Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case 20STCP01547 2022-09-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 20STCP01547, Date: 2022-09-14 Tentative Ruling

Respondent, California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) conducted an audit of the Oxnard Union High School District (District). Through the audit, CalSTRS concluded the District had incorrectly reported its employees’ compensation for purposes of calculating retirement benefits. CalSTRS ordered the District to recalculate benefits. Petitioner, Bruce Ritchey, challenges CalSTRS audit findings which resulted in a reduction in his base working days and affected his retirement benefits.

Through this proceeding, Petitioner requests a writ of administrative mandamus compelling CalSTRS to set aside its audit decision of March 5, 2020 (Decision). Petitioner seeks an order directing CalSTRS to reinstate Petitioner’s full retirement benefits based on his 225-day assignment. Petitioner also seeks back benefits with legal interest.

The CalSTRS is the state agency charged with overseeing the pension fund for teachers and educators (CalSTRS members) who work in public schools and college districts throughout California. (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 17.) The Legislature created CalSTRS “to provide a financially sound plan for retirement, with adequate retirement allowances, of teachers in the public schools of this state, teachers in schools supported by this state, and other persons employed in connection with the schools . . . .” (Ed. Code § 22001.)

As such, CalSTRS is charged with determining “the appropriate crediting of contributions to the Defined Benefit Program . . .” according to “sound principles that support the integrity of the retirement fund.” (Ed. Code § 22119.2, subd. (f).)

CalSTRS is administered by the Teachers Retirement Board and governed by the California Education Code. The Teachers Retirement Board administers the State Teachers' Retirement Fund, which includes the Defined Benefit Program (DB Program), where participation is mandatory for all employees meeting certain eligibility requirements (Ed. Code § 22501), and the Defined Benefit Supplement Program (DBS Program). (Ed. Code §§ 25000, 25004.) Income is derived from contributions from members, school districts, the state general fund and investment earnings. (Ed. Code §§ 22002, 22400.)

Under Education Code section 24202.5, subdivision (a)(1), a member is entitled to retirement benefits based on the “percentage of the final compensation” of the member. That percentage is determined by the member's age at retirement, as set forth in subdivision (a)(1) of Education Code section 24202.5. Once that figure is determined, it is then multiplied by “each year of credited service” to arrive at the member's annual retirement allowance, which is paid in monthly installments. (Ibid.) “Final compensation” is defined to mean “the highest average annual compensation earnable by a member during any period of three consecutive school years while an active member”; “compensation earnable” in turn means “the creditable compensation a person could earn in a school year for creditable service performed on a full-time basis.” (Ed. Code §§ 22134, 22115.) “Creditable compensation” is defined in turn as “[s]alary or wages paid in accordance with a publicly available written contractual agreement.” (Ed. Code § 22119.2, subd. (a).)

In 1985, the District created a year-round, senior agriculture teacher position pursuant to Education Code section 52453. (AR 658-659, 940-941.) During the 1995/1996 school year, Petitioner promoted to the position as senior agriculture teacher at Adolfo Camarillo High School. (AR 962-963.) For 22 years, Petitioner worked year-round, 225 days per school year, in his full-time assignment as senior agriculture teacher. (AR 963-964.)

Prior to retirement, Petitioner met with a CalSTRS retirement counselor several times. During those meetings, Petitioner informed CalSTRS his full-time assignment was 225 days per school year. (AR 967-968.) CalSTRS did not question or require documentation of his assignment. (AR 968.)

In 2018, CalSTRS audited the District’s records. (AR 272-273.) The audit addressed two school years, 2015-2016 and 2016-2017. On October 11, 2018, CalSTRS issued a draft audit report with nine findings. (AR 460-476.)

Through its audit CalSTRS determined the District improperly reported extra-duty compensation to the DB Program for Petitioner. According to CalSTRS, the District also improperly reported Petitioner’s longevity earnings and base work days. (AR 506, 524.) All three audit findings flow from the same fundamental error: the District incorrectly reported Petitioner’s earnings creditable to the DB Program by adding 41 days of extra-duty earnings into his full-time earnings. (AR 506-511.)

On December 6, 2018, CalSTRS informed Petitioner it was reducing Petitioner’s monthly benefit by $582 based on its audit of the District. (AR 651.) On December 13, 2018, Petitioner requested an administrative hearing to challenge CalSTRS reduction of his base working days from 225 to 184 days per school year.

