Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 22STCV27750, Date: 2024-10-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV27750    Hearing Date: October 10, 2024    Dept: 1

22STCV27750           FERNEY PINTO SANTANDER vs JP MORGAN CHASE BANK

Non-Party Jonathan De La Cerda’s Motion to Transfer and Coordinate Pursuant to CCP §§ 403 and 404.1

TENTATIVE RULING:  Motion for Transfer and Coordination is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.  Moving party to give notice.

Background of 22CV008384 De La Cerda v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

According to the declaration of counsel for non-party Jonanthan De La Cerda (“De La Cerda”), Marita M. Lauinger (“Lauinger”), De La Cerda filed a lawsuit in the Alameda County Superior Court on March 14, 2022, alleging a single claim for penalties against Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Defendant”) under PAGA. (Lauinger Decl. ¶ 2.) The claim is based on Defendant’s failure to reimburse its California employees for business-related expenses they have incurred while working from home, including during the COVID-19 pandemic, in violation of Labor Code § 2802. (Lauinger Decl. ¶ 2.) Case No. 22CV008384 is pending before the Honorable Jenna Whitman in the Alameda Court’s Department 25, and such case is designated as non-complex. (Lauinger Decl. ¶ 3.)

On August 24, 2023, the Alameda Superior Court granted Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of De La Cerda’s individual PAGA claim and stayed his representative claim pending the outcome of arbitration. (Lauinger Decl. ¶ 4.) On June 4, 2024, after arbitration, the Honorable Ronald S. Prager (Ret.) issued a final award in favor of De La Cerda. (Lauinger Decl. ¶ 4.) On June 20, 2024, the Alameda Superior Court lifted the stay on the representative PAGA claim, and De La Cerda and Defendant are currently exchanging discovery. (Lauinger Decl. ¶ 4.) No trial date has been set. (Lauinger Decl. ¶ 4.)

Background of 22STCV27750 Santander v. JP Morgan Chase Bank

On August 25, 2022, Plaintiff Ferney Pinto Santander (“Santander”), on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated (“Plaintiff”) filed a representative action complaint against Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association (“Defendant”) alleging a cause of action for civil penalties pursuant to PAGA (Lab. Code §§ 2698, et seq.)

Santander’s complaint is brought on behalf of himself and aggrieved employees. Santander alleges that Defendant failed “to provide their aggrieved employees with all wages, meal periods in compliance with the applicable wage order and/or the California Labor Code, by failing to pay sick pay, vacation and COVID-19 supplemental wages at the regular rate, by failing to reimburse business expenses, and by failing to comply with the applicable wage order and/or the Labor Code in regards to the payment of wages.” (Complaint ¶ 1.)

Santander also alleges that, among other wrongs, Defendant failed to pay overtime wages, failed to provide compliant meal break premiums at the regular rate, and failed to reimburse Plaintiff and other aggrieved employees for business related expenses. (Complaint ¶¶ 3-4.) Santander alleges that Labor Code section 2802 requires employers to pay for all necessary expenditures and losses incurred by the employee in the performance of his or her job. (Complaint ¶ 65.)

Santander alleges that Defendant: (1) failed to pay overtime wages; (2) failed to pay all wages and minimum wages; (3) failed to provide compliant meal periods; (4) failed to provide compliant wage statements; (5) failed to provide sick pay at the regular rate; (6) failed to provide vacation pay at the regular rate; (7) failed to provide COVID-19 supplemental paid sick leave at the regular rate; (8) failed to timely pay all wages during employment; (9) failed to timely pay final wage upon termination; and (10) failed to reimburse business expenses. (Complaint ¶¶ 28-47.) As to the failure to reimburse business expenses, Santander alleges that aggrieved employees were responsible for purchasing their own office supplies, and management would contact Santander and aggrieved employees on their personal cellphones. (Complaint ¶ 46.) Defendant, however, failed to reimburse Santander and aggrieved employees for using their personal phones and office supplies to carry out their work-related duties. (Complaint ¶ 47.) Santander’s claims against Defendant are on behalf of himself and all aggrieved employees who worked for Defendant in California at any time beginning June 7, 2021, through the resolution of this action, and who are classified by Defendant as non-exempt from the wage and hour provisions of the California Labor Code. (Complaint ¶ 53.)

