Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 21STCV20700, Date: 2022-08-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV20700    Hearing Date: August 12, 2022    Dept: 74

21STCV20700           ARNULFO ROBLES vs GENERAL MOTORS

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production, Set One

TENTATIVE RULING:  Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production, Set One is GRANTED, in part.

Requests Nos. 50 and 63 is further limited to California “customer calls” (Request No. 50) and California “consumer lemon law repurchase requests” (Request No. 63). Requests Nos. 68 and 69 shall be further limited to EWR and TREAD reports concerning “ENGINE DEFECT(S) and BRAKE DEFECT(S) in CHEVY VEHICLES” as those terms are defined in Plaintiff’s discovery requests. The remaining requests are properly tailored to the issues in this case.

Defendant is ordered to serve further verified, code compliant responses to Requests Nos. 1, 7, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 48, 50, 63, 64, 66, 68, and 69, as limited herein, within 20 days and to produce all responsive documents within 30 days. To the extent Defendant claims the attorney-client or work product privileges apply over any of the responsive documents or information, it shall simultaneously serve a privilege log with the document production that, at a minimum, identifies each document for which a privilege is claimed, its author, recipients, the date of preparation, the privilege claimed, and any other information necessary to evaluate the privilege. Defendant shall remove all other objections from its supplemental responses.

Background

On June 2, 2021, Plaintiff Arnulfo Robles filed this lemon law action against Defendant General Motors, LLC. The complaint asserts five causes of action under the Song Beverly Act. Plaintiff allegedly purchased a 2017 Chevrolet Silverado on February 12, 2017 and it suffered from:

defects related to the engine; defects causing crank but no start; defects causing misfire(s); defects causing the storage of Diagnostic Trouble Code (“DTC”) P0089; P228C and/or P0300; defects causing fuel smell coming from under the hood; defects requiring the removal of the intake manifold; defects causing the leaking fuel; defects causing rough ridding; defects requiring the replacement of the injectors and/or pipes; defects causing a rattling noise; defects related the electrical system; defects causing the radio screen to turn black and/or turns off; defects requiring the removal of the door panel; defects causing the failure of the window regulator; defects requiring the replacement of the window regulator and/or reinstallation of the door panel; defects requiring performance of Recall N192268490; defects causing increased brake pedal effort; defects causing a rattling noise from the exhaust; defects causing the brake failure; defects causing a loud banging noise when coming to a stop; and/or any other defects listed in the Vehicle’s repair history.

(Compl. ¶ 10.) The complaint alleges Defendant’s violations were willful and seeks civil penalties.

Motion

On April 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel further responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One numbers 1, 7, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 48, 50, 63, 64, 66, 68, and 69.

Opposition

In opposition, Defendant contends Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in good faith, Defendant has produced a set of documents sufficient for Plaintiff’s claims, it need not produce documents regarding similar defects in similar vehicles, it need not produce its policy and procedure information, and the requests seek trade secret or confidential information.

Reply

In reply, Plaintiff contends the meet and confer effort was sufficient, Defendant failed to justify its objections, and the documents sought are relevant and narrowly tailored.

Irrelevant Citations

The Court disregards Defendant’s citation to hearing transcripts in other cases within the Los Angeles Superior Court as they have no precedential value. (Kay Decl. Ex. A-B.)

Motion to Compel Further Responses

Standard

The propounding party may bring a motion to compel further responses to requests for production if it believes the statement of compliance is incomplete, the representation of an inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or if an objection is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310.) The motion must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration, (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2016.040; 2031.310(b)(2)), and a separate statement. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.1345.)

As an additional requirement only as to requests for production, the motion must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(b)(1).) “[T]hat burden is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 447 (2002).) The opposing party bears the burden of justifying any objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255; Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 97-98.)

Discovery at Issue and Meet and Confer Efforts

Plaintiff’s motion is accompanied by the required separate statement and meet and confer declaration.

Plaintiff served Request for Production of Documents, Set One upon Defendant on November 9, 2021. (Rabieian Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. 2.) Defendant served unverified responses containing statements of compliance and objections on January 17, 2022. (Id. ¶ 12, Ex. 3.) Defendant’s substantive responses were unverified, but its objections were preserved. (See Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651, 658.)

On April 7, 2022, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter addressing Defendant’s responses and objections to the requests at issue. (Rabieian Decl. Ex. 7.) On April 8, 2022, Defendant granted Plaintiff an extension to the motion deadline to April 29, 2022. (Id. Ex. 8.)