Following an evidentiary hearing and briefing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), the ALJ issued a proposed decision on January 14, 2020. (AR 1120-1149.)

On March 5, 2020, CalSTRS appeals committee issued the Decision adopting the ALJ’s proposed decision. (AR 119.)

Petitioner brings this proceeding pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b), the issues for review of an administrative decision are: whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (b).)

The parties dispute the applicable standard of judicial review of an agency’s factual determinations under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Petitioner argues his challenge to the factual basis for the Decision is subject to independent judgment. CalSTRS contends such review is by substantial evidence.

The court agrees with Petitioner—the issue is governed by the court’s independent judgment based on the right involved. While the court recognizes the issue here is about the amount of the retirement benefits to which Petitioner is entitled, the Decision “affects a legitimately acquired or ‘vested’ right, and that right is of a fundamental nature in terms of its economic effect on the individual . . . .” (Swehla v. Teachers' Retirement Board (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1088, 1092 [citing Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 34]; see also O'Connor v. State Teachers' Retirement System (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1610, 1620.)[1]

Although the opposition correctly argues the right at issue in this administrative proceeding is not Petitioner’s general right to retirement benefits but rather the amount of retirement benefits, the court notes that nevertheless the ALJ’s decision “affects a legitimately acquired or ‘vested’ right, and that right is of a fundamental nature in terms of its economic effect on the individual . . . .” (Swehla v. Teachers' Retirement Board (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1088, 1092 [citing Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 34]; see also O'Connor v. State Teachers' Retirement System (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1610, 1620.)

Under independent judgment review, the court “ ‘not only examines the administrative record for errors of law but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence.’ ” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 816, fn. 8.) Exercise of independent judgment “does permit (indeed, [] requires) the trial court to reweigh the evidence by examining the credibility of witnesses.” (Barber v. Long Beach Civil Service Com. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 652, 658.)

Further, questions of whether the administrative agency proceeded in the manner required by law is a legal question that the court reviews de novo. (Duncan v. Department of Personnel Admin. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1174; Chico Advocates for a Responsible Economy v. City of Chico (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 839, 845. [“Where the alleged defect is that the agency has failed to proceed in the manner required by law, the court determines de novo whether the agency has employed the correct procedures, scrupulously enforcing all legislatively mandated requirements.”]) Due process claims also raise questions of law, that are also subject to de novo review. (See Schneider v. California Coastal Com. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1343–1344.)

Petitioner seemingly challenges the Decision on two grounds. First, Petitioner claims the evidence does not support CalSTRS findings. Second, Petitioner alleges CalSTRS acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.[2]

“14. District did not appeal the Report, and it agreed to make the reporting changes requested by CalSTRS.” (AR 1126.)

Petitioner argues “[a]lthough the District did not independently appeal CalSTRS Audit Report,” Petitioner reports the District wrote two letters disputing CalSTRS’ conclusion. (Opening Brief 7:3-11.)

As a preliminary matter, the court agrees Petitioner’s challenge to this factual finding is irrelevant to the merits of the Decision. Moreover, Petitioner concedes the District did not appeal, and the evidence in the administrative record supports Factual Finding 14. (AR 819-820 [Testimony of staff program auditor at CalSTRS].) Thus, the weight of the evidence supports Factual Finding 14.

“15. There was no evidence that CalSTRS had knowledge prior to the audit of any employment agreement between District and [Petitioner]. No evidence was presented that District had ever informed CalSTRS of any employment agreement between the District and [Petitioner] regarding his 225 day work year. CalSTRS had not challenged or audited District’s calculation of compensable earning for any agricultural teacher in the past. Nor was any evidence presented of any CalSTRS publications to California school district regarding the application of the TRL [Teachers’ Retirement Law (Ed. Code §§ 22000 et seq.)] to agricultural teacher working year-round.” (AR 1126.)

Petitioner reports he met with a CalSTRS retirement counselor more than once to discuss his retirement benefits. During those meetings, Petitioner disclosed his full-time assignment consisting of 225 days per school year.

Such evidence, as argued by CalSTRS, merely demonstrates Petitioner communicated to the CalSTRS retirement counselor that he worked a full-time schedule of 225 days a year. (AR 967-968.) Nothing in Petitioner’s statement about his full-time status would have advised CalSTRS that Petitioner’s full-time status designation was problematic in the context of Petitioner’s retirement benefits.