On February 23, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss judicial proceedings. Defendant sought an order compelling Santander to arbitrate his individual claims and dismissing the non-individual claims under PAGA.

On April 3, 2023, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, the Honorable Daniel P. Ramirez sitting in Department 71 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse issued an order staying the case in its entirety. (04/03/23 Minute Order.)

On April 13, 2023, this action was reassigned to the Honorable Daniel M. Crowley sitting in Department 71 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse effective April 17, 2023.  

On August 31, 2023, Defendant filed a notice of withdrawal of the motion to compel arbitration.

On May 30, 2024, at a status conference, counsel informed the Court that the case had settled in mediation. (05/30/24 Minute Order.)

On August 2, 2024, Defendant filed a notice of related case involving 22STCV27750,  22CV008384 Jonathan De La Cerda v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (the “De La Cerda Action”), which is pending in the Alameda Superior Court, 24STCV08963 Zvard Santourian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., which is pending in the Los Angeles Superior Court, and 24STCV17341 Maria Lopez v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., which is pending in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

On August 28, 2024, Santander filed a motion for approval of PAGA settlement, which is set for hearing on November 27, 2024.

On September 10, 2024, the Honorable David S. Cunningham III sitting in Department 11 of Stanley Mosk Courthouse issued an order finding that 22STCV27750, 24STCV08963, 22CV008384, and 24STCV17341 were not related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a). (09/10/24 Minute Order.)

Motion

On August 20, 2024, non-party Jonathan De La Cerda (“De La Cerda”) filed the instant motion for transfer and coordination pursuant to CCP §§ 403 and 404.01. De La Cerda seeks an order transferring the De La Cerda Action to this Court and coordinating such case with 22STCV27750 (the “Santander Action”).

De La Cerda contends that consolidation is appropriate because the Santander Action and De La Cerda actions are not complex and share common questions of law and fact related to Labor Code § 2802. De La Cerda further asserts that the actions meet the requirements of CCP § 404.1 and that the requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.500(c) are met.

Oppositions

Defendant JP Morgan Chase filed an opposition to the motion on September 30, 2024. JP Morgan Chase contends that: (1) coordination would not promote the ends of justice at this stage of the proceedings; (2) the factors listed in CCP § 404.1 do not support coordination with the De La Cerda Action; and (3) alternatively, the Court should defer determination of the motion pending the adjudication of Santander’s motion for approval of PAGA settlement.

On September 30, 2024, Plaintiff Santander also filed an opposition to the motion for transfer and coordination on the grounds that the factors articulated in CCP § 404.1 have not been met.

Reply

On October 3, 2024, De La Cerda filed a reply brief arguing that he has met the factors listed in CCP § 404.1.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code §§ 452, 453.)

Motion to Transfer and Coordinate

Standard

Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 3.3(h) provides: “[a] civil case which is not complex as defined by Standard 3.10 of the Standards of Judicial Administration may be transferred to the court from a superior court in another county, if it involves a common question of fact or law within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 403. The coordination motion shall be made in compliance with the procedures established by California Rules of Court, rule 3.500. Coordination motions seeking to transfer a case or cases to the Central District shall be filed and heard in Department 1. Coordination motions seeking to transfer a case or cases to a district other than the Central District shall be heard by the Supervising Judge in that district.”

Coordination motions are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 403, which states, in relevant part:

A judge may, on motion, transfer an action or actions from another court to that judge's court for coordination with an action involving a common question of fact or law within the meaning of Section 404. The motion shall be supported by a declaration stating facts showing that the actions meet the standards specified in Section 404.1, are not complex as defined by the Judicial Council and that the moving party has made a good faith effort to obtain agreement to the transfer from all parties to each action. Notice of the motion shall be served on all parties to each action and on each court in which an action is pending. Any party to that action may file papers opposing the motion within the time permitted by rule of the Judicial Council. The court to which a case is transferred may order the cases consolidated for trial pursuant to Section 1048 without any further motion or hearing.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 403.)

California Rules of Court, rule 3.500(c) requires that the motion “must be supported by a declaration stating facts showing that:  (1) The actions are not complex; (2) The moving party has made a good-faith effort to obtain agreement to the transfer and consolidation from all parties to the actions; and (3) The moving party has notified all parties of their obligation to disclose to the court any information they may have concerning any other motions requesting transfer of any case that would be affected by the granting of the motion before the court.” 

