Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 19STCP02100, Date: 2022-12-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCP02100 Hearing Date: December 14, 2022 Dept: 86
CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, et al. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Case Number: 19STCP21000 [related w/ 19STCP01917]
Hearing Date: December 14, 2022
[Tentative] ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
This proceeding is before the court under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public Resources Code section 21000, et seq.
Real Parties in Interest Tejon Ranch Company, Centennial Founders, LLC and Tejon Ranchcorp (collectively, Tejon Ranch) request relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 (Section 1008). Alternatively, Tejon Ranch seeks relief under the Court’s inherent power to reconsider its own orders pursuant to Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094.
Petitioners, Center for Biological Diversity and California Native Plant Society (collectively, CBD), oppose the motion.
The motion is denied.
Tejon Ranch has requested the court take judicial notice of various materials. Tejon Ranch does not, however, specify the grounds upon which it relies to support its request for judicial notice. CBD objects to the court taking judicial notice of the material asserting it “constitute[s] irrelevant, extra-record evidence.” (Objection 2:5.) The court agrees with CBD. Tejon Ranch’s request for judicial notice is denied. (Moreover, even assuming the court took judicial notice as requested by Tejon Ranch, the results herein would be no different.)
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 30, 2019, Respondents, County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (the County), certified the environmental impact report (EIR) for the Centennial Specific Plan (the Project). The County also approved the Project allowing for the construction of 19,333 homes.
Thereafter, CBD and Climate Resolve—in separate writ petitions in two separate proceedings—challenged the Project’s approval.[1] On April 5, 2021, the court granted Climate Resolve’s petition after finding the County failed to procced as required by law as to several issues related to the EIR. Specifically, the court found:
the EIR’s discussion of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is flawed based on its reliance on the cap-and-trade program to substantially mitigate emissions;
the EIR’s reliance on fair share rationale for mitigation is flawed because it is based on reduced emissions from the cap-and-trade program;
as the EIR’s mitigation discussion is flawed, the County improperly adopted a statement of overriding considerations; and
the EIR’s conclusion wildfire risk impacts outside of the Project site will be reduced to less than significant is not supported by any analysis. (April 5, 2021 Minute Order [Decision], p. 61.)
Following CBD’s motion for reconsideration,[2] on January 14, 2022, the court permitted CBD to join those arguments raised by Climate Resolve in its briefing and granted CBD’s petition. CBD’s opening brief expressly stated: “Petitioner’s join and incorporate by reference the greenhouse gas and fire arguments raised in the Opening Brief filed by Climate Resolve.” (Opening Brief 8:21-22, filed July 17, 2020.)
On November 16, 2022, Tejon Ranch filed its Motion for Reconsideration of April 5, 2021 Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandate as modified by the court’s January 14, 2022 order granting reconsideration.
ANALYSIS
Tejon Ranch requests relief from the court pursuant to Section 1008. Tejon Ranch also suggests the court should reconsider the order granting CBD’s petition pursuant to its inherent power to reconsider its own orders under Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094.
Analysis Under Section 1008:
Section 1008, subdivision (a) limits the extent to which a party may request reconsideration of an order. Section 1008, subdivision (a) provides:
“When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 1008 is “the exclusive means for modifying, amending or revoking an order” and is jurisdictional. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1499; see Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 838-840.) Subdivision (e) of section 1008 expressly provides:
“This section specifies the court's jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.”
Here, the motion for reconsideration is untimely.
As noted, Section 1008, subdivision (a) requires a motion for reconsideration be filed “within 10 days after service upon the party of” a written notice of the entry of the order.
The court filed the signed order at issue on April 5, 2021. The clerk served notice of the order on the parties the same day.[3] The court thereafter modified the April 5, 2021 order pursuant to a motion for reconsideration filed by CBD on April 19, 2021.[4]
Despite the court having granted reconsideration (thereby granting CBD’s petition on the issues it joined with Climate Resolve) on January 14, 2022, Tejon Ranch did not file its motion for reconsideration until November 16, 2022, more than 10 days later.[5]
For this reason alone, the statutory motion for reconsideration pursuant to Section 1008 is denied.[6]
Even assuming the court found Tejon Ranch’s motion timely, the court nonetheless finds the motion is unsupported by “new facts or laws” as required by Section 1008. Under Section 1008, “a party seeking reconsideration of a prior ruling upon an alleged different set of facts must ‘provide both newly discovered evidence and an explanation for the failure to have produced such evidence earlier. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1168.)