Without regard to credibility, Petitioner’s evidence does not undermine Factual Finding 15. As noted in the Decision, “Oral communications from CalSTRS's counselors regarding [Petitioner’s] entitlement to DB Program benefits based on his 225-day work year do not establish knowledge because the counselors had no way of knowing that Respondent's employment terms were not reflected in either the [Collective Bargaining Agreement] or a separate [Teachers’ Retirement Law]-compliant employment agreement.” (AR 1144.)

Petitioner also identifies two documents the District submitted to CalSTRS that Petitioner contends put CalSTRS on notice he had a full-time 225 day per year schedule with the District. (AR 642-646.) Neither document suggests Petitioner had a publicly available written employment agreement with the District separate from the collective bargaining agreement. (See Ed. Code § 22119.2, subd. (a)(1).) The documents do not undermine the Decision.

“16. [Petitioner] is a member of the Oxnard Federation of Teachers and School Employees, Local 1273 (Federation). Federation and District negotiated and executed a [collective bargaining agreement] covering the period July 1, 2015, through June 30, 2018. (Ex. 5.) That [collective bargaining agreement] governs this dispute.” (AR 1127.)

Petitioner’s challenge to this factual finding is as follows: “UTLA v. LAUSD (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1510 and Educ. Code §44924 (contract purporting to waive an employee's rights under provisions of the Education Code is null and void).” (Opening Brief 7:17-18.) The argument is undeveloped in any meaningful way.

In United Teachers-Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1510, a teachers' union sought a writ of mandate to compel a district to grant part-time status to eligible employees under regulations adopted by the district and incorporated into the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The Education Code provides that a district may establish regulations allowing eligible employees to work part-time schedules without a loss of retirement or other benefits. Although the part-time program authorization is permissive, once a district adopts such a plan, applicable statutes require certain minimum provisions to be included in every part-time program. In United Teachers-Los Angeles, the collective bargaining agreement failed to include two regulations the Education Code statutes mandates for every part-time program. The Court of Appeal found regulations in the collective bargaining agreement that directly contradicted otherwise clear statutory mandates are void.

Petitioner fails to explain how United Teachers-Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1510 applies here.

CalSTRS assumes Petitioner contends the collective bargaining agreement that “governs this dispute” violates the prohibition in Education Code section 44924 against the waiver of rights granted educational employees under the Education Code. CalSTRS argues its decision squarely complies with the Teachers’ Retirement Law. CalSTRS found, consistent with the law, only work performed pursuant to a publicly available collective bargaining agreement or written employment agreement is properly credited to the DB Program. As there is no evidence of a publicly available written agreement supporting Petitioner’s required 225-day work year, the only existing publicly available written document—the collective bargaining agreement—governs.

Based on Petitioner’s lack of clarity and CalSTRS assumption Petitioner raises a legal issue as to this factual finding, the court addresses the legal issue below.

“20. The specific provisions of the [collective bargaining agreement] ‘prevail over present and past District practices, procedures and regulations, and over State laws to the extent permitted by State law and that, except as expressly provided by specific provisions of [the Collective Bargaining Agreement], all unlawful practices, procedures, and regulations are discretionary within the District.’ (Ex. 5, p. 76, § 25.1.)

21. The [collective bargaining agreement] requires the District and Federation to make any modification to the school day that alter the teacher workday, benefits, release time, or and any other condition through the consultation process. (Ex. 5, p. 2, § 1.3.) There was no evidence of any efforts by [Petitioner] or District to utilize the consultation process to address the longer work year for agriculture teachers. Testimony by Dr. Ricky Valles, District Assistant Superintendent during the relevant period, that interested parties more than 25 years ago had modified the number of days a Senior Agriculture Teacher had to work did not establish that the modification was a result of the [collective bargaining agreement] consultation process.” (AR 1128.)

Again, Petitioner raises a legal issue to this factual finding. The issue is addressed below.

Petitioner challenges the Decision’s Legal Conclusions at paragraphs 11D, 12, 13A, 13B, 14A, 14B, 14C, 14D, 14E, 14F, 15, 16 and 29.

The relevant statutory structure is governed by the Teachers’ Retirement Law (TRL). (Ed. Code, §§ 22000 et seq.) Under the TRL, CalSTRS has two main retirement programs—the DB Program (Ed. Code § 22122.5) and the DBS Program (Ed. Code § 22122.7).

