Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 20STCV17682, Date: 2022-10-11 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 20STCV17682    Hearing Date: October 11, 2022    Dept: 74

20STCV17682           SUZANNE RUELAS vs CITY OF BALDWIN PARK, et al.

Plaintiff Suzanne Ruelas’s Motion to Compel Defendant City of Baldwin Park to Provide Further Responses, Without Objection, to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories (Sets Two and Three) (C.C.P. § 2030.300)

TENTATIVE RULING:   Plaintiff Suzanne Ruelas’s Motion to Compel Defendant City of Baldwin Park to Provide Further Responses, Without Objection, to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories (Sets Two and Three) (C.C.P. § 2030.300) is GRANTED in part. The motion is GRANTED as to Special Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 128-136 and DENIED as to Special Interrogatories (Set Three) No. 137.  Defendant is ordered to provide complete, verified, code-compliant responses to Special Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 128-136 without objection within 20 days.

Background

On May 8, 2020, Plaintiff Suzanne Ruelas filed this action. The operative Second Amended Complaint asserts the following fourteen causes of action against Defendants City of Baldwin Park, Shannon Yauchzee, Rose Tam, Laura Thomas, Manuel Lozano, Michael Taylor, and Benjamin Martinez: (1) wrongful termination of employment in violation of Labor Code § 1102.5 (wage complaints); (2) wrongful termination of employment in violation of Labor Code § 1102.5 (fraud complaints); (3) discrimination on the basis of race in violation of FEHA; (4) harassment on the basis of race in violation of FEHA; (5) retaliation on the basis of race in violation of FEHA; (6) discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of FEHA; (7) harassment on the basis of gender in violation of FEHA; (8) retaliation on the basis of gender in violation of FEHA; (9) discrimination on the basis of age in violation of FEHA; (10) harassment on the basis of age in violation of FEHA; (11) retaliation on the basis of age in violation of FEHA; (12) retaliation for engaging in protected activity in violation of FEHA; (13) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (14) defamation.

On January 12, 2022, Plaintiff dismissed Robert Tafoya as a defendant.

Motion

On September 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Defendant City of Baldwin Park to provide further responses to Special Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 128-136 and Special Interrogatories (Set Three) No. 137.

Opposition

In opposition, Defendant contends the discovery sought should be denied to protect the privacy of non-parties.

Reply

In reply, Plaintiff notes Defendant did not address its waiver of objections and the asserted privacy rights are insufficient to deny discovery of witness contact information.

Motion to Compel Further Responses

Standard

The propounding party may bring a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories if it believes the responses received are evasive or incomplete, the attempt to produce writings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 is unwarranted or inadequate, or if the objections raised are meritless or too general. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300(a).) The motion must be accompanied by a good-faith meet and confer declaration, (Code Civ. Proc. § 2016.040), and be accompanied by a separate statement. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.1345.) The opposing party bears the burden of justifying any objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255; Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 97-98.) Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 (“the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.”).)

Unless extended, the motion must be filed within 45 days of service of the responses. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2016.050; 2030.300(c); Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410 (“the time within which to make a motion to compel . . . is mandatory and jurisdictional.”).)

Background of Discovery and Meet and Confer

On June 28, 2022, Plaintiff served Special Interrogatories (Set Two) upon Defendant City of Baldwin Park. (Gbewonyo Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) On July 19, 2022, Plaintiff served Special Interrogatories (Set Three) upon City of Baldwin Park. (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. 2.)

On July 29, 2022, Defendant requested an extension to August 19, 2022 for its responses, which Plaintiff denied citing upcoming depositions. (Id. ¶ 5. Ex. 3.) Defendant served its responses on August 12, 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9, Ex. 5-6.) The parties exchanged meet and confer letters, but were unable to resolve the discovery dispute. (Id. ¶¶ 10-12, Ex. 3-4.)

Special Interrogatories (Set Two)

Plaintiff moves to compel Defendant City of Baldwin Park to provide further responses to Special Interrogatories, (Set Two) Nos. 128-136.

Each of these interrogatories request the last known personal phone number and home address for various individuals. (Gbewonyo Decl. Ex. 1.) Defendant responded by asserting the same objections to each interrogatory: “Objection. Disclosure of information would violate the right to privacy of non-parties to this action, whose privacy is protected under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, Article I, Section I, California Government Code Section 7460, et seq., and California Evidence Code Section 1060.” (Id. Ex. 5.)

In response to Special Interrogatories Nos. 128, 131, 132, 134, and 135, Defendant asserted objections and provided home addresses only. (Id. Ex. 5.) Defendant’s partial substantive responses are evasive and incomplete. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.220(a); 2030.300(a)(1).)

In response to Special Interrogatories Nos. 129 and 133, Defendant asserted objections and stated it “does not have the information requested.” (Gbewonyo Ex. 5.) Defendant’s substantive response is not code compliant. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220(c) (“If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.”).)

