Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case 20STCP01934 2022-08-24 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 20STCP01934, Date: 2022-08-24 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner, Inglewood Unified School District, seeks a court order compelling Respondent, Lennox School District (Lennox), to set aside its approval of the charter renewal petition filed on December 10, 2019 by Real Party in Interest, Century Community Charter School, Inc. (Century). Petitioner contends Lennox’s approval violated the Education Code[1] because the approval authorized Century to locate within Petitioner’s boundaries.[2]

The initial charter establishing a new charter school has a term of five years. (§ 47607, subd. (a).) Prior to the passage of amendments in 2019, charter renewals were also subject to five-year terms. (See former § 47607, subd. (a), as amend. by Stats. 2012, ch. 576 (S.B.1290), § 3.)

The CSA allows a school district to approve a charter petition and thereby authorize the operation of a charter school to operate within the district’s boundaries. (§ 47605, subd. (a)(1).)

Section 47605 details how charter schools may come into existence, setting forth the process for consideration of a charter school by a local governing board. Prior to 2019, the CSA provided a narrow exception permitting a charter school to locate outside the boundaries of its authorizing school district:

“A charter school that is unable to locate within the jurisdiction of the chartering school district may establish one site outside the boundaries of the school district, but within the county in which that school district is located, if the school district within the jurisdiction of which the charter school proposes to operate is notified in advance of the charter petition approval, the county superintendent of schools and the Superintendent are notified of the location of the charter school before it commences operations, and either of the following circumstances exists:

(A) The school has attempted to locate a single site or facility to house the entire program, but a site or facility is unavailable in the area in which the school chooses to locate.

(B) The site is needed for temporary use during a construction or expansion project.” (Former § 47605, subd. (a)(5).)

On October 3, 2019, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1507 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1507), which repealed the “unable to locate” exception effective January 1, 2020. Section 47605, subdivision (a)(5) now provides as follows:

“A charter school that established one site outside the boundaries of the school district, but within the county in which that school district is located before January 1, 2020, may continue to operate that site until the charter school submits a request for the renewal of its charter petition. To continue operating the site, the charter school shall do either of the following:

(i) First, before submitting the request for the renewal of the charter petition, obtain approval in writing from the school district where the site is operating.

(ii) Submit a request for the renewal of the charter petition pursuant to Section 47607 to the school district in which the charter school is located.” (§ 47605, subd. (a)(5).)

Thus, a charter school that previously qualified for the former unable to locate exception was allowed to remain in operation only until its next renewal, unless it obtained written consent or approval of the district within which the charter school is operating.

Century is a non-profit public benefit corporation that operates a public charter school called Century Community Charter School (CCCS). (Petition ¶ 20 [as admitted by answers].) Lennox approved Century’s charter. CCCS operates outside of Lennox’s boundaries and within Petitioner’s boundaries.

On August 10, 2004, Lennox first approved CCCS’s charter. (Torres Decl. ¶ 8; Griffith Decl. ¶ 12.) Century qualified to operate CCCS within Inglewood’s boundaries through the unable to locate exception in former section 47605, subdivision (a)(5)(A). (Torres Decl. ¶ 9; Griffith Decl. ¶¶ 8-13.) From its outset, CCCS operated within Petitioner’s boundaries at 901 S. Maple Street in Inglewood (the Maple Street Site) and to Petitioner’s knowledge has never operated school facilities within Lennox’s boundaries. (Torres Decl. ¶ 10; Yeomans Decl. Ex. 4 at 2091-2092; Troy Decl. Ex. E.)

On May 14, 2007, Petitioner notified Lennox that CCCS was “unlawfully operating charter school facilities” at an authorized location within Petitioner’s boundaries. Petitioner advised Lennox CCCS had authority to operate a single facility at the Maple Street Site. (Troy Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. F, H.)

On March 24 and April 15, 2015, Century advised Inglewood of its intent to operate its charter school within Petitioner’s boundaries. (Torres Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. 1-2].) As with its prior charter petitions, Respondents justified CCCS’ out-of-district location by claiming it qualified for the (then operative) unable to locate exception because it could not locate facilities within Lennox’s boundaries for its operation. (Torres Decl. ¶ 16; Yeomans Decl. Ex. 5 at 1233-1235.)

On April 22, 2015, Petitioner threatened legal action if Lennox renewed CCCS’ charter petition at its April 28, 2015 board meeting to permit CCCS to continue operating at the Maple Street Site. (Troy Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. G-H.) Despite the threat, Lennox renewed the charter for a term running from July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2020. (Torres Decl. ¶ 12; Yeomans Decl. Ex. 5 at 1233-1235.)

At some point in late 2019, Century filed its petition for a renewal of CCCS’ charter. (Yeomans Decl. Ex. 7.)[3] In its renewal petition, Century claimed the unable to locate exception allowed it to operate within Petitioner’s boundaries. Century claimed it was unable to locate facilities within Lennox’s boundaries for CCCS. Century relied on a report from a real estate agent dated November 26, 2019 reporting there were no properties available in Lennox’s boundaries that met CCCS’ school building criteria. (Torres Decl. ¶¶ 16, 20, Yeomans Decl. Ex. 8.)

On December 10, 2019, Lennox granted CCCS’ petition and renewed its charter for a term of five years beginning July 1, 2020. (Torres Decl. ¶ 10, Yeomans Decl. Ex. 6 at 1079, Ex. 7 at 1094; Means Decl. ¶ 3.) Respondents did so after providing no notice to Petitioner of Century’s intent to operate CCCS within Petitioner’s boundaries after June 30, 2020. (Torres Decl. ¶ 18.)

The parties and court agree Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 governs here. (California School Bds. Ass’n v. State Bd. of Education (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1324-1325 (CSBA).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part:

A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.

