Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 21STCV47091, Date: 2022-08-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV47091 Hearing Date: August 4, 2022 Dept: 74
21STCV47091           DR.
JAMES M. KANDA DDS vs YST INVESTMENT, LLC
OSC RE ENTRY DEFAULT JUDGMENT
TENTATIVE RULING: 
The OSC is continued to August 31, 2022 at 8:30 a.m.
The
Court finds the phrasing of Plaintiff’s proposed judgment contains unnecessary
language. Plaintiff should provide a revised proposed judgment providing the
following:
-       
Plaintiff Dr. James M. Kanda DDS validly
exercised the first Option to Extend the A.I.R. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
ASSOCIATION STANDARD INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL MULTI-TENANT LEASE-NET (the “LEASE”)
with Mun Chun Hong dated May 14, 2012 for the property located at 3043 Foothill
Boulevard #1, La Crescenta, CA 91214, now owned by Defendant YST Investment,
LLC, (the “PROPERTY”), and the lease duration is validly extended by 60 months.
-       
Plaintiff Must Provide Additional
Documents
Plaintiff’s memorandum of costs seeks
$778.50 in clerk’s filing fees and $445.90 in process server fees. 
The Court only has record of $470.75 in filing fees paid by Plaintiff,
consisting of the $435.00 first appearance fee, seven separate $2.25 e-filing
service fees, and a $20.00 fee associated with the default package. Additionally,
the proof of service of summons filed with the Court indicates the fee for
service was $161.70, which is the only service of process in this action. 
Plaintiff
must provide a declaration identifying the additional costs claimed. 
Plaintiff
must also dismiss Does 1-50.
The Court Shall Not Enter Plaintiff’s
Proposed Injunction
Plaintiff’s proposed judgment seeks injunctive
relief that “Defendant cannot convert the PROPERTY in any way that will impact
Kanda’s quiet enjoyment of the PROPERTY.” 
The injunctive relief request is vague,
overbroad, and not properly supported. Plaintiff alleges he “became aware” of
Defendant’s purported plan to convert the property into a multi-use condo
project in April of 2019. (Compl. ¶ 12, Nieves Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant’s agent
indicated to Plaintiff “they were not privy to the intentions of Defendant with
respect to conversion of the property.” (Compl. ¶ 13, Nieves Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff
attempted to discuss the belief that the property would be converted, but
Defendant did not respond. Plaintiff then filed this action. (Nieves Decl. ¶¶
11-19.) Plaintiff has not demonstrated any steps taken by Defendant between
April 2019 and the present to redevelop the property into a 47-unit mixed use
condo project. Plaintiff has not demonstrated injunctive relief is warranted. (People
v. Robin (1943) 56 Cal.App.2d 885, 887 (“A judgment prohibiting a defendant
from doing that which neither past acts nor present intent indicates he is
likely to do unless prevented by a court of equity is an erroneous exercise of
equitable jurisdiction.”).) 
Plaintiff’s request for injunctive
relief is based upon an asserted anticipatory breach of the implied covenant of
quiet enjoyment and the parties’ lease. However, “[a]n anticipatory breach of
contract occurs on the part of one of the parties to the instrument when he
positively repudiates the contract by acts or statements indicating that he
will not or cannot substantially perform essential terms thereof. Anticipatory
breach must appear only with the clearest terms of repudiation of the
obligation of the contract.” (Guerrieri v. Severini (1958) 51 Cal.2d 12,
18 (citations omitted).) “[T]here is no implied repudiation, i.e., by conduct
equivalent to an unequivocal refusal to perform, unless ‘the promisor Puts it
out of his power to perform.” (Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130,
139.) Here, Plaintiff contends he “became aware” of Defendant’s purported plan
to redevelop the property and notes Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff’s communications,
which would not appear sufficient. 
Moreover, Defendant’s alleged planned development
of the property would not entitle Plaintiff to injunctive relief as to all
potential violations of Kanda’s quiet enjoyment caused by any conversion of the
property. The facts and evidence do not establish a right to an injunction
ordering that “Defendant cannot convert the PROPERTY in any way that will
impact Kanda’s quiet enjoyment of the PROPERTY.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 585 (“The
court shall hear the evidence offered by the plaintiff, and shall render
judgment in the plaintiff's favor for that relief, not exceeding the amount
stated in the complaint, in the statement required by Section 425.11, or in the
statement provided for by Section 425.115, as appears by the evidence to be
just.”).)