Judge Michelle Williams Court, Case Number: 22STCV40905, Date: 2023-10-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 22STCV40905, Date: 2023-10-26 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV40905 Hearing Date: November 29, 2023 Dept: 1

22STCV40905 NIKKI SHIPLEY vs UNIVERSITY OF LA VERNE

Defendant University of La Verne’s Motion to Transfer Venue to the Pomona Courthouse

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant University of La Verne’s Motion to Transfer Venue to the Pomona Courthouse is GRANTED and 22STCV40905 is ordered reassigned to the Pomona Courthouse South in the East District of the Los Angeles Superior Court. Notice of the case reassignment shall issue shortly. Moving party to give notice.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant’s request for judicial notice of information from the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration as well as various maps depicting driving distances is GRANTED. (Evid. Code §§ 452(c); 452(h). See also U.S. v. Perea-Rey (9th Cir. 2012) 680 F.3d 1179, 1182 n.1 (“We take judicial notice of a Google map and satellite image as a ‘source[ ] whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,’ at least for the purpose of determining the general location of the home.”); People v. Bratton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1105 (“We deem this to be a request for judicial notice of a Google Maps view of the area, which is granted.”).)

DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks to transfer this action from the Central District to the East District based upon the convenience of witnesses and the interests of justice. Pursuant to Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(B), an unlimited civil complaint asserting employment causes of action may be filed in either the Central District or “where the contract of employment was performed or where the employer resides or does business.”

The complaint alleges Defendant’s place of business is located at 1950 3rd Street, La Verne, CA 91750, (Compl. ¶ 2), which is within the East District. The filing court locator provided by the Court indicates the Pomona Courthouse South is an appropriate filing location for an unlimited civil action arising in the city of La Verne with the zip code 91750. Accordingly, Defendant requests the Court transfer the action from one proper court location to another.

In opposition, Plaintiff contends Defendant failed to post fees and costs as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 399(a). (Opp. at 6:14-18.) However, the fees referenced in Section 399 apply when cases are transferred between different superior courts, not districts or courthouses within the same superior court. (See generally Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1449 (“Even though a superior court is divided into branches or departments, pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 4, there is only one superior court in a county and jurisdiction is therefore vested in that court, not in any particular judge or department. Whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one and the same court.”).)

Plaintiff also contends the complaint was filed in the proper forum, which is immaterial here. As noted in reply, Defendant does not dispute the Central District was one appropriate filing location and does not seek to transfer the action on the grounds that it was improperly filed. (Reply at 6:17-22.)

Plaintiff further contends Defendant waived the right to seek a transfer arguing Defendant must file the motion within a reasonable time and it previously requested a stipulation to transfer on May 26, 2023 based upon the identities of four witnesses. (Opp. at 7:4-19.) “There is no time fixed by statute when an action may be transferred for trial because of convenience of witnesses or to promote justice. The courts have said that it must be made within a reasonable time after the case is at issue on the facts, the determination of which rests largely in the discretion of the trial court.” (Cooney v. Cooney (1944) 25 Cal.2d 202, 208.) Defendant was not permitted to file its motion based upon the convenience of witnesses until it filed an answer. (See Buran Equipment Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1662, 1665 (“a motion to transfer venue based on witness convenience cannot be made before an answer is filed.”); De Long v. De Long (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 373, 374 (“since no answer had been filed the trial court properly denied the motion made upon the ground of the convenience of witnesses.”).) Defendant answered the complaint on April 12, 2023 and filed its motion on September 11, 2023. No motions were filed in between these dates and Plaintiff has not identified any prejudice from the delay. Defendant also filed its motion shortly after Plaintiff served supplemental discovery responses. (Ahluwalia Reply Decl. ¶ 2.) The Court shall not deny the motion as untimely.

Defendant contends the convenience of witnesses and ends of justice would be served by a transfer to the Pomona Courthouse. (Mot. at 7:10-11:25.) Defendant identifies ten witnesses disclosed in Plaintiff’s complaint and discovery responses. (Ahluwalia Decl. ¶¶ 5-19; Gordien Decl. ¶¶ 2-7.) Defendant provides the current city of residence for its current employees and the last known city of residence for its former employees and former student. Defendant uses the city of residence to compare distances from the Stanley Mosk and Pomona Courthouse South. (Ibid.) Each of the identified cities are closer to the Pomona Courthouse South. (Ibid.)

