Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 21STCV47091, Date: 2022-08-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV47091    Hearing Date: August 4, 2022    Dept: 74

21STCV47091           DR. JAMES M. KANDA DDS vs YST INVESTMENT, LLC

OSC RE ENTRY DEFAULT JUDGMENT

TENTATIVE RULING:  The OSC is continued to August 31, 2022 at 8:30 a.m.

The Court finds the phrasing of Plaintiff’s proposed judgment contains unnecessary language. Plaintiff should provide a revised proposed judgment providing the following:

 

-        Plaintiff Dr. James M. Kanda DDS validly exercised the first Option to Extend the A.I.R. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE ASSOCIATION STANDARD INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL MULTI-TENANT LEASE-NET (the “LEASE”) with Mun Chun Hong dated May 14, 2012 for the property located at 3043 Foothill Boulevard #1, La Crescenta, CA 91214, now owned by Defendant YST Investment, LLC, (the “PROPERTY”), and the lease duration is validly extended by 60 months.

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Plaintiff Must Provide Additional Documents

 

Plaintiff’s memorandum of costs seeks $778.50 in clerk’s filing fees and $445.90 in process server fees.

 

The Court only has record of $470.75 in filing fees paid by Plaintiff, consisting of the $435.00 first appearance fee, seven separate $2.25 e-filing service fees, and a $20.00 fee associated with the default package. Additionally, the proof of service of summons filed with the Court indicates the fee for service was $161.70, which is the only service of process in this action.

 

Plaintiff must provide a declaration identifying the additional costs claimed.

 

Plaintiff must also dismiss Does 1-50.

 

The Court Shall Not Enter Plaintiff’s Proposed Injunction

 

Plaintiff’s proposed judgment seeks injunctive relief that “Defendant cannot convert the PROPERTY in any way that will impact Kanda’s quiet enjoyment of the PROPERTY.”

 

The injunctive relief request is vague, overbroad, and not properly supported. Plaintiff alleges he “became aware” of Defendant’s purported plan to convert the property into a multi-use condo project in April of 2019. (Compl. ¶ 12, Nieves Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant’s agent indicated to Plaintiff “they were not privy to the intentions of Defendant with respect to conversion of the property.” (Compl. ¶ 13, Nieves Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff attempted to discuss the belief that the property would be converted, but Defendant did not respond. Plaintiff then filed this action. (Nieves Decl. ¶¶ 11-19.) Plaintiff has not demonstrated any steps taken by Defendant between April 2019 and the present to redevelop the property into a 47-unit mixed use condo project. Plaintiff has not demonstrated injunctive relief is warranted. (People v. Robin (1943) 56 Cal.App.2d 885, 887 (“A judgment prohibiting a defendant from doing that which neither past acts nor present intent indicates he is likely to do unless prevented by a court of equity is an erroneous exercise of equitable jurisdiction.”).)

 

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is based upon an asserted anticipatory breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment and the parties’ lease. However, “[a]n anticipatory breach of contract occurs on the part of one of the parties to the instrument when he positively repudiates the contract by acts or statements indicating that he will not or cannot substantially perform essential terms thereof. Anticipatory breach must appear only with the clearest terms of repudiation of the obligation of the contract.” (Guerrieri v. Severini (1958) 51 Cal.2d 12, 18 (citations omitted).) “[T]here is no implied repudiation, i.e., by conduct equivalent to an unequivocal refusal to perform, unless ‘the promisor Puts it out of his power to perform.” (Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal.3d 130, 139.) Here, Plaintiff contends he “became aware” of Defendant’s purported plan to redevelop the property and notes Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff’s communications, which would not appear sufficient.

 

Moreover, Defendant’s alleged planned development of the property would not entitle Plaintiff to injunctive relief as to all potential violations of Kanda’s quiet enjoyment caused by any conversion of the property. The facts and evidence do not establish a right to an injunction ordering that “Defendant cannot convert the PROPERTY in any way that will impact Kanda’s quiet enjoyment of the PROPERTY.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 585 (“The court shall hear the evidence offered by the plaintiff, and shall render judgment in the plaintiff's favor for that relief, not exceeding the amount stated in the complaint, in the statement required by Section 425.11, or in the statement provided for by Section 425.115, as appears by the evidence to be just.”).)