To grant the motion, California Rules of Court, rule 3.500(d) requires the Court to “specify the reasons supporting a finding that the transfer will promote the ends of justice, with reference to the following standards:

(1) The actions are not complex;

(2) Whether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation;

(3) The convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel;

(4) The relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel;

(5) The efficient utilization of judicial facilities and staff resources;

(6) The calendar of the courts;

(7) The disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and

(8) The likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.”

(See also Code Civ. Proc. § 404.1.) 

The Crux of the De La Cerda Action

De La Cerda alleges that his complaint is brought on behalf of all current and former aggrieved employees of Defendant. (Defendant’s RJN, Ex. A at ¶ 1.) Aggrieved employees are defined as “[a]ll exempt and non-exempt employees of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in California who incurred reasonable and necessary business expenses as a result of their performance of duties for [Defendant] during the applicable statute of limitations, including without limitation employees who incurred such expenses while working from home during the COVID-19 pandemic.” (Defendant’s RJN, Ex. A at ¶ 2.) De La Cerda alleges that, since March 2020, Plaintiff and other aggrieved employees have been required to bear the cost of working from home without being fully reimbursed by Defendant, and that Defendant has a uniform expense reimbursement policy that applies to all employees throughout California. (Defendant’s RJN, Ex. A at ¶ 11.) De La Cerda alleges that Defendant violated Labor Code § 2802, which is actionable under PAGA. (Defendant’s RJN, Ex. A at ¶ 1.) De La Cerda alleges a single cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA.

De La Cerda’s Standing to Bring the Instant Motion

Initially, the Court will address the respective contentions regarding whether Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664 allows De La Cerda to object or otherwise disturb the settlement entered into between Santander and Defendant.

The Court finds that Defendant’s citation to Turrieta, supra, 16 Cal.5th 664 does not warrant denial of the instant motion. The Turrieta court held that a PAGA plaintiff cannot “intervene in the ongoing PAGA action of another plaintiff asserting overlapping claims” because requiring a court “to consider objections to a proposed settlement in that overlapping action . . . would be inconsistent with the scheme the Legislature enacted.” (Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc., supra, 16 Cal.5th 664, 676-77.) There is no dispute that De La Cerda takes issue with the proposed settlement agreement in the Santander Action. (Mot. at p. 4:1-8.) Specifically, De La Cerda contends that the proposed settlement “purports to release [Defendant] Chase from liability for violations of Labor Code § 2802 that were first alleged, and have been vigorously litigated, in De La Cerda.” (Mot. at p. 4:3-6.)

However, the issue in the instant motion is not concerned with the validity of any objections to the proposed PAGA settlement in 22STCV27750. Rather, the instant motion requests that 22CV008384 be transferred to this Court and coordinated with 22STCV27750. Thus, because De La Cerda contends that the actions overlap, he may seek “consolidation or coordination . . . in order to facilitate . . . adjudication of the same [PAGA] claims in a single proceeding.” (Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc., supra, 16 Cal.5th 664, 706.) Thus, the Court will assess the motion on its merits.

Procedural Requirements

The motion is supported by the declaration of De La Cerda’s counsel, Marita M. Lauinger, which states the cases are not complex, (Lauinger Decl. ¶¶ 3, 10), De La Cerda attempted to obtain an agreement for the transfer, (Id. ¶ 6), and De La Cerda notified the parties of their obligation to disclose information concerning any other motions to transfer that would be affected by granting the instant motion. (Id. ¶ 11.) The declaration addresses the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.500(c).

The Actions Are Not Complex

The Court finds the actions are not complex, which the parties do not contest. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.500(d)(1); Mot. at 5:9-6:8.) Both cases involve the allegation that Defendant violated Labor Code § 2802 by failing to reimburse for business expenses.

This factor supports a finding of transfer and coordination.  

