I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Diana Lujan (“Plaintiff”) filed this medical malpractice action against defendants L. Scott Frazier, Ph.D, Ho Ying Chu, PsyD, MSW, and Does 1 to 25. The complaint alleges Plaintiff received inadequate medical treatment from 2022-2023 in relation to trauma arising from an assault that occurred at her place of employment on July 26, 2021, causing her physical and mental condition to worsen. The complaint sets forth five causes of action for (1) General and Professional Negligence, (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (4) Fraud and Deceit, and (5) Negligent Hiring, Supervision & Retention. 

On June 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to quash deposition subpoenas for production of business records issued by defendants L. Scott Frazier, Ph.D and Ho Ying Chu, PsyD, MSW (“Defendants”) to State Compensation Insurance Fund (3 Subpoenas), AltaMed Health Services Corp, Brand New Day, Lawrence Lyons PhD, Mark McDonald Md, Optum Primary Care, OptumCare Management LLC, Optum Primary Care- Radiology Records, Sarah Sicher Md, and Concentra Urgent Care. Plaintiff also seeks monetary sanctions. 

On October 3, 2024, Defendants filed an opposition. 

On October 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. 

II. MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA 

A motion to quash production of documents at a deposition must be accompanied by a separate statement setting forth the particular documents or demands at issue and the factual and legal reasons why production should not be compelled. (See CRC, rule 3.1345(a)(5).)¿When no separate statement is filed with a discovery motion, the matter may be ordered off calendar.¿(BP Alaska Exploration, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1240, 1270.) 

Defendants contend Plaintiff’s motion is procedurally defective because no separate statement was filed. In reply, Plaintiff argues a separate statement is not required when no response has been provided to the request for discovery pursuant to CRC, rule 3.1345(b)(1).) Here, the parties met and conferred on the issue after Plaintiff objected to the subpoenas on the grounds that they violated Plaintiff’s privacy right. Regardless of any technicality of CRC, rule 3.1345, the Court always has the discretion to consider the motion. Under the circumstances here, the Court finds a lack of separate statement to be not material to the motion. 

Lastly, although this Department’s rules encourage parties to utilize IDCs to resolve discovery disputes, it is not a requirement prior to filing this type of motion. 

A court “may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (CCP § 1987.1.) The court, upon motion reasonably made by the party, may rule upon motions for quashing, modifying or compelling compliance with, subpoenas. (See, e.g., Lee v. Swansboro County Property Owners Ass’n (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 575, 582-583.) 

“[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action,” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) “For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement ...” (citation).” These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery, (Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790), and contrary to popular belief fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases. (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 385.) 

By filing a personal injury action, plaintiffs place in issue their past and present physical and/or mental conditions related to the injury sued upon. All medical and/or psychological records relating to the claimed injuries are thus discoverable. (Evidence Code §§ 996, 1016; Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 862–864.) 

III. DISCUSSION 

Here, Plaintiff alleges professional negligence against Defendants related to their psychiatric care and treatment of her mental trauma arising from a violent inmate attack, wherein the inmate squeezed her throat and caused her head to hit head the floor. As a result of the attack, Plaintiff suffered severe PTSD, depression, and anxiety that was allegedly exacerbated/intensified by Defendants’ sub-standard psychiatric treatment. There is no privilege for communications relevant to a patient’s health if that issue has been tendered by the patient.¿(Slagle v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1313.)¿ “A patient tenders the issue of his physical health if he files an action for personal injuries but only as to information which relates to the claimed injuries.”¿(Ibid.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has put her physical and mental health at issue for injuries stemming from the attack and treatment sought. 

Plaintiff, as the party asserting the right of privacy, bears the initial burden of demonstrating (1) a “legally protected privacy interest”; (2) an “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances”; and (3) a “threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) If Plaintiff meets this standard, Defendant must then show that the requested documents are “directly relevant” to the litigation. (Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1387.)¿ 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants had not served any interrogatories asking Plaintiff to identify her specific injuries and damages, but instead subpoenaed records without any limitation as to time or the specific medical and/or psychological conditions Plaintiff has placed at issue. Plaintiff avers she does not dispute that some relevant records will be contained in the worker’s compensation records for the injuries related to the matter, but that there is other information in the file unrelated to the case. Plaintiff argues the workers’ compensation file Case No. ADJ829672 is unrelated because it involves orthopedic injuries on December 25, 2011, and that the subpoena for the workers’ compensation file for Case No. ADJ15073550 for the date of injury on July 26, 2021 should be limited to psychiatric records only. Further, Plaintiff contends that the subpoenas for employment records from her prior employers have no causal connection to this therapy negligence case, and that Defendants refuse to agree to a First Look deal proposal in the alternative to this motion. 

Information in personnel records is generally subject to constitutional privacy protections. (San Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1097 [“personnel records and employment history are within the scope of the protection provided by the state and federal Constitutions”].) Additionally, “Patients have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to their medical information that is not directly relevant to a particular condition the patient has placed in issue.” (California Consumer Health Care Council v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 21, 31.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that she has a legally protected privacy interest, and that the subpoenas are overbroad such that it encompasses time periods unrelated to the action. The burden thus shifts to Defendants to show that the subpoenas are “directly relevant” to the litigation. 

In opposition, Defendants argue broadly that they are entitled to conduct discovery. Defendants contend the workers' compensation records are necessary to ascertain whether there are any documents which contradict Plaintiff's claims of loss earnings and earning capacity, and that they seek to discover whether Plaintiff suffered any emotional distress prior to Defendants’ treatment. Defendants assert they did not agree to a First Look because it is not required by the Discovery Act, and that Plaintiff’s counsel will cherry pick documents without producing a privilege log. In terms of the employment records, Defendants argue that Plaintiff had three distinct employers at the time of the incident and during Defendants’ treatment of Plaintiff. 

The Court has reviewed the subpoenas at issues and agrees that the majority are overbroad by seeking either “All” records without any time limitation or seeking records spanning up to 11 years prior to the inmate attack that the necessitated psychiatric treatment with Defendants. However, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff that the records regarding Case No. ADJ15073550 (pertaining to the incident) should only be limited to psychiatric records, because Plaintiff has alleged worsening physical injuries in relation to Defendants’ care and treatment. Defendants have a legitimate discovery interest in Plaintiff’s medical records related to her claimed physical injuries, and this will be the only subpoena that will not be modified/quashed. In terms of the remainder, Defendants have not persuasively articulated that the requests seeking the entirety of documents without limitation (or a scope of 11 years prior to the incident) are directly relevant. “‘[F]or discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement’ and ‘[a]dmissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.’” (Cruz v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 646, 653, citations omitted.) Even under a liberal application in favor of discovery, the Court finds the requests overbroad. Defendants are entitled only to records that are reasonably related to Plaintiff’s injuries (both mental and physical), and to the damages claimed by Plaintiff (which includes loss of income/earning capacity/lost benefits). 

Unless the parties can come to a different agreement, the Court finds it appropriate to grant the motion in part, and to modify the remainder pursuant to CCP § 1987.1 as follows: 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, the motion to quash is GRANTED IN PART as to the two subpoenas issued to the State Compensation Insurance Fund pertaining to Case No. ADJ829672 and Case No. ADJ7090751 only. The remainder shall be produced pursuant to the subpoenas, but subject to the above modifications, within 60 days. 

CCP § 1987.2 provides that the court “may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” Under the circumstances, the Court finds sanctions unwarranted and declines to award any.