Judge Michelle Williams Court, Case Number: 24STCV13323, Date: 2024-09-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Michelle Williams Court, Case: 24STCV13323, Date: 2024-09-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV13323 Hearing Date: September 12, 2024 Dept: 1

24STCV13323 ERNESTO LUIS VARGAS, et al. vs LARRY L. KUSSIN

Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Action

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Action is DENIED. Clerk to give notice.

This action arises from alleged uninhabitable living conditions at a property located at 17951 Devonshire Street, Northridge, CA 91325 (the “Subject Property”).

On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs Ernesto Luis Vargas, Oscar Luis, a conservatee by and through his guardian ad litem Maria Paula Aguiluz Ruiz, Ernesto Jr. Luis, and Maria Paula Aguiluz Ruiz (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendant Larry L. Kussin or his Successor, as Trustee of the “Declaration of Trust (Dr. and Mrs. Kussin)” dated February 19, 1970 and as Subsequently Amended (“Defendant”), alleging causes of action for: (1) violation of Civ. Code § 1942.4; (2) tortious breach of the warranty of habitability; (3) private nuisance; (4) Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; (5) negligence; and (6) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code section 45.33.

On June 28, 2024, the Court entered an order appointing Plaintiff Maria Paula Aguiluz as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff Oscar Luis.

Motion

On August 13, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion seeking to transfer this action from the Central District to the North Valley District, on the grounds that the “Central District is not the proper court for trial of this action because the Plaintiffs do not reside in this District, Defendants do not reside in this District, the contractual relationships between Defendants and Plaintiffs do not arise in this District, the alleged wrongdoing did not occur in this District, and . . . convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by such transfer.” (Not. of Mot. at p. 2:6-11.)

Opposition

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the motion must be denied. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that they have properly filed their action in the Central District pursuant to Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(B), and that the Central District is the proper venue for this action. (Opp’n at p. 4.)

Plaintiffs also contend that Defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing inconvenience that would justify transferring venue. (Opp’n at pp. 4-5.) Plaintiffs argue that Defendant alleges “extreme inconvenience without explanation aside from Defendant’s old age.” (Opp’n at p. 5:8-9.)

Reply

On reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s choice of venue is inconvenient to the witnesses. Defendant lists the names of witnesses and their locations (Reply at p. 2:19-24), and argues that such witnesses would be able to testify to Plaintiff’s allegations (Reply at p. 3:1-2). However, Defendant did not file a declaration in support of the reply brief.

Motion to Transfer Between Judicial Districts

Standard

“Even though a superior court is divided into branches or departments, pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 4, there is only one superior court in a county and jurisdiction is vested in that court, not in any particular judge or department. Whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one and the same court.” (Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1449.) The Local Rules of the Los Angeles Superior Court govern the assignment of cases between its districts and departments. (Code Civ. Proc. § 402.) LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) authorizes Department 1 to transfer civil cases from one judicial district to another via a noticed motion on three enumerated grounds: (1) when the case was filed in an improper district; (2) for the convenience of witnesses; or (3) to promote the ends of justice. (LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2).) A transfer under the Local Rules is discretionary.

Given that the same language appears in both LASC Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) and Code of Civil Procedure section 397(c), Department 1 applies the case authority related to Section 397. Accordingly, a party acting under the authority of Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rule 2.3(b)(2) bears the same burden of proof if it seeks a district transfer. (See Lieberman v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 396, 401.) That burden of proof calls for affidavits that contain more than generalities and conclusions. (See Hamilton v Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 418, 424.) Such affidavits or declarations, like those for change of venue under Code Civ. Proc. section 397(c), should show the name of each witness, the expected testimony of each witness, and facts showing why the attendance of said witnesses at trial would be inconvenient or why the ends of justice would be served by a transfer. (See Stute v. Burinda (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 17.) Convenience to non-party witnesses alone is the key to the success of the motion, and not the convenience of parties or employees of parties. (Ibid.)