In opposition, Plaintiff contends “Defendant assumes for purposes of its motion that every single person identified by Plaintiff in her complaint and discovery responses will necessarily be called to testify at trial. This assumption is obviously false given that depositions have not yet been taken from any of the potential witnesses identified.” (Opp. at 7:22-25.) Defendant need not demonstrate any particular person will actually be a witness. (See J. C. Millett Co. v. Latchford-Marble Glass Co. (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 218, 225 (“It is true that Blum did not state that any particular person would actually be a witness, but such an affirmative declaration is unnecessary [Citation] and it is sufficient if the proposed witnesses are identified by name and it is stated they will be necessary witnesses.”).) Here, the individuals to whom Plaintiff allegedly complained, Abe Helou and Marcia Godwin, (Decl. Ex. D at 7:24-9:14), are likely necessary witnesses that would be called by Plaintiff. The evidence indicates both of these individuals reside over twenty miles closer to the Pomona Courthouse South than the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. (Ahluwalia Decl. ¶¶ 5-19; Gordien Decl. ¶¶ 2-7.) Defendant’s other employees are also identified in Plaintiff’s discovery responses and in the complaint. As noted by Defendant, (Reply at 9:8), Plaintiff does not contest that they are necessary witnesses that Plaintiff would call.

Plaintiff faults Defendant for not providing “declarations from the witnesses themselves stating facts supporting inconvenience as to each witness as required.” (Opp. at 7:26-27.) However, a motion to transfer need not be supported by declarations from witnesses. The declarations provided by Defendant are sufficient. (See Rycz v. Superior Court of San Francisco County (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 824, 846 n.22 (“Although that may be advisable where possible, witness declarations are not required by section 397, subdivision (c); counsel declarations have been employed in past published cases . . . and the inconvenience to witnesses may be inferred where the witnesses are located far from the trial venue.”).)

Plaintiff further notes “five of the potential witnesses no longer work at or attend school at the Defendant University” and therefore the information may be incorrect. (Opp. at 8:14-18.) The Court agrees the last known addresses, provided for Yokum, Tao, Miramontes, Duenas, and Book, are not reliable indicators of whether it will be more convenient for these individuals to attend trial at the Pomona Courthouse South than the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. Plaintiff does not provide any contrary evidence and therefore these witnesses do not support either party’s contentions.

Plaintiff cites Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.620, which allows the use of deposition testimony at trial by any person for any purpose if “[t]he deponent resides more than 150 miles from the place of the trial or other hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.620(c)(1).) Plaintiff does not cite any authority establishing the relevance of this statute and the Court does not find it persuasive given the established case authority governing motions to transfer. Finally, in addressing the interests of justice, Plaintiff argues that transfer to the Pomona Courthouse South will impact the jury pool. (Opp.at 9:9-16.) However, Plaintiff failed to support this argument with evidence or authority. (Ibid.)

The Court finds the evidence submitted by Defendant is sufficient to demonstrate the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted by transferring the action to the Pomona Courthouse South. “Convenience of witnesses is shown by the fact that the residence of all the witnesses is in the [district] to which the transfer of the cause is requested. A conclusion that the ends of justice are promoted can be drawn from the fact that by moving the trial closer to the residence of the witnesses, delay and expense in court proceedings are avoided and savings in the witnesses' time and expenses are effected.” (Pearson v. Superior Court, City and County of San Francisco (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 69, 77.) Here, the only evidence before the court demonstrates Plaintiff’s work location where the conduct at issue occurred and the residences of numerous necessary witnesses are significantly closer to the Pomona Courthouse South than the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. Plaintiff’s opposition is not supported by any evidence to dispute the showing made by Defendant. “Where there is a showing that the . . . ends of justice will be promoted by the change and there is absolutely no showing whatever to the contrary, a denial of the motion to change venue is an abuse of discretion, there being no conflict of evidence to sustain the decision of the trial court.” (Pearson, supra, 199 Cal.App.2d at 78.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.