Judge Michelle Williams Court, Case Number: 23CMCV00209, Date: 2023-11-29 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 23CMCV00209, Date: 2023-11-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23CMCV00209 Hearing Date: November 29, 2023 Dept: 1

23CMCV00209 S. COLLIER, et al. vs COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.

Defendants’ Motion for Intra-district Transfer

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants’ Motion for Intra-district Transfer is DENIED. Clerk to give notice.

Defendants seek to transfer this action to the Michael D. Antonovich Antelope Valley Courthouse in the North District. The case is currently assigned to Department B of the Compton Courthouse, which sits in the South Central District of the Los Angeles Superior Court. (LASC Local Rules, rule 2.2(b).)

The parties rely upon the text of Code of Civil Procedure sections 396b and 397, which do not apply. (Mot. at 4:24-5:9; Opp. at 3:22-4:24.) These sections of the Code of Civil Procedure govern transfers between superior courts, not different districts therein. The Los Angeles Superior Court is only one court. (See generally Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1449 (“Even though a superior court is divided into branches or departments, pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 4, there is only one superior court in a county and jurisdiction is therefore vested in that court, not in any particular judge or department. Whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one and the same court.”).) Local Rule 2.3 governs the assignment and transfer of cases between districts of the Los Angeles Superior Court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 402; LASC Local Rule 2.3.)

However, because the same language appears in both LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) and Code of Civil Procedure section 397(c), Department 1 applies the case authority related to Section 397. Accordingly, a party acting under the authority of Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) bears the same burden of proof if it seeks a district transfer. (See Lieberman v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 396, 401.) That burden of proof calls for affidavits that contain more than generalities and conclusions. (See Hamilton v Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 418, 424.) Such affidavits or declarations, like those for change of venue under Code Civ. Proc. section 397(c), should show the name of each witness, the expected testimony of each witness, and facts showing why the attendance of said witnesses at trial would be inconvenient or why the ends of justice would be served by a transfer. (See Stute v. Burinda (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 17.) Convenience to non-party witnesses alone is the key to the success of the motion, and not the convenience of parties or employees of parties. (Ibid.)

Defendants contend the motion was improperly filed in the South Central District and the convenience of witnesses and ends of justice would be supported by the transfer.

As to the convenience of witnesses and ends of justice, Defendants failed to meet their burden. Defendants’ motion and declaration primarily relies upon the location of the parties. (Inlow Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) However, the parties’ location is immaterial to a request to transfer venue on this basis. (Wrin v. Ohlandt (1931) 213 Cal. 158, 160 (“The inconvenience of the parties in attending the trial is not a factor to be considered in a motion of this character.”); Peiser v. Mettler (1958) 50 Cal.2d 594, 612 (“convenience of the parties is not to be considered upon a motion for a change of venue.”).) Defendants’ counsel identifies a single non-party witness, but fails to provide any of the required information. (Inlow Decl. ¶ 4. See Peiser, supra, 50 Cal.2d at 607 (“The affidavits in support of the motion for change of venue on this ground must set forth the names of the witnesses, the nature of the testimony expected from each, and the reasons why the attendance of each would be inconvenient.”).)

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend the motion is untimely as a matter of law, citing inapplicable Code of Civil Procedure section 396b(a), which requires that a motion to change venue to be filed “at the time he or she answers, demurs, or moves to strike, or, at his or her option, without answering, demurring, or moving to strike and within the time otherwise allowed to respond to the complaint.” (Opp. at 4:8-24.) The Local Rules do not contain a similar filing deadline.

The Court finds Defendants’ motion must be brought within a reasonable time. (See e.g. Cooney v. Cooney (1944) 25 Cal.2d 202, 208 (“There is no time fixed by statute when an action may be transferred for trial because of convenience of witnesses or to promote justice. The courts have said that it must be made within a reasonable time after the case is at issue on the facts, the determination of which rests largely in the discretion of the trial court.”); Thompson v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 300, 306 (“There is no special statutory procedure governing the motion, and the code imposes no express time limit within which it must be made. However, it has been stated that such motion must be made within a reasonable time after the answer is filed.”).) Defendants’ motion also must have been filed after the answer. (See Buran Equipment Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1662, 1665 (“a motion to transfer venue based on witness convenience cannot be made before an answer is filed.”).)

However, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendants unreasonably delayed in filing their motion. While Defendants acknowledge their motion must be filed within a reasonable time, (Mot. at 5:1-17; Reply at 2:13-23), Defendants do not provide any argument or evidence that their delay was reasonable. Defendants filed their answer on April 17, 2023 and Defendants decided to file a motion for summary judgment on August 25, 2023. Defendants did not seek to transfer this action until September 25, 2023, albeit in the wrong department. Thus, Defendants delayed five months in seeking to transfer the action and filed a dispositive motion in the interim.

Defendants contend the complaint was filed in an incorrect district because the action arose in the North District. (Mot. at 4:17-21; LASC Local Rules, rule 2.3(a)(1)(B) (providing that tort cases may be filed in either the Central District or where the cause of action arose).) Defendants argue “the alleged incident, i.e., the alleged excessive use of force and false detention/arrest, occurred at Plaintiffs’ home on Sutherland Street in Lancaster, California” in the North District. (Mot. 6:1-3.) However, Defendants’ assertion that the case was filed in the incorrect district is not based upon any newly discovered information. The location of the detention and arrest, in addition to being known by Defendants, is expressly alleged in the complaint. (Compl. ¶ 18 (“Detective Erich Marbach's search warrant (hereinafter ‘Warrant’) was executed on July 25, 2019, at approximately 12:15 p.m., on or around a residential property located at 1542 Sutherland Street, in the City of Lancaster, County of Los Angeles, and State of California.”).) Thus, Defendants were aware of the basis for their motion herein, chose to pursue other litigation objectives without objection to the forum, and delayed seeking a transfer for several months. On November 9, 2023, Defendants obtained a continuance of the hearing on the parties’ fully briefed summary judgment motion via ex parte application based upon the instant motion to transfer. A transfer to the North District will result in further delay of the action and resolution of the summary judgment motion.

Under the circumstances, the Court finds Defendants’ delay is unreasonable and the requested transfer will cause undue further delay to the proceedings. (See generally Willingham v. Pecora (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 289, 295 (“the trial court could have properly denied the motions upon the ground that the ends of justice would not have been promoted by a five–month delay in the trial of the action which would have resulted if the motions had been granted.”).)

Defendants’ motion is DENIED.