Supp. 3d 779, 801.)  

The complaint alleges Monturiol “grabbed his shirts and as Plaintiff was struggling to escape, punched Plaintiff on the face”. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Monturiol compelled Plaintiff to stand in front of Monturiol for two to three seconds (Compl. ¶ 30.) 

Here, Plaintiff pleading that Monturiol grabbed Plaintiff by the shirts such that Plaintiff could not escape for a brief two to three seconds is not an appreciable length of time. (See Alterauge v. Los Angeles Turf Club (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 735, 736 [length of time can be as brief as 15 minutes].) Plaintiff provides no authority that “an appreciable period of time” contemplates a mere two to three seconds of physical restraint. Additionally, the brief grabbing of Monturiol’s person, immediately followed by the punch, is an aspect of the offensive contact already pled as part of the assault and battery causes of action. To hold otherwise would expand the concept of false imprisonment and make every case involving brief grabbing or grappling or pulling a false imprisonment case. 

 

The demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained. 

3. Fourth C/A – IIED 

The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering, and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. Conduct is extreme and outrageous when it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent society, and is of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress. Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590.) 

A defendant’s conduct is “outrageous” when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community, and the defendant must either intend his or her conduct to inflict injury or engaged in it with the realization that injury will result.¿ (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051 [citations and quotations omitted].) 

Here, the allegation that Monturiol, a professional fighter, had followed Plaintiff to his car, grabbed Plaintiff, and punched Plaintiff in the face qualifies as outrageous conduct, since such an act is intended to inflict injury upon another person. Further, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the emotional suffering resulting from the battery, such as nightmares, difficulty sleeping, and anxiety. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, 37.) 

The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is overruled. 

 

V. MOTION TO STRIKE 

A. Legal Standard 

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) 

B. Discussion 

Monturiol’s moves to strike certain words from the causes of action, the causes of action, and the prayer for punitive damages. As stated previously, Monturiol’s use of extrinsic facts to supplement or to contravene the allegations may not be considered since the grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading itself or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) 

Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’¿ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.) 

Here, the allegation that Monturiol followed Plaintiff to his car, grabbed him, and punched him in the face is sufficient to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages based on malice. “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) 

“As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) (Emphasis added.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.)¿Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.¿ Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) The allegation that Monturiol battered Plaintiff is a type of intentional conduct frequently associated with crime and is behavior that would be looked down upon by ordinary people to qualify as despicable conduct. The motion to strike is therefore denied. 

 

VI. CONCLUSION 

Monturiol’s demurrer is SUSTAINED IN PART as to the third cause of action only without leave to amend; the remainder is overruled. 

Monturiol’s motion to strike is DENIED. 

 

Moving Party is ordered to give notice. 

 

DATED: November 8, 2024 

__________________________ 

Hon. Michelle C. Kim 

Judge of the Superior Court 

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

• Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. 

• If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting. 

• Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. 

• If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.