Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 23GDCV01581, Date: 2024-08-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV01581    Hearing Date: August 29, 2024    Dept: 1

23GDCV01581          ERIKA GONZALEZ vs KIA AMERICA, INC.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Change of Venue

TENTATIVE RULING:  Plaintiff’s Motion for Change of Venue is GRANTED and 23GDCV01581 is ordered reassigned to the Stanley Mosk Courthouse in the Central District of the Los Angeles Superior Court.  Notice of case reassignment shall issue shortly. Clerk to give notice.

Background

On July 26, 2023, Plaintiff Erika Gonzalez filed this lemon law against Kia America, Inc. and First Motor Group of Los Angeles, LLC d/b/a Kia of Downtown Los Angeles. The complaint alleges Plaintiff purchased a 2022 Kia Sorrento that suffered from several defects, including with the check engine light, brake assist, and radio display, and Defendants were unable to repair the vehicle.

On April 16, 2024, Judge Ralph C. Hofer issued a minute order stating, in part, “[t]he Court notes that the dealership is located in downtown Los Angeles, and therefore the venue [] appears to be incorrect.”

On April 19, 2024, the parties submitted a stipulation and proposed order to transfer the action  to the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. However, the filing was rejected with the instruction that the parties “[m]ust file a noticed motion in Dept. 1.”

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of the complaint in this action and the Statement of Information filed by both Defendants with the California Secretary of State. The requests are GRANTED. (Evid. Code §§ 452(c); 452(d).)

Motion to Transfer Between Districts

Standard

LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) authorizes Department 1 to transfer civil cases from one judicial district to another via a noticed motion on three enumerated grounds: (1) when the case was filed in an improper district; (2) for the convenience of witnesses; or (3) to promote the ends of justice. (LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2).) A transfer under the Local Rules is discretionary.

Because the same language appears in both LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) and Code of Civil Procedure section 397(c), Department 1 applies the case authority related to Section 397. Accordingly, a party acting under the authority of Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) bears the same burden of proof if it seeks a district transfer. (See Lieberman v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 396, 401.) That burden of proof calls for affidavits that contain more than generalities and conclusions. (See Hamilton v Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 418, 424.) Such affidavits or declarations, like those for change of venue under Code Civ. Proc. section 397(c), should show the name of each witness, the expected testimony of each witness, and facts showing why the attendance of said witnesses at trial would be inconvenient or why the ends of justice would be served by a transfer. (See Stute v. Burinda (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 17.) Convenience to non-party witnesses alone is the key to the success of the motion, and not the convenience of parties or employees of parties. (Ibid.)

The Action Was Filed in the Wrong District

Plaintiff seeks to transfer this action from the Glendale Courthouse in the North Central District to the Stanley Mosk Courthouse in the Central District. Plaintiff contends the case was filed in the wrong district.

Plaintiff relies upon Code of Civil Procedure sections 395(a) and 395.5, which govern venue in the proper county, not the assignment of cases within a superior court. Typically, the Local Rules of the Los Angeles Superior Court govern the assignment of cases between districts and courthouses. (Code Civ. Proc. § 402; LASC Local Rule 2.3; Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1449 (“Even though a superior court is divided into branches or departments, pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 4, there is only one superior court in a county and jurisdiction is therefore vested in that court, not in any particular judge or department. Whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one and the same court.”).)

In opposition, Defendant contends Code of Civil Procedure section 395(b) governs the proper filing location as it expressly addresses the different locations within a superior court where the case could be filed. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 395(b):

[I]n an action arising from an offer or provision of goods, services, loans or extensions of credit intended primarily for personal, family or household use . . . In the superior court designated in this subdivision as the proper court, the proper court location for trial of a case is the location where the court tries that type of case that is nearest or most accessible to where the buyer or lessee resides, where the buyer or lessee in fact signed the contract, where the buyer or lessee resided at the time the contract was entered into, or where the buyer or lessee resides at the commencement of the action. Otherwise, any location of the superior court designated as the proper court in this subdivision is a proper court location for the trial. The court may specify by local rule the nearest or most accessible court location where the court tries that type of case.

(Code Civ. Proc. § 395(b).) Additionally, the Court notes pursuant to Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(A), “[e]very unlimited civil tort action for bodily injury, wrongful death, or damage to personal property (hereinafter referred to as “Personal Injury Action”) must be filed in the judicial district where the incident arose.

In “Step 4” of the civil case cover sheet addendum where the filing party is asked to “[c]heck the appropriate boxes for the numbers shown under Column C for the type of action that you have selected. Enter the address, which is the basis for the filing location including zip code,” Plaintiff selected Reason 3, which corresponds to “Location where cause of action arose” and listed the relevant address as “330 N Brand Blvd. Glendale, CA 91203.” However, the complaint does not allege any conduct occurred in Glendale.

In opposition, Defendants contend Plaintiff residence at the time of purchase was in Huntington Park, CA and Plaintiff registered the vehicle at Plaintiff’s address in Huntington Park. (Proudfoot Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8, Ex. B, E.) Unlimited civil cases arising out of Huntington Park, California are properly filed in the Norwalk Courthouse in the Southeast District. Plaintiff signed the purchase contract in Carson, CA. (Id. ¶ 5, Ex. B.) Unlimited civil cases arising out of Carson, California are properly filed in the Compton Courthouse. In their opposition, Defendants request the court grant the motion, but transfer the action to the Norwalk Courthouse rather than the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. (Opp. at 4:5-6.)

However, it is well-established that “where a plaintiff takes advantage of the liberal statutory joinder rules and joins various causes of action against various defendants, so long as the plaintiff chooses a venue that is proper as to one defendant, the entire case may be tried there, regardless of whether venue would be improper with respect to other defendants if the causes of action against them were analyzed separately.” (K.R.L. Partnership v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 490, 504.) As argued by Plaintiff, the negligence cause of action against Defendant Kia of Downtown arises out of a contract for services rendered in Los Angeles, California 90007. (Stocca Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B.) Accordingly, this action is properly filed in the Central District.

In opposition, Defendant contends transferring the case to the Norwalk Courthouse, rather than the Stanley Mosk Courthouse, will promote the ends of justice. (Opp. at 4:7-4:25.) Defendant failed to meet its burden on this issue as it is not supported by sufficient evidence and relies upon the speculation that Defendant Kia of Downtown will prevail in a dispositive motion. Defendant does not adequately demonstrate Defendant Kia of Downtown is a sham party improperly joined to obtain a specific venue.  (Buran Equipment Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1662, 1666 (“A defendant's residence for venue purposes may only be disregarded when the joinder is sham, against one having no real interest in the litigation, who is joined solely for the purpose of achieving venue in a particular [place].”).)

The motion is GRANTED.