The DB Program is a traditional defined benefit plan providing retirement, survivor and disability benefits. (AR 1123.) A CalSTRS member’s monthly retirement benefit under the DB Program is based on a formula set by the TRL using an age factor, years of service credit, and final compensation. (AR 805-808.) The formula’s service credit calculates the years worked at a CalSTRS covered job (with a maximum of one service credit earned per year by law). A CalSTRS member’s final compensation is his or her highest “compensation earnable” (either over one year or the average of the highest three years depending on the amount of service credit earned). (AR 805-808.)

“Compensation earnable” is defined under the TRL as creditable compensation or "the . . . remuneration that is paid in cash by an employer to all persons in the same class of employees for performing creditable service in that position: [] Salary or wages paid in accordance with a publicly available written contractual agreement, including, but not limited to, a salary schedule or employment agreement." (Ed. Code § 22119.2, subd. (a)(1) [emphasis added].)[3]

Accordingly, the TRL expressly establishes the only compensation considered in the benefits calculation for the DB Program is compensation to the teacher for work performed pursuant to a publicly available collective bargaining agreement or written employment agreement. (Such an interpretation is also consistent with Education Code section 22138.5 defining “full time” as those days and hours “specified under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or employment agreement.”)[4]

As there is (and was) no publicly available written employment agreement between Petitioner and the District, CalSTRS found Petitioner’s monthly benefit calculation required a reduction under the TRL. That is, Petitioner could not claim compensation earnable based on a 225-day full-time work year for purposes of the DB Program where there is no evidence of a publicly available written agreement to support such a work year. Instead, for purposes of Petitioner’s “creditable compensation” and a benefits calculation, CalSTRS would have to rely on the written collective bargaining agreement and its 184-day full-time work year—the only writing that exists.

Petitioner asserts CalSTRS erred by not treating his personnel action form (PAF) as a written agreement for purposes of Education Code section 22119.2, subdivision (a)(1).[5] Petitioner argues the document (referenced by CalSTRS in its audit report) should have been deemed sufficient to establish the required written agreement between Petitioner and the District to memorialize Petitioner’s 225-day full-time work year. According to Petitioner, it was error to find the PAF inadequate.

Petitioner has not challenged Factual Finding 26 in this proceeding. It provides:

“[Petitioner] presented no evidence of a formal written agreement with District reflecting the terms and conditions of his employment, specifically the requirement that he work 225 days a year. Despite repeated requests from the auditor, District was unable to provide a copy of any written agreement. (See Exs. 7, 8.) Although [Petitioner] and District officials testified to a few documents that could have reflected the terms and conditions of his employment, including a letter from District each summer noting such terms and conditions [on] a ‘PAF’ or [Personnel Action Form], Respondent did not offer those documents as evidence.” (AR 1130-1131 [emphasis added].)

While a PAF may have existed and may have memorialized the District’s expectation of Petitioner, Petitioner did not introduce the PAF into evidence during the administrative hearing. At best, a PAF demonstrates the District budgeted 225 days of work for Petitioner’s position.

(AR 896-897, 909 [Dr. Valles’ testimony—“the amount of days that goes into our budget”].)

Moreover, CalSTRS evidence from the auditor suggests the PAF did not require a 225-day work year schedule for Petitioner. The auditor expressly advised the District during the audit: “I have asked for documents regarding these additional work days and the only documents available were his PAFs, which did not say that 225 days were required for his position.” (AR 586.) Finally, there is no evident the PAFs were “publicly available” as required by Education Code section 22119.2, subdivision (a)(1).

Petitioner also argues Education Code section 52454 “makes special provisions for the uniqueness of an agriculture instruction program, and the duties of the Senior Agricultural Teacher . . . .” (Opening Brief 8:5-6.) Petitioner relies on testimony from Dr. Valle and Dr. Tresvant who stated the District found it necessary to extend the school year position to 225-days for the senior agriculture teacher position. (AR 514-515, 658-684, 900, 906, 909, 939-944.)

“It is the intent of the Legislature that opportunities are provided for teachers to be employed on a 12-month basis in order to maintain supervised occupational experience on a year-round basis for students enrolled in agricultural career technical programs.”

CalSTRS persuasively responds nothing in Education Code section 52454 requires a teacher to work year-round in an agricultural teaching position. Education Code section 52454 is also not part of the TRL. Thus, while Education Code section 52454 informs on the curriculum requirements of a high school agricultural program and authorizes such programs to operate year-round—the statute “has no bearing on how the TRL considers that full-time year-round employment for retirement benefit purposes.” (AR 1141.)