Defendant Failed to Demonstrate a Transfer is Warranted

Defendant seeks to transfer this action to the Chatsworth Courthouse in the North Valley District. The case is currently assigned to Department 38 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse, which sits in the Central District of the Los Angeles Superior Court. (LASC Local Rule 2.2(b).)

Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(A) contains mandatory filing rules which have no application to Plaintiffs’ complaint, as the case does not fall within any of the enumerated case types: personal injury, asbestos, class action, probate, Labor Code section 98.2, writ of prohibition or mandate, emancipation, or adoption. If none of the mandatory provisions apply, an unlimited civil case may be filed in the Central District at a plaintiff’s election. (LASC Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(B) (“Except as set forth in subsection (A) above, [Mandatory Filing], . . . an unlimited civil or Family Code action may be filed in the Central District . . .”).) An unlimited civil complaint asserting breach of contract claims may be filed either in the Central District or “where performance is required by an express provision or where the defendant resides.” (LASC Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(B).) Plaintiffs allege the existence of uninhabitable conditions at the Subject Property, which is located at 17951 Devonshire Street, Northridge, CA 91325, (Compl. ¶ 1), which is within the North Valley District. Here, the civil case cover sheet identifies this action as a breach of contract/warranty case and as an unlimited civil case. The Court notes that “Step 5” of the Certification of Assignment on the Civil Case Cover Sheet Addendum is incomplete as counsel did not identify the chosen venue. The lack of a complete certification, however, does not warrant a finding that this action was improperly filed in the Central District. Plaintiffs did indicate on the Civil Case Cover Sheet Addendum, in “Step 4” therein, that this action was filed in the Central District under permissive filing. LASC Local Rule 2.3(a)(1)(B) allows a party to file a contract action in the Central District. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ action was properly filed in the Central District.

Next, Defendant argues that the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by transferring this action to the Chatsworth Courthouse. Defendant’s counsel, Nicholas A. McNally (“McNally”), declares that Subject Property is located in the County of Riverside. (McNally Decl. ¶ 4.) The contractual relationships between the parties arose in Northridge, CA. (McNally Decl. ¶ 5.) According to Mr. McNally, “[i]t would be extremely inconvenient for witnesses to appear and give their testimony in [the] . . . Central District . . . from the City of Northridge due to [the] cost of travel, loss of time, [and] personal and work obligations.” (McNally Decl. ¶ 6.) The ends of justice would be promoted by transferring this action for trial to the Chatsworth Courthouse where the alleged causes of action arose. (McNally Decl., ¶ 7.)

In opposition to the motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel, Paola Leon (“Leon”), attests that the statement of Defendant’s counsel that the Subject Property is located in the County of Riverside is incorrect. (Leon Decl. ¶ 4.) The Subject Property is located within the County of Los Angeles. (Leon Decl. ¶ 4.) Ms. Leon indicates that Plaintiffs’ choice to lay venue in the Central District is correct and that “Defendants fail to offer any adequate basis to disturb Plaintiffs’ proper choice of forum . . . .” (Leon Decl. ¶ 6.)

The Court finds that Defendant has not met his burden in showing that witness convenience or the ends of justice would be served by a transfer. Here, the declaration of Mr. McNally in support of the motion is conclusory and too general. As to the inconvenience of witnesses, Mr. McNally does not state the name of each witness, their expected testimony, or facts showing why their attendance would be inconvenient. Moreover, as to the ends of justice being served by a transfer, Mr. McNally only sets forth in a conclusory manner that the ends of justice would be served by a transfer because the North District is “where the alleged causes of action arose.” (McNally Decl. ¶ 7.)

Defendant’s attempt to make a showing on reply is insufficient as no declaration or affidavit was filed with the reply brief. Based on the sole declaration of Mr. McNally submitted with the moving papers, Defendant has not met his burden as Defendant has only presented mere generalities and conclusions.

Defendant’s motion is DENIED.