Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 20STCV19369, Date: 2022-08-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV19369 Hearing Date: August 19, 2022 Dept: 74
20STCV19369 UNG
THI LAM vs JIM TURCO
OSC RE ENTRY DEFAULT
TENTATIVE RULING:
The OSC is CONTINUED to September 29, 2022 at 8:30 a.m.
Background
On May 21, 2020, Plaintiffs Ung Thi Lam and Phung
Nguyen filed this action against Defendants Jim Turco, Margaret Cheng, American
Gateway Regional Centers, LLC, 1875 N. Palm Canyon Gateway Partners I, LP, JM
Investment Group, LLC, and 1875 N. Palm Canyon Partners II, LLC. The complaint
alleges seven causes of action: (1) Enforcement of Rights Under California
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (3) Breach of
Contract, (4) Fraud, (5) Fraudulent Inducement, (6) Fraudulent Concealment, and
(7) Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200.
On August 26, 2020, the clerk entered Defendant
1875 N. Palm Canyon Gateway Partners I, LP’s default.
On December 17, 2020, Defendants filed a Notice
of Stay of Proceedings due to Defendant 1875 N. Palm Canyon Partners II, LLC’s
filing of a bankruptcy petition.
On June 2, 2021, the Court dismissed Does 1-10.
On January 21, 2022, the Court granted
Plaintiffs’ motion for terminating sanctions against Defendants Jim Turco,
Margaret Cheng, American Gateway Regional Centers, LLC, and JM Investment
Group, LLC. The Court struck these Defendants’ answers and entered their
defaults.
On May 4, 2022, the Court struck Defendant 1875
N. Palm Canyon Partners II, LLC’s answer and on June 23, 2022, the clerk
entered its default.
On June 23, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Status
Report indicating the bankruptcy proceedings were closed on July 12, 2021
without a discharge.
On July 6, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their default
judgment package.
Legal Standard
Code
of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a judgment after a Defendant
fails to timely answer following proper service of process. A party seeking
judgment on the default by the Court must file a Request for Court Judgment,
and provide: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other
admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest
computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) a
proposed form of judgment; (6) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment
is not sought; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought
or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section
579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as
necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys’ fees if allowed by statute or by
the agreement of the parties. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.1800(a).)
Plaintiffs Must Submit Additional
Documents
Plaintiffs’
proposed judgment is not consistent with the declarations regarding breach of
contract damages. The proposed judgment states “Plaintiffs’ total damages under
their third cause of action for breach of contract is $1,100,000 plus
pre-judgment interest at the lawful rate of 10%, the daily rate of $273.97 per
day from November 27, 2018.” Plaintiffs’ counsel’s declaration states
“Plaintiffs’ total actual damages under the Third Cause of Action for Breach of
Contract is $1,000,000. As none of the agreements specify a specific rate of
interest, the rate of interest applicable here is 10%. See Cal. Civ. Code §
3289(b). Per diem pre-judgment interest would therefore be $273.97.” (Veeneman
Decl. ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs must resolve this discrepancy.
Plaintiffs
also must execute declarations in their native language that are then
translated into English via a court-certified translator. (See Cal. R. Ct.,
rule 3.1110(g); Evid. Code §§ 750, 751, 753; Gov. Code §§ 68561(a); 68566.)
Plaintiff Nguyen’s declaration states “English is not my primary language.
While I can understand basic English, I am not fluent.” (Nguyen Decl. ¶ 3.) It
is not clear whether Nguyen’s ability to understand English is sufficient to
read and understand the English declaration filed with the Court absent
interpretation. Plaintiff Lam’s declaration states “I neither speak nor read
English. . . . My son, plaintiff Phung Nguyen, translated the contents of this
declaration so that I could review and sign.” (Lam Decl. ¶ 3.) Accordingly,
both Plaintiffs’ declarations appear to be uncertified translations.
Additionally,
Plaintiffs must remove their request for punitive damages.
Plaintiffs
served their statement of damages related to their $200,000.00 punitive damages
request on February 1, 2022. (Veeneman
Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 24.) However, all but Defendant 1875 N. Palm Canyon Partners II, LLC’s default had
been entered prior to February 1, 2022. To be valid, a statement of damages
must be served within a reasonable time before the entry of default. (See Code
Civ. Proc. § 425.115(f) (“The plaintiff shall serve the statement upon the
defendant pursuant to this section before a default may be taken, if the motion
for default judgment includes a request for punitive damages.”).)
This rule applies even where, as here, Plaintiffs
obtain a default via terminating sanctions. (Behm v. Clear View Technologies
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1, 11–12 (“By not filing a statement of punitive damages
until after the hearing on the order terminating sanctions . . . [Plaintiffs] .
. . , effectively deprived [Defendants] of notice of the full potential
consequences of foregoing its last chance to change its course of noncompliance
and nonopposition, demonstrating to the court that it will take part in the
litigation process. [Plaintiffs] failed to give [Defendants] sufficient notice
of its potential liability.”); Matera v. McLeod (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th
44, 62 (“plaintiffs personally served a statement of damages on defendants'
attorney only two days before the court struck the defendants' answer and
entered their defaults. . . . We conclude that two days before the entry of
default was not a reasonable period of time to apprise the defendants of their
substantial potential liability for purposes of due process.”).)
Moreover, Plaintiffs failed to provide adequate
evidence of Defendants’ financial condition to support the claim for punitive
damages. Accordingly, a punitive damages award is also not appropriate on this basis. (See Adams
v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 114; Robert L. Cloud &
Associates, Inc. v. Mikesell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1151 (1999) (“an
award of punitive damages must be supported by meaningful evidence of the
defendant's financial condition.”); Baxter
v. Peterson (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 673, 680 (“there should be some evidence of the defendant's actual
wealth. Normally, evidence of liabilities should accompany evidence of assets,
and evidence of expenses should accompany evidence of income.”).)