Petitioner has not demonstrated error by CalSTRS. There is no evidence of a publicly available written employment agreement between him and the District requiring him to work 225 days a year. Petitioner failed to submit a PAF during the administrative proceeding to support his claim and the court is left guessing at the contents of a PAF. Additionally, the evidence suggests the PAF concerned budgeting and not a requirement that Petitioner work a certain number of days. There is also nothing in the evidence to suggest the PAF is publicly available as required by the TRL.

Absent a written agreement otherwise, CalSTRS properly relied on the collective bargaining agreement for purposes of calculating Petitioner’s DB Program benefit. The collective bargaining agreement makes no provision for a 225-work year. (AR 402.) The collective bargaining agreement also does not reference the senior agricultural teacher position held by Petitioner. (AR 1129.) There is also no evidence the collective bargaining agreement was amended, negotiated or subject to some consultation process in an effort to provide for Petitioner’s unique teaching position.

CalSTRS specifically requested evidence of a separate written employment agreement between the District and Petitioner requiring Petitioner to work a 225-day work year. (AR 586.) Dr. Tresvant, Director of Human Resources for the District, disclosed: “There is no contract extending [Petitioner’s] work year . . . No office contract or agreement was signed for him to have 225 day work year.” (AR 586.)

Therefore, CalSTRS did not err when it found Petitioner’s “creditable compensation” must be derived from the collective bargaining agreement—the only publicly available written agreement supporting his employment. CalSTRS’ audit correctly concluded the District misreported Petitioner’s compensation creditable to the DB Program by 41 days. (AR 524.) Based on the reporting error, the District inflated Petitioner’s creditable compensation by $20,854.74 per year (41 days worked multiplied by a daily rate of $508.62) for the 2015-2016 school year, which resulted in a higher final compensation figure used for Petitioner’s retirement benefit under the DB Program. (AR 506, 524.) Based on the District’s error in reporting, the District caused CalSTRS to calculate an overpayment to Petitioner through the DB Program of approximately $582 per month. (AR 651.)

Petitioner contends even if CalSTRS is correct on the law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply under the facts of this case. Petitioner argues CalSTRS “should not be empowered to cause injury to [Petitioner] who detrimentally relied on CalSTRS' conduct, assurances and representations.” (Opening Brief 13:19.)

“The doctrine of equitable estoppel is founded on concepts of equity and fair dealing. It provides that a person may not deny the existence of a state of facts if he intentionally led another to believe a particular circumstance to be true and to rely upon such belief to his detriment. The elements of the doctrine are that (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” (Strong v. County of Santa Cruz (1975) 15 Cal.3d 720, 725.)

Equitable estoppel “ordinarily will not apply against a governmental body except in unusual instances when necessary to avoid grave injustice and when the result will not defeat a strong public policy.” (Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 793.)

Petitioner cites Medina v. Board of Retirement (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 864 for the proposition courts have long "recognized the existence of cases which applied estoppel to the area of public employee pensions, in which the courts emphasized the unique importance of pension rights to an employee's well- being.” (Id. at 869.) The Court in Medina v. Board of Retirement, however, found equitable estoppel was not available to the petitioner as basis for relief because the retirement board lacked authority to classify as safety members employees who do not meet the statutory definition. (Medina v. Board of Retirement, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at 869-871. [“[E]stoppel is barred where the government agency to be estopped does not possess the authority to do what it appeared to be doing.”] See also City of San Diego v. San Diego City Employees’ Ret. System (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 69, 79-80, 82. [“It is not within SDCERS's authority to expand pension benefits beyond those afforded by the authorizing legislation.”])

The court finds equitable estoppel is unavailable here. The court cannot apply the doctrine as an override to the statutory limitation on CalSTRS’ authority.

Moreover, Petitioner fails to identify how any of the basic elements of equitable estoppel here. Petitioner has shown no intentionally misleading conduct as to Petitioner and his retirement benefits.

“. . . CalSTRS actually retains an expansive duty to make corrections that goes even further beyond language of the Board in Medina and even those powers for the Board in Crumpler. This is because under Educ. Code § 223O8(a) CalSTRS has even broader power to correct any mistakes made that any employer, such as the District or CalSTRS makes.” (Opening Brief 14:1-4.)