In response to Special Interrogatory No. 130, Defendant asserted objections and stated: “Sharon Rivera is an employee of the City of Baldwin Park, she was deposed by Plaintiff, and she is accessible, if necessary, through counsel.” (Gbewonyo Ex. 5.) Defendant’s substantive response is evasive and incomplete. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.220(a); 2030.300(a)(1).)

In response to Special Interrogatory No. 136, Defendant asserted objections and stated it “has no record of any employee or former employee by the name of ‘Michal Taylor.’” (Gbewonyo Decl. Ex. 3.) Defendant’s substantive response is proper. Plaintiff must bear the consequences of her counsel’s apparent typographical error.

As argued by Plaintiff and unaddressed by Defendant, Defendant waived its right to assert objections to Special Interrogatories, Set Two. (Code Civ. Proc. §  2030.290(a).) Plaintiff served Special Interrogatories, Set Two on June 28, 2022 via electronic mail. (Gbewonyo Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) Thus, Defendant’s responses were due no later than August 1, 2022. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1010.6; 2030.260(a).) Defendant did not obtain a written extension and served its responses on August 12, 2022. (Gbewonyo Decl. ¶ 7.) Defendant’s late responses waived the right to assert objections to Special Interrogatories, Set Two. (Code Civ. Proc. §  2030.290(a).) Defendant’s August 12, 2022 response was timely as to Special Interrogatories, Set Two, which were served on July 19, 2022. (Gbewonyo Decl. ¶ 4.)

As the responding party, Defendant bears the burden to justify its objections, (Fairmont, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 255; Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at 97-98), including those based upon privacy. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 557 (Courts must instead place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion.”).) Even if it had not waived its right to assert objections, Defendant failed to meet its burden.

Defendant summarily states that Plaintiff is not entitled to the telephone numbers of witnesses and they should be protected by the witnesses right to privacy. (Opp. at 2:14-3:18; 4:6-12.) Defendant does not cite any authority in support of its contentions. (See generally Fenton v. City of Delano (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 400, 410 (“A point totally unsupported by argument and authority may be rejected by the reviewing court without discussion.”).)

Witness contact information, including telephone numbers, is discoverable. (Crab Addison, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 958, 967 (“contact information for witnesses ordinarily is produced during discovery, and it is neither unduly personal nor overly intrusive.”); Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1254 (“Indeed, it is only under unusual circumstances that the courts restrict discovery of nonparty witnesses' residential contact information.”).) Defendant concedes the disclosure of telephone numbers is not a serious invasion of privacy as it suggests the information is publicly available. (Opp. at 4:9-10 (“finding their telephone numbers should not be an impossible task. It may take no more than a telephone call to a reasonably experienced investigator.”).) The Court finds the privacy interests at issue to be limited and outweighed by Plaintiff’s need to contact relevant witnesses. Defendant must provide the information reasonably available to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220(a).)

Defendant states in its opposition, “[f]or some inexplicable reason, Plaintiff spends pages arguing improper objections such as attorney client privilege, vague and ambiguous, and relevance. Plaintiff must have been reading something else because the only objection posed by Defendants was the right to privacy of the individuals whose contact information was sought by Plaintiff.” (Opp. at 3:20-23.) Defendant’s responses began with “general objections” that stated “[t]he City makes the following general objections, whether or not separately set forth the response to each and every interrogatory to this entire set of interrogatories.” (Gbewonyo Decl. Ex. 5 at 2:27-3:12.) Defendant’s argument in opposition concedes its “general objections” were entirely improper and boilerplate. (Korea Data Systems Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516 (“we recognize the use of ‘boiler plate’ objections as were provided in this case may be sanctionable.”).)

Defendant’s specific objections are similarly boilerplate and inapplicable. Defendant cited Evidence Code 1060, which codifies trade secret protection. (Evid. Code § 1060 (“If he or his agent or employee claims the privilege, the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to prevent another from disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.”).) Witness telephone numbers are not trade secrets.

Defendant also cited “California Government Code Section 7460, et seq.,” which addresses government access to financial records. (Gov. Code, § 7460 (“This chapter shall be known as the ‘California Right to Financial Privacy Act.’”); Gov. Code § 7461(c) (“The purpose of this chapter is to clarify and protect the confidential relationship between financial institutions and their customers and to balance a citizen's right of privacy with the governmental interest in obtaining information for specific purposes and by specified procedures as set forth in this chapter.”).) The interrogatories do not seek financial information.

The motion is GRANTED as to Special Interrogatories (Set Two) Nos. 128-136. Defendant is ordered to provide complete, verified, code-compliant responses without objection within 20 days.

Special Interrogatories (Set Three)

Plaintiff also seeks to compel a further response to Special Interrogatories (Set Three) No. 137. This special interrogatory seeks contact information for Viviana Robles, which is also sought in Special Interrogatories (Set Two) No. 131. Accordingly, this request is unreasonably duplicative.

The motion is DENIED as to Special Interrogatories (Set Three) No. 137.

Plaintiff Did Not Request Sanctions

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300(d), “[t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

Plaintiff declined to seek sanctions in her motion.