Judge Michelle Williams Court, Case Number: 22STCV36194, Date: 2023-08-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 22STCV36194, Date: 2023-08-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV36194 Hearing Date: August 3, 2023 Dept: 1

22STCV36194 MARIE AUGUSTINA TORRES vs COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Motion to Determine Whether Cases Should be Related

TENTATIVE RULING: Department 1 relates 22STCV36194 with 19STCV15856 and orders 22STCV36194 reassigned to Department 52 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse for all purposes. All hearings currently set in 22STCV36194 are hereby advanced and vacated.

Defendant to give notice.

DISCUSSION

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED as to Exhibit Nos. 1-5 and 8-9, which are filed court records. (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is DENIED as to Exhibit Nos. 6 and 7. These exhibits are not conformed copies of court records and Plaintiff did not file a “Motion to Relate and Consolidate Cases for All Purposes in Case No. 19STCV[]15856” as represented. While Plaintiff filed such a motion on November 28, 2022 in 22STCV36194, those documents contain a different caption page and the motion was taken off-calendar by Plaintiff.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice of Plaintiff’s purported interrogatory responses as Exhibit No. 10 is also DENIED. Discovery responses do not expressly fall within any provision of Evidence Code sections 451 or 452 and judicial notice is not sought to highlight statements of fact that contradict allegations in a complaint. (See e.g. Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 468, 477 (“real parties in interest do not seek to have us judicially notice statements of fact that contradict allegations of facts in the SACC.”); Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604–605 (“The court will take judicial notice of records such as admissions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and the like, when considering a demurrer, only where they contain statements of the plaintiff or his agent which are inconsistent with the allegations of the pleading before the court.”).) Discovery responses are otherwise not the proper subject of judicial notice. (See e.g. TSMC North America v. Semiconductor Manufacturing Internat. Corp. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 581, 594 n.4. (“Appellants’ discovery responses are not in the appellate record, however, and they are not a proper matter for judicial notice.”).)

Plaintiff asks that the Court not relate the two cases, but contends she was required to file the instant motion to comply with a court order. Plaintiff notes Judge Tamzarian previously ruled the cases were not related and contends “this decision should be reversed only when an abuse of discretion is shown.” (Mot. at 5:19-21.) Plaintiff relies upon the standard for appellate review, citing People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 31: “[w]here, as here, a discretionary power is inherently or by express statute vested in the trial judge, his or her exercise of that wide discretion must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” This appellate standard is inapplicable here. Department 1 is vested with the authority, pursuant to Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 3.3(f)(3) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(h)(1)(D), to relate civil cases upon a noticed motion.

The Court finds the cases are related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300. The cases involve the same parties and the same claims. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.300(a)(1).) As argued by Defendant, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint in 22STCV36194 expressly alleges Plaintiff suffered retaliation due to her prior complaints of sexual harassment. (22STCV36194 SAC ¶ 5 (“because it was well-known that Plaintiff had made a formal complaint of sex harassment against a sheriff deputy, the deputies, in retaliation, ostracized Plaintiff, encouraged violence against her and refused to accommodate her disabiliites [sic].”): Id. ¶ 30 (“The unfair treatment was in retaliation for PLAINTIFF’s prior complaints of harassment and discrimination.”); Id. ¶ 35 (“COUNTY . . . in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment, . . . exposed her to an unreasonable risk of inmate violence, including the risk and fear of death”); Id. ¶ 172 (“DEFENDANT intentionally orchestrated a campaign of retaliatory harassment against PLAINTIFF where it condoned and encouraged both its supervisory and non-supervisory employees to subject PLAINTIFF to ridicule, insults and other conduct to make PLAINTIFF’s job oppressive, dangerous and threatening, all in retaliation for her protected complaints against the Deputies she worked with prior to being transferred to MCJ.”).) These are the same complaints relied upon by Plaintiff’s retaliation claim in 19STCV15856. (19STCV15856 FAC ¶ 193 (“Plaintiff believes and alleges that Defendants retaliated against her for her complaints of sexual harassment.”).)

The two cases arise from Plaintiff’s employment with the same employer, assert claims under FEHA, and will require the determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law or fact related to Plaintiff’s employment and Plaintiff’s sexual harassment complaints. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.300(a)(2).)

Plaintiff contends Judge Kalra has expended time on the issues having made a detailed demurrer ruling and therefore “there is no concern here as to issues of judicial economy.” (Mot. at 5:28-6:3.) Plaintiff also notes the earlier filed case has settled. In opposition, Defendant argues Judge Tamzarian previously ruled on a motion for summary adjudication, involving Plaintiff’s employment-related FEHA claims in 19STCV15856 and is familiar with the issues. Because ruling on the summary judgment motion required the consideration of evidence related to Plaintiff’s employment rather than just the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings, judicial economy would not be served by maintaining the actions before different judges. There remains a likelihood that there will be a substantial duplication of judicial resources if the two cases are heard by different judges. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.300(a)(4).)

Finally, Plaintiff argues “[i]t would be unfair to allow Defendant to oppose a Notice of Related case have the cases not related and then manipulate the proceedings by having the cases subsequently related. Defendant took a contrary position in its opposition to demurrer . . . motivating the trial court in Case 2 to have Department 1 hear the motion.” (Mot. at 6:3-8.) As noted by Defendant, Plaintiff is similarly taking a contrary position at this time, having previously argued the cases should be related and consolidated. (Def. RJN Ex. 5.) Both the pleadings and procedural posture of the cases have changed since the initial related case order, such that the parties’ positions are not impermissibly contradictory or unduly prejudicial.