Education Code “[s]ection 22308 gives CalSTRS the power—and sometimes the duty—to correct errors or omissions made by a member of CalSTRS or by CalSTRS itself.” (Welch v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)

Petitioner suggests its was the District’s error in failing to memorialize the 225-workday agreement formally. Petitioner further suggests CalSTRS also erred “because for over twenty years it never told [Petitioner] or the District that Ritchey's agreed upon 225 day full-time assignment was not properly documented.” (Opening Brief 14:15-17.)[6] That is, CalSTRS did not notify the District or Petitioner that they needed to modify how they documented the employment agreement between them. (Of course, the argument assumes CalSTRS had any knowledge about how, if at all, the District and Petitioner memorialized any agreement between them such that the collective bargaining agreement did not control.)

First, the court finds no error by CalSTRS; nothing required CalSTRS to monitor and oversee the District’s compliance with law, including whether it had properly memorialized a specific teacher’s employment agreement. Further, the District’s purported error is not within the CalSTRS’ control to remedy. That is, there is no dispute a publicly available written employment agreement between Petitioner and the District as required by Education Code section 22119.2 does not exist. CalSTRS cannot create or compel such an agreement between the District and Petitioner any more than it can ignore its statutory mandate under Education Code section 22119.2.

[1] CalSTRS cites and relies on the discussion in Cal Fire Local 2881 v. California Public Employees' Retirement System (2019) 6 Cal.5th 965 and Kern v. City of Long Beach (1947) 29 Cal.2d 848 to support its position the court should review its factual findings by substantial evidence. As stated in Cal Fire Local 2881:

“[P]ublic employees have generally been held to possess no constitutionally protected rights in the terms and conditions of their employment. ‘[I]t is well settled in California that public employment is not held by contract but by statute and that, insofar as the duration of such employment is concerned, no employee has a vested contractual right to continue in employment beyond the time or contrary to the terms and conditions fixed by law.’ [Citation.] It is also ‘well settled that public employees have no vested right in any particular measure of compensation or benefits, and that these may be modified or reduced by the proper statutory authority.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at 977.)

Further in Kern v. City of Long Beach (1947) 29 Cal.2d 848, the Court explained:

“[A]n employee may acquire a vested contractual right to a pension but that this right is not rigidly fixed by the specific terms of the legislation in effect during any particular period in which he serves. The statutory language is subject to the implied qualification that the governing body may make modifications and changes in the system. The employee does not have a right to any fixed or definite benefits, but only to a substantial or reasonable pension. There is no inconsistency therefore in holding that he has a vested right to a pension but that the amount, terms and conditions for the benefits may be altered.” (Id. at 855.)

The court does not find CalSTRS’ authority entirely persuasive here. This matter concerns an audit adjustment requiring a significant reduction in benefits to a CalSTRS member currently receiving benefits. In any event, the court finds the standard of review is not determinative here.

[2] While Petitioner frames his second challenge as one of jurisdiction, in actuality, Petitioner takes issue with CalSTRS legal analysis. Thus, Petitioner’s challenge is a claim CalSTRS failed to proceed in the manner required by law.

[3] On January 1, 2014, Education Code section 22119.2 added the requirement of the employment agreement being "publicly available [and] written . . . .”

[4] “(a)(1) “Full time” means the days or hours of creditable service the employer requires to be performed by a class of employees in a school term in order to earn the annualized pay rate as defined in Section 22104.8 and specified under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or employment agreement. . . Each collective bargaining agreement or employment agreement that applies to a member subject to the minimum standard specified in either paragraph (5) or (6) of subdivision (c) shall specify the number of hours of creditable service that equals “full time” pursuant to this section for each class of employee subject to either paragraph and make specific reference to this section, and the district shall submit a copy of the agreement to the system.” (Ed. Code § 22138.5 [emphasis added].) CalSTRS argues that the statute’s requirement that “copies” be submitted indirectly confirms that the agreement but be written. (Opposition 9:9-12.)

[5] The PAF is not in the administrative record.

[6] Petitioner speaks of inducement by CalSTRS. (Opening Brief 15:20-21.) Yet, Petitioner fails to demonstrate CalSTRS had any interest in persuading or influencing Petitioner’s retirement. Rather, the record shows Petitioner represented to CalSTRS the facts concerning his employment and CalSTRS—based on Petitioner’s representations—responded to Petitioner’s representations. That Petitioner’s representations were later found to be inaccurate, contrary to the law, or incomplete does not place culpability on CalSTRS.