Judge Michelle Williams Court, Case 21STCP02387 2022-08-31 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 21STCP02387, Date: 2022-08-31 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21STCP02387 Hearing Date: August 31, 2022 Dept: 74

21STCP02387 TILANA TONEY vs ESCROW AGENTS FIDELITY CORPORATION

Motion by Cross-Petitioner Escrow Agents Fidelity Corporation (EAFC) for Order to Enter Default and for Default Judgment against Cross-Respondent Tilana Toney on EAFC’s Cross-Petition

TENTATIVE RULING: The Motion by Cross-Petitioner Escrow Agents Fidelity Corporation (EAFC) for Order to Enter Default and for Default Judgment against Cross-Respondent Tilana Toney on EAFC’s Cross-Petition is GRANTED as a motion for hearing on the petition and cross-petition. EAFC is ordered to submit a proposed judgment in conformity with this ruling by September 6, 2022. An OSC re entry of judgment is scheduled for September 22, 2022 at 8:30 a.m. The Court confirms the arbitration award and shall enter judgment in conformity therewith.

Background

On May 21, 2021, Petitioner Tilana Toney, in propria persona, filed a “Petition for the Writ of Mandamus to Set Aside the Arbitration Award” in the Ventura County Superior Court. The Petition sought to set aside the arbitrator’s award based upon allegations of improper exclusion of evidence and the discovery of new evidence.

On July 7, 2021, the court in Ventura County entered the parties’ stipulation to transfer the action to Los Angeles County, and the transfer was completed on July 23, 2021.

On September 13, 2021, the Court entered an order sustaining without leave to amend, in part, Escrow Agents Fidelity’s demurrer to the Petition.

On September 30, 2021, Escrow Agents Fidelity filed a cross-petition seeking to confirm the arbitration award.

On December 14, 2021, the Court entered an order on Petitioner Toney’s demurrers and motion to strike Escrow Agents Fidelity’s answer and cross-petition. The Court overruled the demurrers, denied the motion to strike, and ordered Petitioner Toney to “file a Response to the cross-petition within 30 days.”

Petitioner Toney did not file a response.

Motion to Enter Default and Default Judgment

On June 28, 2022, Escrow Agents Fidelity filed the instant motion to enter Petitioner Toney’s default on the cross-petition and enter judgment on the cross-petition in its favor confirming the arbitration award.

The motion is unopposed.

Request for Judicial Notice

Escrow Agents Fidelity requests the Court take judicial notice of 14 enumerated facts and 7 exhibits. Each of the exhibits are court records. The Court takes judicial notice of their existence and legal effect but not the truth of the matters asserted therein. (Evid. Code § 452(d).) The Court takes judicial notice of facts regarding the general procedural history of the case. (Ibid.) The Court does not take judicial notice of Escrow Agents Fidelity’s editorial statements accompanying the recitations of fact. (See e.g. RJN ¶ 9 (“after numerous delays by TONEY”); ¶ 10 (“TONEY has violated this Court’s order”).)

Discussion

Standard

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1285, “[a]ny party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate the award.” “A response to a petition under this chapter may request the court to dismiss the petition or to confirm, correct or vacate the award.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1285.2.)

The Arbitration Award is Confirmed

While titled as a “Petition for the Writ of Mandamus to Set Aside the Arbitration Award,” Petitioner Toney’s petition is one to vacate an arbitration award pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1285. Respondent Escrow Agents Fidelity filed a response and cross-petition seeking to confirm the award.

The clerk rejected Escrow Agents Fidelity’s request for entry of default informing it that “[d]efaults are not entered on Petitions.” (RJN Ex. 5.) “A petition under this title shall be heard in a summary way in the manner and upon the notice provided by law for the making and hearing of motions, except that not less than 10 days' notice of the date set for the hearing on the petition shall be given.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1290.2.)

While Escrow Agents Fidelity’s motion is captioned a motion to enter default and default judgment, it is properly construed as a motion for hearing on the petition and cross-petition. “The proposition that a trial court may construe a motion bearing one label as a different type of motion is one that has existed for many decades. The nature of a motion is determined by the nature of the relief sought, not by the label attached to it. The law is not a mere game of words.” (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 187, 193 (quotation omitted).)

