Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 21STCV31928, Date: 2022-08-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV31928    Hearing Date: August 31, 2022    Dept: 74

21STCV31928           ANVAR SADEGHPOUR vs MONIR HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

Defendant Monir Homeowners Association’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication

TENTATIVE RULING:  The motion is GRANTED.

Background

On August 30, 2021, Plaintiff Anvar Sadeghpour filed this action against Defendant Monir Homeowners Association. The complaint asserts causes of action for: (1) declaratory relief; (2) declaratory relief; (3) reformation of written instrument; (4) cancel written instrument; (5) breach of contract; (6) restitution; and (7) accounting. Plaintiff seeks to avoid a 1988 amendment to the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Monir Condominiums.

On August 3, 2022, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication as to the declaratory relief causes of action.

Motion

On June 17, 2022, Defendant Monir Homeowners Association filed its motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of the following issues:

-        Issue No. 1: The First and Second Causes of Action for Declaratory Relief are Barred by the Four-Year Statute of Limitations under Code of Civil Procedure § 343.

-        Issue No. 2: The Third and Fourth Causes of Action to Reform and Cancel Written Instrument are Barred by the Four-Year Statute of Limitations under Code of Civil Procedure § 343.

-        Issue No. 3: The Fifth Cause of Action for Breach of Contract is Barred by the Four-Year Statute of Limitations under Code of Civil Procedure § 337(a).

-        Issue No. 4: The Sixth Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment is Barred by the Three Year Statute of Limitations under Code under Civil Procedure § 338(d).

-        Issue No. 5: The Seventh Cause of Action for Accounting is Subject to the Four-Year Statute of Limitations under Code under Civil Procedure § 343. It Too Fails if Other Claims Fail.

Opposition

In opposition, Plaintiff contends the statute of limitations does not bar the claims alleged in the complaint.

Reply

In reply, Defendant contends none of Plaintiff’s evidence or authority overcomes the statute of limitations and Plaintiff’s claims are all time barred.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objection

Plaintiff’s objection is immaterial to the Court’s disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(q).) The documents relevant to the motion are either subject to judicial notice or also provided by Plaintiff.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections in Reply

Objections Nos. 1-4 and 6-21 – SUSTAINED

Objection No. 5 – OVERRULED.

Improper Reply Separate Statement

On August 26, 2022, Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff’s opposing separate statement. The Court does not consider this document. (See e.g. Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 (“The deficiencies carried over to the reply papers, which included a 297–page reply separate statement. There is no provision in the statute for this.”); San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 313 (“While the code provides for reply papers, it makes no allowance for . . . filing a supplemental separate statement. (§ 437c, subd. (b).) This is consistent with the requirement supporting papers and the separate statement be served with the original motion. (§ 437c, subd. (a).).”).) 

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of the CC&Rs and amendments thereto, as well as a recorded grant deed. The Court GRANTS judicial notice of the recorded documents and their legal effect. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452(c).)

Motion for Summary Adjudication

Standard

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial.¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) In analyzing such motions, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley¿v.¿Oakshade¿Town Center¿(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)¿Thus, summary judgment or summary adjudication is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿(Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c);¿Villa v.¿McFarren¿(1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.) ¿ 

¿ 

Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”¿(Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1).)

Declaratory Relief – First and Second Causes of Action

The first cause of action for declaratory relief requests that the 1988 Amendment to the CC&Rs be found inconsistent with, and in violation of, the prior versions and be declared invalid, void, or voidable. (Compl. ¶¶ 55-65.) The second cause of action for declaratory relief seeks a refund consistent with the finding that the 1988 Amendment is void. (Compl. ¶¶ 66-70.)

Defendant contends the first and second causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. (Mot. at 6:5-11:17.) “[T]he statute of limitations governing a request for declaratory relief is the one applicable to an ordinary legal or equitable action based on the same claim.” (Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1155.) Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claims seek to avoid a written instrument. Accordingly, they are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. (Zakaessian v. Zakaessian (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 721, 725 (“Ordinarily a suit to set aside and cancel a void instrument is governed by Sec. 343 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”); Code Civ. Proc. § 343 (“An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within four years after the cause of action shall have accrued.”); Walters v. Boosinger (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 421, 433 (“statutes of limitations apply whether the document under challenge is asserted to be ‘void’ or ‘voidable.’”).)