Tejon Ranch argues in its motion the court’s Decision was simply incorrect. (Motion 10:21-13:8.)
Tejon Ranch reports the Project’s EIR is consistent with climate plans intended to achieve the region’s GHG reduction goals and in compliance with statewide regulations. More specifically, Tejon Ranch contends the EIR’s GHG analysis was adequate based on the court’s finding the Project was consistent with applicable regulatory plans designed to reduce GHG emissions and contribute to statewide GHG emissions goals and therefore had complied with its “fair share” such that no further mitigation was required and the County’s Statement of Overriding Considerations was proper under Public Resources Code section 21081, subdivision (b). Tejon Ranch also argues, contrary to the Decision, the Project does not rely on the cap-and-trade program reductions to mitigate any of the Project’s GHG emissions and the “EIR consistently explains that the Project as approved will emit 157,642 MTCO2e/year of GHG on an annual basis.” (Motion 12:11-12.) Tejon Ranch lastly contends even assuming error in the County’s cap-and-trade discussion, the error was not prejudicial.
Tejon Ranch’s arguments provide no new facts or law as required by Section 1008.[7] Rather, Tejon Ranch takes issue with the Decision and attempts to relitigate it.
The only “new” facts impacting the court’s Decision and GHG discussion is the “new” fact that, under Climate Resolve’s settlement agreement with Tejon Ranch, the Project will now be a “net-zero” development.
As noted by CBD, post-approval, extra-record documents are irrelevant to the court’s determination regarding the County’s certification of the Project’s EIR in April 2019. That Tejon Ranch has now changed the Project to address the court’s concerns regarding the Project does not address the standard on which the court made its ruling: whether the County complied with its CEQA obligations at the time it approved the Project. As such, this “new” fact is immaterial to reconsideration of the court's ruling. (See New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 214 [immaterial facts cannot support a motion for reconsideration].)
The court also finds Tejon Ranch does not identify any new (and relevant) facts or legal authority concerning the Decision’s discussion of off-site wildfire risk. Here, Tejon Ranch argues “new” law demonstrates the court’s ruling was incorrect. Tejon Ranch relies on the ruling in Stop Syar Expansion v. County of Napa (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 444, 449, a decision decided after the court took the matter under submission.
According to Tejon Ranch, this new authority:
“recently explained, it is not enough that a petitioner broadly raised the issue because that is not the standard for exhaustion under CEQA. Stop Syar, 63 Cal.App.5th at 453-54, 460 (‘[B]land and general references to environmental matters” or isolated and unelaborated comments do not satisfy the exhaustion requirement’ []). Instead, ‘the exact issue must have been presented to the administrative agency’ and the objections must have been ‘sufficiently specific so as to allow the [a]gency to respond to them’ and to provide ‘an opportunity to render litigation unnecessary.’ Id. . . . ‘Requiring anything less would enable litigants to narrow, obscure, or even omit their arguments before the final administrative authority because they could possibly obtain a more favorable decision from the trial court.’ Id. . . .” (Motion 15:2-11.)
In the court’s view, Stop Syar Expansion v. County of Napa, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at 444 merely restates well-established law; it is not new legal authority on an issue. In fact, the cited portion above directly quotes from a 2013 decision: North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Marin Municipal Water Dist. Bd. of Directors (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 614, 623. Tejon Ranch’s argument here is mere disagreement with the Decision and an attempt to relitigate the issues.
Tejon Ranch also notes its settlement with Climate Resolve attempts to address these off-site wildfire claims. Specifically, Tejon Ranch has agreed to implement a comprehensive fire protection plan, subject to periodic updates to include any new or modified state or County fire prevention, protection and response requirements, and has agreed to fund on-site fire prevention, protection, education, inspection, and enforcement ($500,000 annually, inflation adjusted), as well as a grant program for funding of off-site fire protection and prevention programs ($500,000 annually, inflation adjusted) in communities surrounding Tejon Ranch. (Motion 14:9-15 [citing Climate Resolve Settlement, Ex. 3, p. 11-13].)
For the reasons previously discussed, the subsequent settlement agreement between Tejon Ranch and Climate Resolve do not require the court to reconsider the Decision and whether the County complied with its CEQA obligations at the time it approved the Project.