Defendant responded to the meet and confer letter on April 18, 2022. (Id. Ex. 9.) Defendant indicated it “is willing to supplement its document production to include other customer complaints within GM’s ESI database that are substantially similar to Plaintiff’s complaint(s) concerning the alleged defects, for vehicles purchased in California of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle. GM is willing to supplement its document production pursuant to the entry of the negotiated Protective Order, and subject to a reasonable production deadline.” (Ibid.) Defendant also indicated it was “willing to produce its policy and procedure documents directly responsive to Plaintiff’s Requests, subject to the negotiated protective order agreed between our respective firms in this matter.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff signed a stipulated protective order as evidence of Plaintiff’s willingness to accommodate Defendant’s claims of confidentiality. (Id. Ex. 10.) The Court finds the meet and confer effort sufficient.

Defendant Must Provide Further Responses and Produce Responsive Documents

Plaintiff describes the documents sought as “relating to Defendant’s internal investigation and analysis of the Defects plaguing Plaintiff’s vehicle and establishing that Defendant previously knew of such Defects but nevertheless refused to repurchase the Subject Vehicle (i.e., Nos. 1, 17, 20, 22-26, 29, 31-34, 64, 66, 68, and 69); and (2) those relating to Defendant’s warranty and vehicle repurchase policies, procedures, and practices (i.e., Nos. 7, 48, 50, and 63).” (Mot. at 1:11-16.)

Plaintiff’s motion and separate statement demonstrate good cause for production of the documents sought. Nearly all the requests are either specifically limited to either Plaintiff’s vehicle, (Request No. 1), or documents related or applicable to vehicles of the same year, make, and model in California suffering from the same defects as Plaintiff’s vehicle. (Requests Nos. 7, 17, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 48, 64, and 66.)

The Court finds Requests Nos. 50 and 63 must be further limited to California “customer calls” (Request No. 50) and California “consumer lemon law repurchase requests” (Request No. 63). Additionally, Requests Nos. 68 and 69 seek “All Early Warning Reports (‘EWR’),” and “All Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (‘TREAD’) reports,” respectively, concerning vehicles of the same make, model, and year as Plaintiff’s vehicle. These requests must be further limited to only encompass the defects alleged by Plaintiff in this action. Reports unrelated to Plaintiff’s claimed defects are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Accordingly, Requests Nos. 68 and 69 shall be further limited to EWR and TREAD reports concerning “ENGINE DEFECT(S) and BRAKE DEFECT(S) in CHEVY VEHICLES” as those terms are defined in Plaintiff’s discovery requests.

Once good cause has been shown, a respondent has the burden to justify objections in response to a motion filed to compel further responses. (Fairmont, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 255; Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at 97-98.) Defendant failed to meet this burden.

The Court does not agree with Defendant’s contention that it “does not have to produce information about similar occurrences of the alleged defects in the same year, make, and model vehicles.” (Opp. at 5:19-7:15.) In Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154, the court upheld a trial court’s determination that evidence of “the transmission model Ford installed in plaintiff’s truck and other vehicles” should not be excluded from trial as prejudicial in a Song–Beverly Act case brought by a single plaintiff.  Therefore, relevant discovery may extend beyond Plaintiff’s specific vehicle. (Cf. Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 540, 555 (“Evidence of prior accidents is admissible to prove a defective condition, knowledge, or the cause of an accident, provided that the circumstances of the other accidents are similar and not too remote.”).)

The Court also rejects Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff is not entitled to discover its policies and practices regarding repurchases, warranties, and complaints. (Opp. at 7:15-8:17.) Such information is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding Defendant’s willfulness and the availability of civil penalties. (See Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 136; Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 186 (“A decision made without the use of reasonably available information germane to that decision is not a reasonable, good faith decision.”); Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 218, 226 (“Surely, Silvercrest's refusal, after notice of the mobilehome's defective condition, to make Mrs. Troensegaard whole, and its concealment of the report of such condition, was substantial evidence of such willfulness.”).) 

Defendant indicates its willingness to produce documents subject to the entry of a protective order, (Opp. at 7:11-15, 8:12-13), acknowledging “Plaintiff also executed the protective order proposed by GM.” (Opp. at 2:25-26. See Rabieian Decl. Ex. 10.) Further production pursuant to the protective order would not absolve Defendant of its obligation to provide further verified, code-compliant responses consistent with its production. Plaintiff is entitled to a verified response that Defendant has produced all relevant documents within its possession, custody, and control. Defendant also raises its objection based upon “trade secret material and other protected information.” (Opp. at 8:18-10:9.) Defendant fails to justify this objection, relying upon the October 25, 2018 declaration of Huizhen Lu, which does not contain any specific facts relating to the requests at issue or the specific documents falling within the requests. This declaration is irrelevant and insufficient. Moreover, the protective order would resolve these concerns.

The motion is GRANTED as to each request at issue, subject to the limitations added to Requests Nos. 50, 63, 68, and 69 outlined above.