Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 19STCV30239, Date: 2022-08-12 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19STCV30239 Hearing Date: August 12, 2022 Dept: 74
19STCV30239 THE
WONDERFUL COMPANY LLCvs ANTHEM BLUE CROSS LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY
Defendant Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance
Company’s Motion to Compel: (1) Deposition of Person Most Knowledgeable on
Topic Nos. 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15 and 17; (2) Completion of Deposition of Person
Most Knowledgeable on Topic Nos. 6, 9, 11 and 16; (3) Testimony and Relevant
Documents Related to the UCLA Review; and (4) Completion of Deposition of
Stephen Howe
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance Company’s Motion
to Compel: (1) Deposition of Person Most Knowledgeable on Topic Nos. 4, 7, 8,
10, 12, 15 and 17; (2) Completion of Deposition of Person Most Knowledgeable on
Topic Nos. 6, 9, 11 and 16; (3) Testimony and Relevant Documents Related to the
UCLA Review; and (4) Completion of Deposition of Stephen Howe is GRANTED in
part.
The motion is GRANTED as to Topics Nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12,
15, 16, and 17. The motion is DENIED as to Topics Nos. 9 and 11.
The motion is DENIED to the extent it seeks to overrule
TWC’s privilege objections.
The motion is GRANTED as to the request to compel Howe to
complete his deposition as a percipient witness.
Plaintiff TWC is ordered to produce a person or persons most
qualified as to Topics Nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, and 17, as well as Howe
in his individual capacity, for deposition no later than September 15, 2022.
Background
On August 22, 2019, Plaintiff The Wonderful
Company LLC (“TWC”), on behalf of itself and other similarly situated, filed a
complaint against Defendants Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance
Company (“ABCLH”) and Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital Standard. The
operative First Amended Complaint asserts causes of action for: (1) breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) breach of fiduciary
duty; (3) accounting; (4) violation of the Cartwright Act (price fixing) (Bus.
& Prof Code, § 16720, et seq.); (5) unreasonable restraint of trade (Bus.
& Prof Code, § 16720, et seq.); (6) combination to monopolize in violation
of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720, et seq.); and (7)
violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200, et. seq.
TWC alleges Defendant ABCLH violated the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and its fiduciary duties by inflating
medical bills to TWC’s detriment, failing to disclose negotiated rates, and
threatening to remove TWC from the insurance network. TWC also alleges the Defendants unlawfully
control, fix, or tamper with the prices for acute care services for children by
entering into secret price agreements and consolidating healthcare practices.
Motion
Defendant ABCLH moves the Court to compel
Plaintiff TWC to provide a Person Most
Qualified to testify as to Topics Nos. 4,
7, 8, 10, 12, 15 and 17,
provide further testimony as to Topics Nos. Topic Nos. 6, 9, 11 and 16,
responses to questions to which the witness was instructed not to answer, and
the completion of the deposition of Stephen Howe.
Opposition
In opposition, TWC contends it met its obligations
to produce a person most qualified as to the topics it produced a witness for,
the remaining topics are impermissibly overbroad, its privilege objections are
meritorious, and it never refused to produce Howe for his continued deposition.
Reply
In reply, ABCLH argues the topics meet the standard
of reasonable particularity, TWC failed to adequately inform Howe as its
designated witness, the privilege objection lacks merit, and TWC must produce
Howe for his continued deposition.
Improper Citations to Superior Court
Orders
In support of
its motion and reply, ABCLH cites numerous California Superior Court rulings.
(Mot. at 8:16-9:8; Reply at 4:18, 8:4-10, 8:17-20.) The Court disregards these
citations. (Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
1290, 1299 n.5 (“Rule 8.1115 of the California Rules of Court prohibits the
citation of unpublished opinions of California state courts, with certain
limited exceptions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a).) We shall disregard
the unpublished superior court opinions cited and relied upon by plaintiff.”); (See City of Bakersfield v. West Park Home Owners Assn. & Friends (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1210 (“trial court orders hold no precedential value.
Accordingly, we will neither rely upon, nor take judicial notice of, these
orders.”) (internal citation omitted).)
Discussion
Standard
ABCLH brings
its motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450(a), which
provides: “[i]f, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or
an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person
designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without
having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for
examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document,
electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the
deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling
the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of
any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in
the deposition notice.”
