Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 22STCV07755, Date: 2022-10-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV07755 Hearing Date: October 24, 2022 Dept: 74
22STCV07755 LYNN SWENSEN vs SONIA R. BAUTISTA, DMD, INC.
Defendants
Sonia R. Bautista, D.M.D. and Sonia R. Bautista, D.M.D., Inc.’s Motion for
Transfer of Venue to Humboldt County Based upon Forum Non Conveniens; CCP §
397(c).
TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED.
Background
On March 3,
2022, Plaintiffs Lynn Swensen and Dennis Swensen filed this action against Sonia
R. Bautista, DMD, Inc., Sonia R. Bautista, DMD, Leon Kiraj, DDS, Liana
Muradyan, DDS, Kiraj & Muradyan Dental Corporation, and Infinite Dental
Wellness. The complaint asserted causes of action for: (1) professional
negligence; (2) elder abuse; (3) willful misconduct; (4) negligent infliction
of emotional distress; and (5) loss of consortium. The complaint alleges
Plaintiff Lynn Swensen underwent a dental procedure on December 18, 2020, which
was performed by Defendant Kiraj. Plaintiff notified Defendants Bautista and
Muradyan of swelling and significant pain on December 23, 2020, which was the
result of an infection resulting in sepsis.
On June 13,
2022, the Court entered the parties’ stipulation and order dismissing the
second, third, and fourth causes of action without prejudice and striking the
prayers for attorneys’ fees, punitive damages, and treble damages.
On September 1,
2022, the Court issued an order denying Defendants’ initial motion to transfer
venue without prejudice, noting Defendants’ motion was premature, inadequately
supported, and was not accompanied by the required transfer fees.
On October 10,
2022, the Court entered an order dismissing Defendant Infinite Dental Wellness
without prejudice.
Motion
On September 16,
2022, Defendants Sonia Bautista, DMD and Sonia Bautista, DMD, Inc. filed the
instant motion to transfer this case to the superior court in Humboldt County,
California based upon the convenience of witnesses and the interests of
justice.
Defendants’
motion is accompanied by a Notice of Payment of Venue Transfer Fees.
Opposition
In opposition, Plaintiffs
contend Defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the motion,
Defendants rely upon facts irrelevant to a motion to transfer venue, and the
asserted inconvenience is speculative or mitigated by available technology.
Reply
In reply, Defendants
contend Plaintiffs’ arguments are unpersuasive and unsupported and Defendants
have met their burden.
Evidentiary Objections
Plaintiff’s Objections
Nos. 1, 3, and 5 are OVERRULED.
Plaintiff’s remaining
objections are SUSTAINED.
Motion
Standard
Pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 397(c), “[t]he court may, on motion, change the
place of trial in the following cases: . . . [w]hen the convenience of
witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.”
“The burden
rests on one who seeks a change of venue under this subdivision to prove that
both the convenience of witnesses and ends of justice will be promoted thereby,
and this he must do through affidavits that contain more than generalities and
conclusions.” (Hamilton v. Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 418, 423.)
“[A] motion to change venue based upon the
convenience of witnesses must name the witnesses to be called, indicate the
nature and relevance of their testimony and explain why the current forum is
inconvenient.” (Silva v. Superior Court
(1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 301, 305.) Convenience to non-party witnesses alone
should be the key to the success of the motion, and not the convenience of
parties or employees of parties. (See Stute v. Burinda (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d
Supp. 11, 17; Lieberman v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 396, 401
(“except under limited circumstances, the court may not consider the
convenience of the parties or of their employees in passing upon the
motion.”).)
It is a “well-settled
rule that the burden rests upon one who seeks a change of venue under Code of
Civil Procedure, section 397, subdivision 3, to prove that both the convenience
of witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted thereby. This he must do
through affidavits which contain something more than generalities and
conclusions.” (Dillman v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 769, 773
(citations omitted). See also Peiser v. Mettler (1958) 50 Cal.2d 594, 607 (“The affidavits in support of the
motion for change of venue on this ground must set forth the names of the
witnesses, the nature of the testimony expected from each, and the reasons why
the attendance of each would be inconvenient.”); Silva, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at 305.)
A Transfer of Venue is Warranted
The Complaint
alleges the procedure at issue was performed at the dental office of Defendant
Sonia Bautista in Eureka, California and performed by Defendant Leon Kiraj who
travelled from his office in Glendale, California to perform the procedure.