Finally, Tejon Ranch relies on Attorney General guidance[8] suggesting a lead agency is not required to assess off-site ignition and fire risks. Without citing any binding authority, Tejon Ranch argues the Attorney General's new wildfire guidance confirms that the EIR's wildfire analysis complied with CEQA, and, if errors did occur, such errors were not prejudicial. Tejon Ranch acknowledges the “guidance” is not legally binding but argues neither is a California Air Resources Board staff member's interpretation of the cap-and-trade regulations—relied upon by CBD.
The court notes CARB commented on the EIR and the GHG analysis; it reviewed the Project and made a specific recommendation. The same is not true of the Attorney General. The administrative record included CARB’s review of the Project and did not include any Attorney General guidance concerning wildfire assessment. Tejon Ranch’s attempt to introduce extra-record evidence that it believes should have informed the County but was not—and could not have been—put before the County is improper and inconsistent with the court’s role on administrative mandamus.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds Tejon Ranch’s motion fails to comply with the statutory requirements under Section 1008. The motion is therefore denied. (Cox v. Bonni (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 287, 312. [“A trial court may not grant a party's motion for reconsideration that does not comply with section 1008.”] See also Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1278; Kerns v. CSE Ins. Group (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 368, 391.)
Analysis Under the Court’s Inherent Authority:
Tejon Ranch also requests the court exercise its inherent authority to reconsider its ruling under Le Francois v. Goel, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 1094.[9]
In Le Francois v. Goel, the Supreme Court stated: “If a court believes one of its prior interim orders was erroneous, it should be able to correct that error no matter how it came to acquire that belief.” (Id. at 1108.) The Court explained: “[I]t should not matter whether the ‘judge has an unprovoked flash of understanding in the middle of the night’ [citation] or acts in response to a party's suggestion.” (Ibid.)
The court is not persuaded a prior interim order was erroneous. Aided by the expertise of counsel, their briefs and the administrative record, the court conducted many hours of trial over the course of three days. Here, Tejon Ranch reargues issues ultimately decided against it. The core of those arguments made merely duplicate those made previously in briefing and at trial.
Having considered the arguments made by all parties on this motion, the court finds reconsideration under Le Francois v. Goel, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 1094 is unwarranted here.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Tejon Ranch’s motion for reconsideration is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
December 14, 2022 ________________________________
Hon. Mitchell Beckloff
Judge of the Superior Court
[1] CBD and Climate Resolve coordinated their efforts and did not make duplicate arguments challenging the EIR.
[2] CBD brought the motion based on the court’s finding it was unclear how CBD could incorporate by reference arguments made by a different petitioner in a different (but related) proceeding. (Decision, p. 3 fn. 2, p. 31 fn. 31.)
[3] The parties waived notice of the January 14, 2022 order granting reconsideration.
[4] CBD timely filed its motion for reconsideration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1013, subd. (a).)
[5] The court ruled on CBD’s motion for reconsideration from the bench. The parties waived notice of the order.
[6] While the parties did not raise the issue of timeliness, the court does so as the matter is jurisdictional under Section 1008, subdivision (e).
[7] Tejon Ranch also argues: “No further assessment or mitigation was required under McCann v. City of San Diego (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 51, and Newhall.” Although Tejon Ranch posits McCann v. City of San Diego is “new” law, Tejon Ranch appears to rely on both cases for the same proposition—implicitly undermining McCann v. City of San Diego as a source of “new” authority. Moreover, in reply, Tejon Ranch quotes McCann v. City of San Diego: "If the project is found to be consistent with the broad [GHG reduction] plan, that finding provides sufficient evidence for the agency to conclude the project has no significant impact due to greenhouse gas emissions." (McCann v. City of San Diego, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 91-92.) Again, however, the cited discussion in McCann v. City of San Diego merely repeats established CEQA case law: Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204, 230 and California Code of Regulations, title 14 at section 15183.5. Tejon Ranch fails to identify any new legal theory to support its motion.
[8] Tejon Ranch describes the guidance as "best practices to disclose, analyze and mitigate wildfire impacts.”
[9] The court may reconsider its rulings even in the face of a statutorily deficient motion. (In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303-1304 [“the trial court's inherent authority to correct its errors applies even when the trial court was prompted to reconsider its prior ruling by a motion filed in violation of section 1008”].)