The motion must be
accompanied by a meet and confer declaration and “shall set forth specific facts
showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document,
electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the
deposition notice.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(b).) “[W]hen the deponent fails
to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored
information, or things described in the deposition notice, [the motion must be
accompanied] by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the
deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.” (Code Civ. Proc. §
2025.450(b)(2).) “Implicit in the requirement that counsel contact the deponent
to inquire about the nonappearance is a requirement that counsel listen to the
reasons offered and make a good faith attempt to resolve the issue.” (Leko v.
Cornerstone Bldg. Inspection Serv. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th
1109, 1124.) The opposing party bears the burden to justify any objections.
(See e.g. Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.)
While not cited by ABCLH, some of the relief sought in ABCLH’s motion is more properly based upon Code of
Civil Procedure section 2025.480(a), which provides “[i]f a deponent fails to
answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored
information, or tangible thing under the deponent's control that is specified
in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery
may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” The
“motion shall be made no later than 60 days after the completion of the record
of the deposition, and shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration
under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.480(b).) “If the court
determines that the answer or production sought is subject to discovery, it shall
order that the answer be given or the production be made on the resumption of
the deposition.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.480(i).) The motion must be
accompanied by a separate statement. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.1345.)
“Because of the similarity of California and federal discovery
law, federal decisions have historically been considered persuasive absent
contrary California decisions.” (Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1288.)
Background of Discovery and Meet and
Confer
On
January 12, 2022, ABCLH served
the Third Amended Notice of Taking the Videotaped Deposition of Stephen Howe in
his individual capacity with the deposition set for March 23, 2022. (Braje
Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B.) On January 31, 2022, ABCLH
served the Notice of Taking the Videotaped Deposition of The Wonderful
Company LLC’s Person(s) Most Qualified with the deposition set for March 9,
2022. (Id. Ex. C.)
On
March 23, 2022, TWC served
objections to the person most qualified deposition notice objecting to every deposition
topic and document request. (Id. Ex. D.) The parties met and conferred
regarding the objections and agreed Howe would appear in both his individual
and representative capacity on March 23, 2022. (Id. ¶ 6.) Howe appeared in
response to Topics Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, and 16 and the parties agreed
to keep the deposition open with the next Howe deposition to take place on May
9, 2022. (Id. ¶ 9.)
On
April 5, 2022, ABCLH sent a meet
and confer letter arguing TWC must
produce a witness as to the other topics listed in the notice, TWC must properly educate Howe to
testify regarding Topics Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 11, 13, and 16, and TWC improperly instructed Howe not
to answer questions regarding the UCLA review. (Id. Ex. E.) TWC sent a responsive letter on
April 27, 2022. (Id. Ex. F.) Despite TWC’s
previous agreement to resume Howe’s deposition on May 9, 2022, TWC informed ABCLH on May 4, 2022 that it would not
make Howe available on that date because the parties had not yet resolved their
disagreement regarding the scope and substance of his PMQ testimony. (Id. Ex.
I.) ABCLH disagreed that the
deposition needed to be postponed pending the resolution of their disputes.
(Id. Ex. J.) The parties conducted a further meet and confer via telephone on
May 9, 2022. (Id. ¶ 18.) On May 12, 2022, TWC sent a letter indicating its position that it satisfied its
obligations and would stand on its objections. (Id. Ex. K.) The parties
satisfied the meet and confer requirement as to the issues raised in the
motion.
Topics Nos. 4, 7, 10, 12, 15 and 17
Topics Nos. 4, 7, 10, 12, 15, and 17 all seek “All COMMUNICATIONS” regarding the following:
Topic 4 – the Administrative Services Agreement
between TWC and ABCLH effective January 1, 2014, and/or any amendment to the
agreement.
Topic 7 – stop loss coverage at any
time since 2014.
Topic 10 – patient J.J.
Topic
12 – patient I.C.
Topic 15 – any and all complaints and/or
criticisms of ABCLH’s performance under the Administrative Services Agreement
between TWC and ABCLH effective January 1, 2014, and/or any amendment to the
agreement
Topic 17 – any audit related to patient claim(s)
processed by ABCLH pursuant to the Administrative Services Agreement including,
but not limited to the NBAS audit.