(Compl. ¶ 4.) Eureka, California is in Humboldt County. All Defendants have
answered the complaint.
Defendants’
motion is supported by the declaration of Allison Friedman who provides
Plaintiff’s responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One and Requests for
Production of Documents, Set One. (Friedman Decl. ¶¶ 2-4, Ex. B-D.) Friedman
notes Plaintiff identified eleven health care providers as those having
provided medical care and treatment for Plaintiff’s injuries, each of which are
either in Humboldt County in California or Oregon. (Id. ¶ 5, Ex. C at 10:18-13:21.)
Friedman identifies the testimony expected from each of these witnesses that
directly relate to Plaintiff’s claims. (Id. ¶ 6.) While Plaintiffs argue
Defendants’ counsel’s declaration is “perfunctory,” (Opp. at 1:10-3:13), Plaintiffs’
verified discovery responses demonstrate the relevant non-party witnesses are
in and around Humboldt County and not in Los Angeles County. (Friedman Decl.
Ex. C at 10:18-13:21, 19:17-27.) Defendants have met their evidentiary burden.
The alleged
injury took place in Humboldt County and Plaintiff’s identified witnesses,
including non-party healthcare providers and Plaintiff’s neighbor, are located
either in Humboldt County or in a location significantly closer to Humboldt
County than Los Angeles. Based upon the evidence before the Court and the allegations
in the complaint, a transfer to Humboldt County will promote the convenience of
the non-party witnesses and the ends of justice. (See Pearson v. Superior Court, City and County of San
Francisco (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 69, 77
(“A conclusion that the ends of justice are promoted can be drawn from the fact
that by moving the trial closer to the residence of the witnesses, delay and
expense in court proceedings are avoided and savings in the witnesses' time and
expenses are effected.”); Harden v.
Skinner and Hammond (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d
750, 754 (“a court cannot be said to have abused its discretion if it permits
the trial to be had as near as possible to the residences of the greatest
number of witnesses.”); J. C. Millett Co. v. Latchford-Marble Glass Co. (1959)
167 Cal.App.2d 218, 228 (“the witnesses would be readily accessible for
immediate recall if further testimony was desirable, thus preventing needless
delays. The obvious saving in the witnesses’ time and expense in traveling to
Los Angeles and returning to San Francisco also promote justice.”); Richfield Hotel Management, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 222, 227 (“The logical inferences which arise
from the affidavits demonstrate the inconvenience of trying this case in San
Mateo County. All of the designated witnesses live or work in the area around
Tulare County. All of the relevant events allegedly took place in Visalia. All
of the relevant documents would be there. It is undisputed that San Mateo
County is 210 miles from Visalia and that many of the lay witnesses are
restaurant employees for whom the lost working time and travel expenses would
be significant.”).)
Plaintiffs did not provide any
contrary evidence, other than to suggest documents may be copied and trial and depositions
may take place via remote means. (Bashant Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) However, the Court of
Appeal has rejected reliance upon remote technology, including Code of Civil
Procedure section 367.75 cited by Plaintiffs, as a basis to deny a motion to
change venue. (Rycz v. Superior Court of San Francisco County (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 824, 843, 849 (“the availability of remote testimony is a
circumstance that may ease the inconvenience for any witnesses that live in a
location distant from the site of trial, but it is not a proper basis for
denying a motion to transfer a case to the county where most witnesses are
located. . . . we reject the Superior Court’s conclusion that the availability
of remote testimony means section 397 motions based on the
convenience of witnesses are a relic of the past.”).)
The Court finds Plaintiffs
failed to rebut Defendants’ evidence. “Where there is a showing that the . . .
ends of justice will be promoted by the change and there is absolutely no
showing whatever to the contrary, a denial of the motion to change venue is an
abuse of discretion, there being no conflict of evidence to sustain the
decision of the trial court.” (Pearson,
supra, 199 Cal.App.2d at
78. See also Rycz, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at 848–849 (“Plaintiffs point
to no circumstances suggesting ‘that the ends of justice would not be promoted
by the change.’”).)
Conclusion
Defendants Sonia R. Bautista, D.M.D. and Sonia R. Bautista, D.M.D.,
Inc.’s Motion for Transfer of Venue to Humboldt County Based upon Forum Non
Conveniens; CCP § 397(c) is GRANTED.