Judge Michelle Williams Court, Case Number: 23GDCV02203, Date: 2024-10-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 23GDCV02203, Date: 2024-10-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23GDCV02203 Hearing Date: October 10, 2024 Dept: 1

23GDCV02203 DAVID K. WRIGHT, et al. vs MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC

Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Change of Venue

TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiffs’ Motion for Change of Venue is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs to give notice.

On September 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to transfer this case from the Glendale Courthouse to the Stanley Mosk Courthouse pursuant to CCP §§ 395 and 395.5. The motion is made on the grounds that Defendant MB Los Angeles has its principal place of business in Los Angeles and the repair work on the subject vehicle, as well as the agreement for services, took place in Los Angeles.

Judicial Notice

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code §§ 452, 453.) The Court therefore takes judicial notice of the complaint in this action and the corporate statements of information filed with the Secretary of State for the State of California for Defendants MBUSA and MB Los Angeles.

Standard

The Local Rules of the Los Angeles Superior Court govern the assignment of cases between its districts and departments. (Code Civ. Proc. § 402.) The Los Angeles Superior Court is only one court, even though it is divided into districts. (See generally Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1449 (“Even though a superior court is divided into branches or departments, pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 4, there is only one superior court in a county and jurisdiction is therefore vested in that court, not in any particular judge or department. Whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one and the same court.”).) LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) authorizes Department 1 to transfer civil cases from one judicial district to another via a noticed motion on three enumerated grounds: (1) when the case was filed in an improper district; (2) for the convenience of witnesses; or (3) to promote the ends of justice. (LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2).) A transfer under the Local Rules is discretionary.

Given that the same language appears in both LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) and Code of Civil Procedure section 397(c), Department 1 applies the case authority related to Section 397. Accordingly, a party acting under the authority of Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) bears the same burden of proof if it seeks a district transfer. (See Lieberman v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 396, 401.) That burden of proof calls for affidavits that contain more than generalities and conclusions. (See Hamilton v Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 418, 424.) Such affidavits or declarations, like those for change of venue under Code Civ. Proc. section 397(c), should show the name of each witness, the expected testimony of each witness, and facts showing why the attendance of said witnesses at trial would be inconvenient or why the ends of justice would be served by a transfer. (See Stute v. Burinda (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 17.) Convenience to non-party witnesses alone is the key to the success of the motion, and not the convenience of parties or employees of parties. (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs Failed to Demonstrate a Transfer is Warranted

Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(A) contains mandatory filing rules which have no application to Plaintiffs’ complaint, as the case does not fall within any of the enumerated case types: personal injury, asbestos, class action, probate, Labor Code section 98.2, writ of prohibition or mandate, emancipation, or adoption. If none of the mandatory provisions apply, an unlimited civil case may be filed in the Central District or may be filed in a district other than the Central District where the case involves breach of contract claims “where performance is required by an express provision or where defendant resides . . . .” (LASC Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(B).)

CCP § 395, upon which the motion is brought, provides that “the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (a).) “If none of the defendants reside in the state or if they reside in the state and the county where they reside is unknown to the plaintiff, the action may be tried in any county that the plaintiff may designate in his or her complaint, and, if the defendant is about to depart from the state, the action may be tried in the superior court in any county where either of the parties reside or service is made.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (a).)

CCP § 395.5, upon which the motion is also brought, provides that “[a] corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 395.5.)

Initially, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not seeking to change the venue of this case from Los Angeles County to another county. Rather, Plaintiffs are seeking to transfer this action from the Glendale Courthouse to the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. The Stanley Mosk Courthouse is located in Los Angeles County. The complaint alleges that Defendant MBUSA is a Delaware Limited Liability Company operating and doing business in the State of California. (Compl. ¶ 3.) Defendant MB Los Angeles has its principal place of business in Medford, OR with its California office located in Los Angeles, CA. (Serrano Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. B.) Defendant MBUSA has its principal place of business in Sandy Springs, GA. (Serrano Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. C.) The Court finds that this action was filed in the proper county under both CCP §§ 395 and 395.5.

The declaration of Plaintiffs’ counsel, Luis A. Serrano, is void of any facts showing the necessity of a transfer to the Stanley Mosk Courthouse. Mr. Serrano’s declaration merely functions to authenticate the documents attached to Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice. Plaintiffs have presented no facts to warrant a district transfer. Plaintiffs have therefore not met their burden to warrant a district transfer. Plaintiffs are informed that “[i]n law and motion practice, factual evidence is supplied to the court by way of declarations.” (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224.)