Predominating and Significant Common Questions of Law and Fact

The two actions do not involve predominating and significant common questions of law and fact. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.500(d)(2).) While both actions do involve allegations of the failure to reimburse for necessary business expenditures, the Santander Action makes the additional allegation of Defendant contacting Santander and other aggrieved employees on their personal cellphones, which is not raised in the De La Cerda Action. While De La Cerda’s counsel declares that she believes that De La Cerda was a non-exempt employee (Lauinger Reply Decl. ¶ 7), the complaint in the De La Cerda Action does not articulate De La Cerda’s employment classification as either exempt or non-exempt and fails to set forth the specific relevant time period in which De La Cerda is seeking relief. (Defendant’s RJN at Ex. A.) Moreover, the De La Cerda Action does not allege claims such as the failure to pay wages, failure to provide timely wages, or the other numerous claims raised in the Santander Action. The failure to pay necessary business expenditures is not a predominant or significant question of fact or law in the Santander Action.  

This factor weighs against coordination and transfer.

Convenience of Parties, Witnesses, and Counsel

Ms. Lauinger declares that De La Cerda worked for Defendant in San Diego County and currently resides in Riverside County. (Lauinger Decl. ¶ 7.) Many of the witnesses in this case are located in Southern California and four of the six witnesses who testified in De La Cerda’s arbitration reside in Southern California. (Lauinger Decl. ¶ 8.) None reside in Northern California. (Lauinger Decl. ¶ 8.)

According to Defendant’s counsel, Alexander L. Grodan (“Grodan”), De La Cerda’s counsel works in and is located in Carlsbad, CA. (Grodan Decl. ¶ 16.)

The Court finds that given that neither Defendant nor Santander have presented any dispositive evidence regarding convenience of parties, witnesses, and counsel, this factor weighs in favor of coordination. De La Cerda resides in Riverside County and his counsel is located in San Diego County, which the Court finds is closer to the Los Angeles Superior Court than the Alameda County Superior Court. Additionally, most of the relevant witnesses who testified at the arbitration reside in Southern California.

Development of Actions, Work Product, Use of Judicial Facilities and Staff Resources, and Apparent Court Calendars

The two cases arise, in part, out of the failure to Defendant to reimburse employees for necessary business expenditures. Efficient utilization of judicial facilities and staff resources is not promoted by having both cases in a single superior court. The Santander Action has settled and is awaiting final approval by the Court, whereas the representative PAGA claims in De La Cerda are in its early stages.  While De La Cerda’s counsel states that De La Cerda estimates he may have to take 5 to 10 depositions of Defendant’s witnesses to establish his Labor Code § 2802 claims, the Court fails to see how duplication of discovery is even an issue as argued by De La Cerda. (Mot. at 8:10.) Here, there is no current risk of duplication of discovery given that the Santander Action is awaiting final approval of the settlement.

Additionally, the Court notes De La Cerda argues coordination will conserve judicial resources. (Mot. at 8:3.) The Court fails to see how judicial resources would be conserved given that the Santander Action is awaiting final approval of its PAGA settlement. Allowing coordination would not conserve judicial resources as the claims alleged in the Santander Action would be re-litigated via a coordination order.

The relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel, (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.300(d)(4)), and the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and staff resources, (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.300(d)(5)), do not weigh in favor of coordination.

The Court notes that both the Los Angeles Superior Court and the Alameda Superior Court both have substantial court calendars. The apparent court calendars, (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.300(d)(6)), weigh in favor of transfer and consolidation.

Inconsistent and Duplicative Rulings

The Court also considers “[t]he disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments.” (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.500(d)(7).) Given that both cases involve claims related to the violations of Labor Code § 2802 arising from the failure to reimburse for business expenses, there will be an opportunity for inconsistent or duplicative rulings if the two cases remain pending in separate superior courts. If the settlement agreement is not approved in the Santander Action, it is feasible that conflicting findings in each case may be made as to the violations of Labor Code § 2802. The Court finds the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments by having the two cases proceed separately weigh in favor of transfer and consolidation.

Likelihood of Settlement

California Rules of Court, rule 3.500(d)(8) requires the Court to consider “[t]he likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.” The Santander Action has settled and is awaiting final approval, and the De La Cerda Action is in its early stages of discovery. Coordination which would add “more parties and attorneys might inhibit settlement.” (Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245, 253.) Thus, coordination—which would add De La Cerda as a party as well as his counsel—may inhibit the settlement reached in the Santander Action. This factor weighs against coordination.  

On balance, the Court finds the relevant factors demonstrate the ends of justice will not be promoted by transfer and consolidation of the two actions in Los Angeles County. De La Cerda has not made a showing of all the factor set forth in CCP § 404.1.