Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

Department 78 

¿ 

Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of (1) Frank Ramos’, of the Investigations and Enforcement Section of the Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department (HCIDLA), December 17, 2020, letter to Nathan Richards, (2) Brandon Dimond, Esq.’s, response letter to Mr. Ramos’ letter dated January 13, 2021, and (3) Francis Ramos’, of the Investigations and Enforcement Section of the Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department (HCIDLA), letter dated January 14, 2021, to attorney Brandon Diamond in response to his letter of January 13, 2021. 

The requests are DENIED. The opinions of HCIDLA are not relevant to the disposition of the motion. (Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal. App. 3d 296, 301 [Judicial notice “is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issue at hand.”]. 

 

IV. DISCUSSION 

“The basic elements of unlawful detainer for nonpayment of rent contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (2), are (1) the tenant is in possession of the premises; (2) that possession is without permission; (3) the tenant is in default for nonpayment of rent; (4) the tenant has been properly served with a written three-day notice; and (5) the default continues after the three-day notice period has elapsed.” (Kruger v. Reyes (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10, 16 (internal citations omitted).) 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (2), requires that a notice for the nonpayment of rent must state “the amount that is due, the name, telephone number, and address of the person to whom the rent payment shall be made….” The requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision (2), must be strictly complied with. (Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip Communications, Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1038.)¿¿ 

The action is based on two Three-Day Notices to Pay Rent or Quit: (1) The first Notice to Pay demands a total of $27,000, representing $2,250 per month for the months of May 2023 through April 2024, and (2) The second Notice to Pay demands a total of $47,250, representing rent for the period of May 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021, and from October 1, 2021 through January 31, 2023, for a total of $47,250.00 at the rate of $2,250 per month. (Compl. Exh. A.) Defendant argues her rent increased from $1,000 to $1,174.80 effective June 1, 2019, increased to $1,239.41 effective August 1, 2020, and increased to $2,250 effective February 1, 2021. (Woocher Decl. ¶¶ 3-4; Exhs. A & B.) Defendant asserts Plaintiff the rent increase in February 2021 from $1,239.41 to $2,250.00 was in violation of Penal Code §396,¿which limits rent increases to 10% during declared emergencies. As such, Plaintiff’s Notices are defective and cannot support an unlawful detainer action. 

Penal Code § 396 is an anti-price gouging statute which aims to “protect citizens from excessive and unjustified increases in the prices charged during or shortly after a declared state of emergency or local emergency for goods and services that are vital and necessary for the health, safety, and welfare of consumers.” (Pen. Code § 396(a).) As such, its subsections limit price increases on essential goods and services after an emergency is declared. Subsection (b) provides that it is unlawful for a person or other entity to sell or offer to sell “housing… for a price of more than 10 percent greater than the price charged by that person for those goods or services immediately prior to the proclamation or declaration of emergency.” (Ibid., subd. (b).) Subsection (e) provides that it is unlawful for any person to “increase the rental price…advertised, offered, or charged for housing, to an existing or prospective tenant, by more than 10 percent.” (Ibid., subd. (e).) The provisions of Section 396(e) remain in effect during “any period the [emergency] proclamation or declaration is extended by the applicable authority [including local authorities].” (Ibid.)¿ 

On September 3, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Governor Newsom signed an order extending the duration of Penal Code § 396(b) protections to March 4, 2021. (Executive Order N-78-20.) Therefore, Penal Code § 396(b) tenant protections were in legal effect between March 4, 2020, and December 31, 2021. 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff increased Defendant’s rent from $1,239.41 to $2,250.00 in February 2021. This constitutes an approximate 80% rental increase during a state of emergency, in direct violation of Penal Code § 396(e). Additionally, a three-day notice to pay rent or quit under CCP § 1161(2) must state no more than the amount of rent due and it must be served after the stated amount becomes due. (CCP § 1161(2);¿Lydon v. Beach¿(1928) 89 Cal.App. 69, 74.) The notice provisions of CCP § 1161 requires strict compliance.¿(Feder v. Wreden Packing & Provision Co. (1928) 89 Cal.App.665, 670.) Because the 3-Day notice sought past-due amounts based on an illegal rent increase, it is therefore defective. 

The Court finds that Defendant has met her burden of production showing that Plaintiff is unable to prove an essential element of its unlawful detainer because the 3-Day Notice overstates the amount due in rent, and thus cannot support an unlawful detainer action. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to show a triable issue of fact regarding the validity of the 3-Day Notice. 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues Penal Code § 396 is in direct conflict with the Tenant Protection Act of 2019, which includes Civil Code section 1947.13. Plaintiff argues the Notices were valid because Civil Code Section 1947.13 must be read as an exception to Penal Code § 396. Additionally, Plaintiff argues HCIDLA determined that the Defendant’s rent increase was legal and that the statutory limitations on rent increases did not apply to this Property for this one-time adjustment, and that the Subject Property was exempt from the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 at the time the rent increase was given. 

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention that Penal Code § 396 and the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 are in direct conflict, such that full effect cannot be given to both. The anti-price gouging statute of Penal Code § 396 prohibiting an increase of price by more than 10 percent is a temporary protection, effective only during a proclaimed state of emergency. Reading the statutes in their entirety, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments that the provisions lack harmony, would lead to absurdity, or that Penal Code § 396 is unconstitutional when Civil Code § 1947.13 is still applicable upon expiration of the emergency. Defendant’s reply directly addressing Plaintiff’s arguments are well reasoned, and the Court need not reiterate the points aptly raised. Any opinions by HCIDLA as to whether Defendant abided by Civil Code § 1947.12 and Civil Code § 1947.13 are not relevant. Plaintiff has therefore failed to meet its shifted burden of a triable issue of material fact pertaining to the validity of the 3-Day Notice. 

 

V. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, Defendant Marta Rodriguez’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.¿¿ 

 

Moving Party is ordered to give notice. 

 

DATED: November 15, 2024 

__________________________ 

Hon. Michelle C. Kim 

Judge of the Superior Court 

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

• Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. 

• If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting. 

• Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. 

• If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.