(Braje
Decl. Ex. C.) “COMMUNICATIONS” are defined as “any transmission or exchange of
information, ideas or thought(s), between or among two or more PERSONS, orally
or in writing, and includes any conversation or discussion, whether
face-to-face or by means of a telephone, telegraph, telex, telecopier,
facsimile transmission, general mail, email, instant messaging, electronic
device, or other any other medium.” (Ibid.)
TWC did not produce a witness for these
topics, concedes their relevance in its opposition, argues it produced Howe to
testify as to similar topics, but objects to being required to produce a
witness to testify as to “all communications.” (Opp. at 5:17-7:27.) TWC argues “[t]he obligation rests
on Anthem, not TWC’s PMQ, to review all communications in its own records and
those produced by TWC in the action. It is not the obligation of TWC’s PMQ to
review all such communications as to every topic in the notice, so that he can
be prepared to answer questions as to any email on any of the topics.” (Opp. at
7:18-21.)
As noted by ABCLH in reply, (Reply at 4:19-21), TWC does not support its arguments regarding these
topics with citations to any relevant authority. ABCLH’s topics are reasonably particularized, seeking
communications related to limited topics, and it is the TWC’s burden to educate its witnesses. (Maldonado
v. Superior Court (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1395–1396 (“[i]f the subject
matter of the questioning is clearly stated, the burden is on the entity, not
the examiner, to produce the right witnesses. And, if the particular officer or
employee designated lacks personal knowledge of all the information sought, he
or she is supposed to find out from those who do!”).) Nothing prevents TWC from designating different individuals
for different topics to lessen the burden upon natural persons. (Maldonado,
supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at 1396 (“Certainly, no single person is expected to
be familiar with the total contents of a corporation's files.”); Code Civ.
Proc. § 2025.230.)
Under similar circumstances, federal
courts overrule objections based upon burden such as those asserted by TWC here. (See e.g. MedImmune, LLC v. PDL Biopharma, Inc.
(N.D. Cal., Dec. 17, 2009, No. C08-05590 JF (HRL)) 2009 WL 5069142, at *2 (“As
other courts have noted, ‘it is not uncommon’ for a company to claim that a
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition would cause an undue burden because it no longer
employs anyone with personal knowledge of the events at issue. [Citation.] Yet
PDL is not relieved of its obligation to prepare one or more designees on this
ground alone.”); Sprint Communications
Co., L.P. v. Theglobe.com, Inc. (D. Kan. 2006) 236 F.R.D. 524, 528
(“Although the Court readily acknowledges that the requirements listed above
may be onerous, the burden upon such a responding entity is justified since a
corporation can only act through its employees.”).)
The motion is GRANTED as to Topics Nos. 4, 7, 10, 12, 15, and 17.
Topic No. 8
Topic No. 8
seeks testimony regarding “Any and all reports and/or invoices provided by
ABCLH to TWC at any time during the time period 2014-19 including, but not
limited to, enrollment reports, claims reports, high cost claimant reports, lag
reports, OOP reports, transplant reports, health condition reports and monthly
reports.” (Braje Decl. Ex. C.) TWC contends
“neither Howe nor any other individual at TWC can testify as to these
incredibly broad categories of documents, for the thousands of insureds covered
by TWC’s benefits plans, over a five year period. Since the request is not
described with reasonable particularity, Anthem is not entitled to depose TWC’s
PMQ on this topic.” (Opp. at 8:7-10.) TWC does not
cite any specific authority or evidence supporting this argument and therefore
has failed to meet its burden. The Court finds the topic meets the standard of
reasonable particularity.
The motion is
GRANTED as to Topic No. 8.
Topics
Nos. Topic Nos. 6, 9, 11 and 16
As
relevant here, TWC produced Howe as its
person most qualified to testify as to Topics Nos. 6, 9, 11, and 16. ABCLH contends Howe was not adequately
prepared to testify as required. TWC
has a duty to produce “the most knowledgeable person currently in its
employ and making sure that that person has access to information and documents
reasonably available within the corporation.” (Maldonado, supra, 94
Cal.App.4th at 1398.)
