Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

Department 78 

¿ 

 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Hisham Harake (“Plaintiff”) filed this employment action against defendants Hochiki America Corporation (“HAC”), Hochiki Corporation (“HC”), and Does 1 through 10 alleging that Plaintiff was unlawfully terminated from his employment based on discriminatory practices favoring Japanese employees over non-Japanese employees, age, and Plaintiff’s protected complaints of illegal activities. (Compl. ¶ 15.) The complaint sets forth fourteen causes of action for (1) FEHA Employment Discrimination (Gov. Code §12940(a)); (2) FEHA Harassment (Gov. Code §12940(j)); (3) FEHA Retaliation (Gov. Code §12940(h); (4) FEHA Failure to Prevent/Remedy Discrimination, Harassment or Retaliation (Gov. Code §12940(k)); (5) Whistleblower Retaliation (Lab. Code §§ 98.6, 1102.5, 6310); (6) Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy; (7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (8) Nonpayment of Wages in Violation of Labor Code §§ 201-204, 218.6, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197.1; (9) Waiting Time Penalties; (10) Unfair Competition (California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et. seq.); (11) Breach of Contract; (12) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (13) Promissory Estoppel; and (14) Fraud. 

On August 1, 2024, HAC filed the instant motion to transfer venue to Orange County, in addition to seeking monetary sanctions.  

On September 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed his opposition. 

On October 2, 2024, HAC filed a reply. 

 

II. DISCUSSION 

“[I]n the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the presumption is that the county in which the title of the action shows that it is brought is, prima facie, the proper county for the commencement and trial of the action. [Citations.]” (Smith v. Stanford Research Institute¿(1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 750, 753.) 

However, Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivisions (a) provide: “Except as otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.” 

The FEHA's exemption provision regarding venue provides:¿“[A FEHA] action may be brought in any county in the state in which the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, in the county in which the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered, or in the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice, but if the defendant is not found within any of these counties, an action may be brought within the county of the defendant's residence or principal office.”¿(Cal. Gov’t Code § 12965(b).) The plain language of the statute indicates that “[i]f none of the three enumerated criteria are satisfied, then venue rests in the county of the defendant's principal office or residence.” (Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 306, 310.)¿This provision regarding venue applies to actions that are solely based on FEHA claims and those that involve FEHA claims, among causes of action that contain “the same factual allegations and were based on the same allegedly discriminatory practices.” (Brown v. Sup. Ct. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 487.)¿¿ 

Here, a review of the complaint does not demonstrate that any injury or liability arose in Los Angeles County. The complaint omits any specific reference to where any of the alleged unlawful practices were committed. Additionally, there is no supporting evidence offered to indicate the obligation or liability arose in Los Angeles County. Plaintiff argues that Los Angeles County is an appropriate venue because of the time he spent working remotely in Los Angeles, particularly due to his romantic relationships in Los Angeles, and cites to Malloy v. Superior Ct. (2022) 83 Cal. App. 5th 543. The Court finds Malloy be distinguishable from the facts of this matter. In Malloy, the plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she was working with her employer’s consent from her home in Los Angeles due to the COVID-10 pandemic, and that she was told she could continue to work in her home during and after her pregnancy. However, as alleged in the complaint, she was told that she had to return to work in-person at her employer’s Orange County office, which was inconsistent with the prior assurance that plaintiff could work from home, and that her refusal to return led to her termination. Based on those allegations, venue was proper in Los Angeles County as “the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked ... but for the alleged unlawful practice.” (Id. at 556.) In contrast, here Plaintiff simply argues that the main office in Buena Park is on the border of Orange and Los Angeles Counties, such that he was able to spend considerable time in Los Angeles and still get to the office. There is no nexus between Plaintiff’s ability to also work remotely in Los Angeles and the alleged wrongful acts, nor are there any allegations in the complaint tying the wrongful acts to Los Angeles County. 

In contrast, HAC proffers the declaration of its Human Resources Manager, who attests that HAC maintains all personnel records for its employees in Buena Park, no employment records related to Plaintiff are in Los Angeles County, that HAC hired Plaintiff on August 3, 1990 to work at HAC’s office in Orange County, HAC’s business records indicate Plaintiff lived in Orange County for the entire duration of his employment and that he worked at HAC’s office in Orange County, Plaintiff oversaw HAC’s operations as President/Chief Executive Officer from Buena Park, and that Plaintiff would have continued working in an reporting to HAC in Buena Park. (Well Decl. ¶¶ 4-10.) Additionally, most Plaintiff’s opposing arguments focus on non-moving party HC, not HAC, which the Court finds unavailing for a few reasons: (1) the arguments concerning HC are contrary to the complaint’s allegations (Compl. ¶3) and not particularly relevant to rebut HAC’s contentions, (2) Plaintiff acknowledges that HAC’s main office is in Orange County, and (3) there is no evidence or allegations tying any of the causes of action to Los Angeles County. Plaintiff’s conclusion that “strong policy” allows plaintiffs to assert a wide choice for FEHA actions is not persuasive. There is no public policy exception in the FEHA statute – there are factors a plaintiff must still meet to ensure an equitable and fair case for all involved. (See Gov’t Code § 12965).) 

Given all the above, Plaintiff has provided the Court with no ground to maintain the action in Los Angeles County under FEHA, and HAC has sufficiently demonstrated that the action should be maintained in Orange County and that venue in Los Angeles County is improper under Gov’t Code § 12965(b). 

 

III. CONCLUSION 

HAC’s motion to transfer venue is GRANTED.¿ This matter is ordered transferred to Orange County with Plaintiff to pay any transfer fees.¿ 

HAC’s request for sanctions is DENIED as Plaintiff provides he had reason to believe Los Angeles was a proper venue, even though he did not ultimately prevail in opposing the motion. 

 

Moving Party is ordered to give notice. 

 

DATED: October 8, 2024 

__________________________ 

Hon. Michelle C. Kim 

Judge of the Superior Court 

 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

• Parties are encouraged to meet and confer after reading this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreement. 

• If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at SMCDEPT78@lacourt.org with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting. 

• Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue. 

• If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.