The grant deed transferring ownership of Unit 1 to Plaintiff was recorded on March 8, 1989. (Def. RJN Ex. 2-113–2-114.) Plaintiff also signed the recorded 1988 Amendment. (Def. RJN Ex. 2-101; Sadeghpour Decl. Ex. 3.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s stated basis for the declaratory relief causes of action that the 1988 Amendment is inconsistent with, or violates, the CC&Rs would be readily apparent on the face of the document Plaintiff signed in 1988. Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claims are therefore time barred. (See e.g. Schuman v. Ignatin (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 255, 265 (“In the present case, the Amendment extending the CC & Rs was recorded in December 1998. Ignatin first sought to challenge the validity of the Amendment in August 2008. . . . Ignatin’s challenge is barred by the statute of limitations.”).)

Plaintiff’s invocation of the continuing violation doctrine, (Opp. at 7:7-11:21), does not apply to the declaratory relief causes of action or any of Plaintiff’s claims in the complaint, which are all based upon the contention the 1988 Amendment is void, voidable, or otherwise invalid. The conduct causing the alleged invalidity was completed in 1988. Plaintiff’s claims do not involve fraudulent concealment and therefore Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 790 and Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Co. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 226, 228, cited by Plaintiff, are inapplicable. Other cases cited by Plaintiff do not involve the statute of limitations and are therefore inapposite. (See Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Development Co. (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 783; Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Assn. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 642.)

Plaintiff also cites Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, which demonstrates the continuing violation and continuous accrual doctrines do not apply here.  (Id. at 1198 (“nothing in the operative complaint alleges the presence of factors that might warrant application of the continuing violation doctrine. The complaint identifies a series of discrete, independently actionable alleged wrongs. Nor is this a case in which a wrongful course of conduct became apparent only through the accumulation of a series of harms; Aryeh concedes he was aware of, recognized as wrongful, and was recording as early as 2002, Canon's allegedly fraudulent and unfair acts.).) Similarly here, Plaintiff allegedly objected at each and every budget, assessment, and collection since 1988. (Compl. ¶ 49; Sadeghpour Decl. ¶ 11.) Additionally, “continuous accrual applies whenever there is a continuing or recurring obligation: When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period. [Citation.] Because each new breach of such an obligation provides all the elements of a claim—wrongdoing, harm, and causation [Citation]—each may be treated as an independently actionable wrong with its own time limit for recovery.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at 1199.) Here, the alleged wrong is one discreet event: the alleged invalid 1988 Amendment. (Id. at 1200 (“To determine whether the continuous accrual doctrine applies here, we look not to the claim's label . . . but to the nature of the obligation allegedly breached.”).)

Notably, challenging the amendment as void does not render the statute of limitations inapplicable. (See Marin Healthcare Dist. v. Sutter Health (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 861, 879 (“Nor does the fact that the contracts are claimed void avoid the statute of limitations. Actions to void contracts are nonetheless subject to the statute of limitations.”).) Even if it could, as argued by Defendant, there is no evidence of fraud that would support the amendment being void. Additionally, the complaint does not contain any allegations of fraud. “Summary judgment cannot be granted on a ground not raised by the pleadings. Conversely, summary judgment cannot be denied on a ground not raised by the pleadings.” (Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663 (internal citations omitted).) “Even if the [Plaintiff] had alleged fraud in the enactment of the Amendments, the fraud would have to have been one by which the homeowners were induced to agree to Amendments different from the Amendments that were actually recorded.” (Costa Serena Owners Coalition v. Costa Serena Architectural Com. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1193.) No such allegation or evidence has been provided by Plaintiff.

The CC&Rs provided: “[t]his Declaration may be amended only by Instrument executed and acknowledged by each and every of the owners or their legally appointed and duly authorized guardian, conservator, executor or administrator, of at least fifty-one (51%) percent of the total voting power of the association and fifty-one (51%) percent of votes of members, excluding the Declarant.” (Sadeghpour Decl. Ex. at Art. XV § 3.) Declarant is defined as Azlaullah Sadeghpour and Monavar Sadeghpour. (Id. at § Art. I ¶ 3.)