Contrary to Escrow Agents Fidelity’s arguments, Toney’s failure to respond to the petition does not render her in contempt of court or in violation of any local rule. It merely has the effect of admitting the allegations in the cross-petition. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1290 (“The allegations of a petition are deemed to be admitted by a respondent duly served therewith unless a response is duly served and filed.”).)

Escrow Agents Fidelity’s cross-petition complies with the procedural requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1285.4, which governs requests to confirm arbitration awards. The cross-petition includes the arbitration agreement, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1285.4(a). (Brown Decl. Re Exhibits, Ex. 2.) The cross-petition sets forth the name of the arbitrator, (Code Civ. Proc. § 1285.4(b)), and attaches a copy of the award and written opinion of the arbitrator. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1285.4(c); Brown Decl. Re Exhibits, Ex. 6.) Substantial compliance is all that is required. (Puccinelli v. Nestor (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 48, 49-50 (“The purpose of the code section is to be sure that the trial judge has access to the arbitration agreement, the names of the arbitrators and the award. Here the trial judge had such access.”).)

“If a petition or response under this chapter is duly served and filed, the court shall confirm the award as made, whether rendered in this state or another state, unless in accordance with this chapter it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1286.) “Unless one of the enumerated grounds exist, a court may not vacate an award even if it contains a legal or factual error on its face which results in substantial injustice.” (Marsch v. Williams (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 238, 243–244.)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1290, “[t]he allegations of a petition are deemed to be admitted by a respondent duly served therewith unless a response is duly served and filed.” Petitioner Toney did not file a response to the cross-petition or an opposition to the instant motion. Accordingly, Toney admits “[i]t was Toney, not the Arbitrator, whose violations of the Arbitration Act prevented her introduction of the witness testimony, as alleged in her Petition.” (Cross-Pet. ¶ 34.) The arbitration award states:

Appellant Toney requested an evidentiary hearing to challenge the underlying loss claim filed by 805 Escrow with Respondent EAFC that resulted in Respondent paying the loss in the amount of $132,773.69. Appellant argued that she would be able to demonstrate that the bases for the claim were the result of fraud perpetrated by 805 Escrow owners. . . . Arbitrator requested Appellant’s offer of proof. She proffered evidence to demonstrate that 805 Escrow violated several provisions of California Labor Code. And that because of her support for Christina Redmon who filed a complaint for labor violations, 805 Escrow personnel retaliated against her and Ms. Redmon by creating false entries in escrow documents, and disbursement transactions to frame Appellant and Ms. Redmon. Arbitrator denied Appellant’s request to call live witnesses, but allowed her sworn testimony, witness declarations, and the other evidence heretofore mentioned.

(Brown Decl. Re Exhibits, Ex. 6.) There is no evidence demonstrating Toney’s rights were substantially prejudiced by the failure to allow live testimony. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1286.2(a)(5); Hall v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 427, 439 (“To find substantial prejudice the court must accept, for purposes of analysis, the arbitrator's legal theory and conclude that the arbitrator might well have made a different award had the evidence been allowed. . . . [Toney] failed to show substantial prejudice.”).) The arbitrator requested Toney’s offer of proof and considered all the evidence presented. There is no basis to conclude “the arbitrator might have made a different award had the excluded evidence been allowed.” (Epic Medical Management, LLC v. Paquette (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 504, 519.)

The Court finds confirmation of the arbitration award appropriate, and the motion is GRANTED.

The Court shall not sign the proposed judgment offered by Respondent, which contains unnecessary factual recitations, procedural histories, and references to default.

Respondent must provide a revised proposed judgment that simply confirms the arbitrator’s award and enters judgment consistent therewith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1287.4 (“If an award is confirmed, judgment shall be entered in conformity therewith.”).) The Court also notes the proposed judgment incorrectly identifies the arbitration decision as “Exhibit 5 to EAFC’s Cross-Petition.” The arbitrator’s statement of decision was provided as Exhibit 6.