Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 23STCV11074, Date: 2023-09-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV11074 Hearing Date: September 7, 2023 Dept: 1
23STCV11074 TONYA
FOSTER, et al. vs RICHARD MAKARY
Defendant Richard Makary’s Unopposed Motion to Transfer
Venue – Courthouse Assignment
TENTATIVE RULING:
The motion is DENIED.
On May 16, 2023, Plaintiffs Tonya Foster and Marqueece
Foster filed this action against Defendant Richard Makary arising out of their
tenancy in the residential property located at 7414 Laura St., Rear, Downey, CA
90242. The complaint asserts eight causes of action and alleges the unit
Plaintiffs rented was an unlawfully subdivided unit with unpermitted plumbing,
gas, and electrical that lacked a Certificate of Occupancy.
Standard
LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) authorizes Department 1 to
transfer civil cases from one judicial district to another, including when the
case was filed in an improper district, or for the convenience of witnesses or
to promote the ends of justice on a noticed motion. (LASC
Local Rule 2.3(b)(2).)
The Action Was Permissively Filed in
the Central District
Defendant seeks to transfer this action to the Norwalk Courthouse in the Southeast District.
The case is currently assigned to Department 55 in the Stanley Mosk
Courthouse, which sits in the Central District of the Los Angeles Superior
Court. (LASC Local Rule 2.2(b).)
In his motion, Defendant cites Code
of Civil Procedure sections 396b. (Mot. at 3:18-25.) However, Code of Civil
Procedure section 396b governs transfers between superior courts, not districts
therein. The Los Angeles Superior Court is only one court, even though it is
divided into districts and departments. (See generally Glade v. Glade
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1449 (“Even though a superior court is divided into
branches or departments, pursuant to California Constitution, article VI,
section 4, there is only one superior court in a county and jurisdiction is
therefore vested in that court, not in any particular judge or department.
Whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one and the same
court.”).) The Local Rules of the Los Angeles Superior Court govern the assignment
of cases between its districts and departments. (Code Civ. Proc. § 402; LASC
Local Rule 2.3(b)(2).)
In “Step 4” of the civil case
cover sheet where the filing party is asked to “[c]heck
the appropriate boxes for the numbers shown under Column C for the type of
action that you have selected. Enter the address, which is the basis for the
filing location including zip code,” Plaintiffs
selected Reason 2, which correlates with “[p]ermissive filing in Central
District,” and Reason 6, which correlates with “[l]ocation of property or
permanently garaged vehicle.” Plaintiffs listed the relevant address as 7414 Laura St., Rear, Downey, CA 90240.
In Step 5 of the civil case coversheet, where the filing
party is asked to certify the proper filing location, Plaintiffs’ counsel
indicated the Central District was the appropriate filing location under the
applicable Local Rules.
Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(A) contains mandatory filing rules
which have no application to Plaintiffs’ complaint, as the case does not fall
within any of the enumerated case types: personal injury, asbestos, class
action, probate, Labor Code section 98.2, writ of prohibition or mandate,
emancipation, or adoption. If none of the mandatory provisions apply, an
unlimited civil case may always be filed in the Central District at a
plaintiff’s election. (LASC Local Rule
2.3(a)(1)(B) (“Except as set forth in subsection (A) above, [Mandatory Filing],
. . . an unlimited civil or Family Code
action may be filed in the Central District . . .”).) As noted by Defendant,
(Mot. at 3:26-28), an unlimited civil complaint may also be brought “where the
property is located” for cases involving real property. (LASC Local Rule
2.3(a)(1)(B).)
Plaintiffs’ complaint was properly filed in the Central
District under the permissive filing rules enumerated in LASC Local Rule
2.3(a)(1)(B). Therefore, there is no basis to transfer the action based upon a “failure
to file the case in accordance with the requirements set forth in . . .
Chapter” 2 of the Local Rules, (LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2)), and Defendant’s
motion cannot be granted on this basis.
Defendant Failed to Meet His Burden
for a Transfer on Other Grounds
Pursuant to Local Rule 2.3(b)(2), Department 1 may also
transfer a case between judicial districts “for the convenience of witnesses or
to promote the ends of justice.”
Considering that the same language appears in both LASC
Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) and Code of Civil Procedure § 397(c), the Court finds that
a party acting under the authority of Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule
2.3(b)(2) should bear the burden of proof if it seeks a district transfer out
of a presumptively correct forum, just as in motions for change of proper venue
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 397(c). (See Lieberman v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 396, 401.) That
burden of proof should, moreover, call for affidavits that contain more than
generalities and conclusions. (See Hamilton v Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal.
App.3d 418, 424.) Such affidavits or declarations, like those for change of
venue under Code Civ. Proc. section 397(c), should show the name of each
witness, the expected testimony of each witness, and facts showing why the
attendance of said witnesses at trial would be inconvenient or why the ends of
justice would be served by a transfer. (See
Stute v. Burinda (1981) 123 Cal. App.
3d Supp. 11, 17.) Convenience to non-party witnesses alone is the key to the
success of the motion, and not the convenience of parties or employees of
parties. (Ibid.)
Defendant failed to meet this burden.
Defendant’s motion cites the complaint and summarily contends a transfer “will
reduce inconvenience to witnesses, to the parties, and to counsel for the
parties.” (Mot. at 4:4-11.) Defendant’s counsel provides a four-paragraph
declaration purporting to attach the complaint and a printout of the results
from the court’s Filing Court Locator page, and stating Defendant resides in
Downey. (Marsh Decl. ¶¶ 2-4.) The declaration filed on June 26, 2023 does not include
the stated exhibits. However, this filing omission does not affect the Court’s
analysis herein. None of the information provided by Defendant relates to the
convenience of specific, non-party witnesses and their attendance at trial in
the Stanley Mosk Courthouse as required. (Peiser v. Mettler
(1958) 50 Cal.2d 594, 607 (“The affidavits in support of the motion for change
of venue on this ground must set forth the names of the witnesses, the nature
of the testimony expected from each, and the reasons why the attendance of each
would be inconvenient.”).)
Accordingly, Defendant failed to demonstrate a transfer is
warranted “for the convenience of witnesses or to
promote the ends of justice.” (LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2).)
Furthermore, Defendant has not
filed an answer to the operative complaint and a motion to transfer based upon
the convenience of witnesses is premature. (Buran Equipment Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1662,
1665 (“a motion to transfer venue based on witness convenience cannot be made
before an answer is filed.”); De Long v.
De Long (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 373, 374 (“since no answer had been filed the
trial court properly denied the motion made upon the ground of the convenience
of witnesses.”); Delgado v. Superior
Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 560, 562–563 (“Petitioners correctly argue that
the order cannot be upheld as an exercise of the court's power to transfer for
the convenience of witnesses under Code of Civil Procedure section 397,
subdivision 3, because no answer was filed.”).)