It is undisputed that the association consists of six units and Plaintiff now owns two of the units, acquiring Unit 1 from Monavar Sadeghpour via grant deed recorded on March 8, 1989. (Opp. Sep. Stmt. Facts 7-8.) The 1988 Amendment is signed by Plaintiff, Saeed Sadeghpour, Sohrab Sadeghpour, Sepehr Sadeghpour, and Monavar Sadeghpour. (Def. RJN Ex. 2-101; Sadeghpour Decl. Ex. 3.) The 1988 Amendment acknowledges “more than 51 percent of the members of Monir Homeowners Association have executed this instrument.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff contends, without admissible evidence, the document was not properly executed in the manner required by the CC&Rs. (Opp. Sep. Stmt. Fact 17; Sadeghpour Decl. ¶ 28; Opp. at 11 n.2.) However, even if adequately supported, it would not save the time-barred claims. (See Costa Serena Owners Coalition v. Costa Serena Architectural Com. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1196 (“If the Amendments were, in fact, ineffective as a result of being enacted/adopted in a manner that did not comply with the amendment provisions of the DoR's/UDoR, as the Coalition asserts, then homeowners in the Costa Serena community sustained a ‘manifest and palpable’ injury at the time the each of the Amendments was recorded and thereby made effective. Further, the recording of the Amendments served to provide notice to anyone who may have wished to challenge their validity. The Architectural Committee's recording of each of the instruments that contained the Amendments thus triggered the statutory period for bringing an action to invalidate the Amendments, since the recording of the Amendments ensured that homeowners and subsequent purchasers had at least constructive knowledge that there existed amendments to the DoR's/UDoR that purported to change the provisions of the DoR's/UDoR.”).)

Summary adjudication is GRANTED as to the first and second causes of action.

Reformation and Cancellation of Instrument - Third and Fourth Causes of Action

The third and fourth causes of action seek to reform the 1988 Amendment or cancel the 1988 Amendment. (Compl. ¶¶ 71-78.) The third cause of action for reformation based upon mistake is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 338(d); North Star Reinsurance Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1815, 1823 (applying Section 338(d) to a “cause of action for reformation based on mistake.”).) The fourth cause of action for cancellation is governed by the same statute of limitations above and seeks the same relief as the declaratory relief causes of action. (Marin Healthcare, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at 878.) Accordingly, the third and fourth causes of action are time-barred for the same reasons discussed above. Plaintiff was aware, of should have been aware, of the facts supporting these causes of action when Plaintiff signed the 1988 Amendment.

Summary adjudication is GRANTED as to the third and fourth causes of action.

Breach of Contract - Fifth Cause of Action

The complaint alleges Defendant breached the governing documents by using the 1988 Amendment to make assessments. (Compl. ¶¶ 79-90.) Breach of contract claims based upon a written contract are similarly subject to a four-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc. § 337(a).) The fifth cause of action is entirely dependent upon Plaintiff’s claim that the 1988 Amendment is unenforceable, which is time-barred for the reasons stated above. Additionally, applying the rules of contract interpretation support enforcement of the 1988 Amendment signed by Plaintiff as it replaced the prior terms of the CC&Rs. (See generally Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 240 (“courts have described recorded declarations as contracts.”); Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264 (“The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.”).) Plaintiff does not allege or provide evidence that Defendant failed to apply the 1988 Amendment or comply with its terms.

Accordingly, summary adjudication of the fifth cause of action is GRANTED.

Restitution (Unjust Enrichment – Sixth Cause of Action)

Similar to the breach of contract claim, the sixth cause of action seeks the return of alleged overpayment of assessments resulting from the application of the 1988 Amendment. (Compl. ¶¶ 91-93.) “[T]he section 338, subdivision (d), three-year statute of limitations applies to an unjust enrichment cause of action based on mistake.” (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dintino (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 333, 348.) As with the breach of contract claim, Plaintiff relies entirely upon the invalidity of the 1988 Amendment to support this claim. Accordingly, the sixth cause of action is time-barred and fails for the reasons discussed above.

Summary adjudication is GRANTED as to the sixth cause of action.

Accounting – Seventh Cause of Action

Finally, Plaintiff’s complaint requests an accounting “to determine the amounts overpaid by SADEGHPOUR as to the improper assessments based upon erroneous allocations.” (Compl. ¶ 98.) Thus, the seventh cause of action is premised upon the same time-barred allegations regarding the 1988 Amendment. The statute of limitations for an accounting cause of action is based upon the underlying claims upon which an accounting is sought. (See e.g. Jefferson v. J. E. French Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 717, 719; Estate of Peebles (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 163, 166.) Additionally, accounting claims are derivative and must fail if the underlying cause of action fails. (See Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 594 (“There is no right to an accounting where none is necessary.”).) Plaintiff’s accounting claim similarly falls with the claims associated with the 1988 Amendment.

Summary adjudication is GRANTED as to the seventh cause of action.

Having found for Defendant on each cause of action in the complaint, summary judgment is GRANTED.