Topic No. 6 sought testimony regarding
“[a]ny and all stop loss coverage in place with respect to TWC’s self-funded
health benefit plan(s) at any time since 2014.” (Braje Decl. Ex. C.) ABCLH cites a portion of Howe’s
testimony wherein he responded to the question “Did The Wonderful Company
discuss the stop loss issue with Anthem back in 2015?” with “I don’t know,” and
also admitted to not knowing whether TWC
communicated “with Mercer about these things by email.” (Id. Ex. G, Howe
Depo. at 264:14-23.) In opposition, TWC
attempts to place the burden upon ABCLH to identify the deposition topics with more specificity than
is required. (Opp. at 10:4-10 (“If Anthem wanted to know more specific
information about the identity of TWC’s carrier in 2014 or the substance of any
communications with stop-loss carriers in 2015 (which, in any event, is better
memorialized by documents), then Anthem could have specifically identified
those as topics in its PMQ deposition notice.”).) The testimony indicates TWC failed to adequately inform its
designated deponent as to Topic No. 6 and further testimony is warranted. The
motion is GRANTED as to Topic No. 6.
Topic No. 9 sought testimony regarding
“[t]he treatment provided by Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital to patient J.J.
and the claim(s) associated with that treatment” and Topic No. 11 sought testimony regarding
“[t]he treatment provided by Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital to patient I.C.
and the claim(s) associated with that treatment.” (Braje Decl. Ex. C.) In its
separate statement, ABCLH cites
testimony in which it asked whether “the Wonderful Company contend[s] that
J.J.’s transplant surgery wasn’t necessary from a medical perspective” and Howe
responded that he was not a doctor and “can’t tell people what’s medically
necessary or not.” (Braje Decl. Ex. G, Howe Depo. at 245:5-18.) TWC indicates there is no person
most qualified to testify regarding treatment and it did not have access to
their medical records. (Opp. at 10:24-11:9.) In reply, ABCLH argues it is “asking about TWC’s contentions in this case,
it is not asking TWC’s witness to offer a medical opinion.” (Reply at 9:2-3.)
However, ABCLH’s contention
questions are not the proper subject of deposition discovery. (See e.g. Rifkind
v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1262 (“If the deposing party
wants to know facts, it can ask for facts; if it wants to know what the adverse
party is contending, or how it rationalizes the facts as supporting a
contention, it may ask that question in an interrogatory.”).) The motion is
DENIED as to Topics Nos. 9 and 11.
Topic No. 16 sought testimony regarding
“[a]ny audit related to patient claim(s) processed by ABCLH pursuant to the
Administrative Services Agreement including, but not limited to, the NBAS
audit.” (Braje Decl. Ex. C.) ABCLH notes
Howe did not know “how much time . . . NBAS spen[t] auditing the . . . J.J.
claim” or “how much The Wonderful Company paid for the audit.” (Braje Decl. Ex.
G, Howe Depo. at 188:17-24.) Howe admitted he did not “ask anybody about the
fees or costs associated with the NBAS audit.” (Id. at 189:13-16.) While TWC argues “Anthem complains Howe
was unable to answer only two questions about the NBAS audit” and “[a] PMQ
deposition is not meant to be a memory test,” (Opp. at 11:16-20), the testimony
demonstrates Howe did not inquire as to the cost or fees associated with the
audit. Accordingly, Howe was not adequately prepared, and further testimony is
warranted. The motion is GRANTED as to Topic No. 16.
The parties disagree whether Topic 16
seeking testimony about an “any audit” includes the UCLA review, which Howe
testified was not an “audit.” (Opp. at 8:20-9:1; Traboulsi Decl. Ex. A, Howe
Depo. at 217:10-13; Reply at 6:9-22.) The definition of “audit” includes a
“review.” (See e.g. Graydon-Murphy Oldsmobile v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.
(1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 53, 60 (“Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary
(1969) defines ‘audit’ in the following manner: ‘1 a: a formal or official
examination and verification of an account book; b: a methodical examination
and review.”).) Accordingly, the Court agrees with ABCLH that the UCLA review
falls within the scope of Topic No. 16. However, it is unclear, based upon the
Court’s discussion below, whether a witness for TWC will be able to provide
non-privileged testimony related to the review.
Privilege
Instruction
“The party claiming the privilege has
the burden of establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its
exercise, i.e., a communication made in the course of an attorney-client
relationship. [Citations] Once that party establishes facts necessary to
support a prima facie claim of privilege, the communication is presumed to have
been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the
burden of proof to establish the communication was not confidential or that the
privilege does not for other reasons apply.” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v.
Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733.) “[T]he privilege attaches to
any legal advice given in the course of an attorney-client relationship.” (Ibid.) “The attorney-client privilege
attaches to a confidential communication between the attorney and the client
and bars discovery of the communication irrespective of whether it includes
unprivileged material.” (Id. at 734. See also Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 601 (“Neither the
statutes articulating the attorney-client privilege nor the cases which have
interpreted it make any differentiation between ‘factual’ and ‘legal’
information.”).)
ABCLH notes that TWC’s counsel instructed Howe not to answer certain
questions about the UCLA review based upon the attorney client privilege. (Mot.
at 12:1-13:17.) Howe testified that he believed “one of the lawyers called over
to UCLA and asked them questions to someone over there about the bill.” (Braje
Decl. Ex. G, Howe Depo. at 213:13-15.) ABCLH
then asked whether Howe knew “what information the lawyer provided to
UCLA” and TWC’s counsel
instructed “I'm going to object to the -- well, just caution you, Steve, that
any information that she asks you about that you received directly from an
attorney tell her that you received that information from the attorney so that
she -- so you don't testify about it.” (Id. at 213:21-214:1.) Howe then
responded to various questions about the UCLA audit stating the information he
had all came from an attorney. (Id. at 214:10-221:16.) Howe could only identify
an attorney as the person from TWC who
communicated with UCLA. (Id. at 217:4-6.)
The Court finds TWC’s objections meritorious. ABCLH contends TWC’s counsel maintained the instruction
“despite the fact that counsel for Defendants emphasized that TWC was
‘misstating the law’ because the questions asked sought ‘factual matter’ rather
than ‘legal advice.’” (Mot. at 12:24-26.) However, this is not a material
distinction under California law. (Mitchell,
supra, 37 Cal.3d at 601 (“Real parties' further contention that their
inquiries about warnings to Ms. Mitchell from her attorney are not privileged
since they involve “factual information” as opposed to “legal advice” must
similarly be rejected.).) ABCLH also
focuses upon case law involving the transmission of facts to an attorney,
(Reply at 6:23-7:8), which is not the situation here. Howe testified the
information he received regarding the UCLA review only came from TWC’s counsel. Accordingly, ABCLH’s statement that “these questions
do not ask for Howe’s communications with the Roll Law Group nor his counsel’s
conclusions,” (Reply at 7:16-18), is incorrect and requiring ABCLH to obtain information from UCLA
does not “undermine[] any claim of privilege.” (Mot. at 13:11-13.) While facts
are not privileged, if the only way a deponent
learned of those facts is through counsel operating within the
attorney-client relationship, the privilege applies to ABCLH’s questioning. (Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d at 601; DP
Pham, LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 653, 666 (“The privilege
therefore protects the confidential communication or transmission of
information between an attorney and a client regardless of whether the
information transmitted is otherwise privileged.”).) The motion is DENIED to
the extent it seeks to overrule TWC’s privilege objections.
Howe
Deposition
Finally,
ABCLH notes TWC did not comply with its agreement to continue Howe’s deposition
on May 9, 2022 and the parties’ dispute did not apply to Howe’s deposition as a
percipient witness. (Mot. at 15:6-14.) In opposition, TWC contends it never
refused to produce Howe as a percipient witness, but only sought to avoid
having him appear separately after the ABCLH previously deposed him in both
capacities on the same date. (Opp. at 11:26-12:3.) In reply, ABCLH contends
“TWC is not entitled to hamstring ABCLH’s discovery in this case by
conditioning the completion of Mr. Howe’s deposition on resolution of other
discovery disputes” and failed to provide alternative dates for the continued
deposition. (Reply at 9::16-10:11.) ABCLH requests the Court grant the motion
and “require TWC to provide several, alternative dates for the completion of
Mr. Howe’s deposition on or before September 15, 2022.” (Reply at 10:10-11.)
Counsel for ABCLH is unavailable from August 15 through August 24. (Braje Reply
Decl. ¶ 3.) The evidence is sufficient to demonstrate Howe refused to proceed
with his deposition on May 9, 2022. Additionally, the Court has resolved the
discovery disputes that served as the basis for this refusal.
The motion is
GRANTED as to the request to compel Howe’s continued deposition as a percipient
witness.