“There are two essential requirements to the issuance of a traditional writ of mandate: (1) a clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty. (California Ass’n for Health Services at Home v. Department of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) “Generally, a writ will lie when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy . . . .” (Pomona Police Officers’ Ass’n v. City of Pomona (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 583-584.)

“When there is review of an administrative decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, courts apply the following standard of review: ‘[J]udicial review is limited to an examination of the proceedings before the [agency] to determine whether [its] action has been arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether [it] has failed to follow the procedure and give the notices required by law.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at 584.)

As noted earlier, AB 1507 amended section 47605 and removed the unable to locate exception allowing charter schools to operate outside of the chartering school district. The amended version of section 47605 became effective January 1, 2020.

Lennox granted Century’s petition and renewed its charter in December 2019, just before the effective date of the amendments to section 47605. Lennox renewed Century’s charter for a term beginning July 1, 2020.

Petitioner argues the law in effect on the date the charter renewal takes effect or operates (July 1, 2020) controls. According to Petitioner, while Lennox renewed Century’s charter before the effective date of the statute, the validity of the charter renewal must be governed by the amendment to section 47605 because the charter renewal term began after the effective date of the amended statute.

Respondents argue the law in effect on the date of the renewal expressly permitted the use of the unable to locate exception. That is, Respondents contend when Lennox granted the charter renewal petition Lennox fully complied with the law then in effect. Respondents argue Lennox could not be constrained by a law not yet in operation. The court agrees.

“The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. [Citations.] To determine legislative intent, we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.] When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.” (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340.) When interpreting a statute, the court must construe the statute, if possible to achieve harmony among its parts. (People v. Hall (1991) 1 Cal. 4th 266, 272; Legacy Group v. City of Wasco (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1313.)

First, there is no argument Lennox failed to comply with section 47605 as it then existed when it granted Century’s charter renewal petition. Thus, Lennox’s action granting Century’s charter renewal petition was lawful.

The amended version of section 47605 and its elimination of the unable to locate exception applies when a charter school “submits a request for the renewal of its charter provision.” (§ 47605, subd. (a)(5).) Thus, the trigger on the elimination of the exception occurs when the charter school submits the renewal petition. The operative fact under the amended statute is submission of a petition for renewal of a charter—not the date a renewed charter termed begins. The Legislature could have focused on the date a charter term concluded, but it did not do so. For example, the Legislature could have eliminated the exception for any charter terminating after January 1, 2020; it did not do so. The plain language of the amended statute—and its clear trigger on the submission of a charter renewal petition—supports Respondents’ position.

Petitioner notes evidence in the record demonstrates Century petitioned Lennox to renew its charter in 2019 to avoid the statutory amendment and the elimination of the exception upon which it relied. (Yeomans Decl., Ex. 9.) While that may be true, nothing legally precluded Century from submitting its petition or Lennox from approving it prior to January 1, 2020. Respondent has provided evidence districts, including Petitioner, do not adhere to strict scheduling requirements for charter renewal consideration. (Troy Decl., Ex. J at 11 and Ex. K at 5.) The law does not provide guidance on submissions for charter renewal petitions.

The revised statute focuses on a petition to renew a charter. The Legislature did not focus on the end of a charter term as it could have. Petitioner’s interpretation of amended section 47605, subdivision (a)(5) would ignore the statutory language focused on the submission of a renewal petition.

Under the Prior Version of Section 47605 Can Respondents Rely Upon The Unable to Locate Exception?

Petitioner contends even if the amended version of 47605 does not apply here, Respondents nonetheless did not comply with section 47605 as it then existed.

First, Petitioner argues Respondents did not provide Petitioner with advanced notice of the renewal petition. Petitioner emphasizes the following statutory language:

Petitioner argues it received advance notice of the previous charter renewal petitions, including the petition for the previous term beginning in 2015 (Torres Decl. Ex. 1), but not Century’s most recent petition. (Torres Decl. ¶ 18.) Petitioner’s argument overlooks and omits relevant statutory language. The statute requires notice “of the location of the charter school before it commences operations . . . .” (Former § 47605, subd. (a)(5).)

Again, the plain reading of the notice provisions in the statute does not require notice to Petitioner where CCCS “commence[d] operations” in September 2004. In the context of a renewal petition where the charter school remains in the same location, former section 47605, subdivision (a)(5) did not require notice to Petitioner. Such notice was not required because CCCS had long ago commenced operations.

Petitioner also argues Century did not make a good faith attempt to locate CCCS in Lennox. Petitioner notes the statute requires an “attempt[] to locate . . . but a site or facility is unavailable.” (Former § 47605, subd. (a)(5)(A).) An attempt implies an obligation to undertake the task attempted in good faith.

As a threshold matter, Respondents assert the good faith attempt needed to locate the site or facility must be done at the beginning of the charter petition process, and not each subsequent renewal. Respondents contends former section 47605, subdivision (a)(5) is inapplicable after the charter school has established and thereafter maintains a location outside of the chartering school district.

Section 47607, subdivision (b) states that “[r]enewals and material revisions of charters are governed by the standards and criteria described in Section 47605 . . . .” (See also Reply 7:22-23.) Thus, to resolve the issue the court must examine the “standards and criteria” in section 47605.

Today’s Fresh Start Charter School v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 276, 282 (Today’s Fresh Start) provides some guidance on section 47605’s reference to standards and criteria. Today’s Fresh Start identified section 47605 subdivisions (b)(5), (c) and (d) as the “criteria for the grant of a charter.” (Ibid.) The subdivisions identified by Today’s Fresh Start all concern the charter school’s academic program and statewide pupil standards.

The court finds the language of former section 47605, subdivision (a)(5) significant on the issue. First, the subdivision speaks of establishing a charter school outside the chartering school district. The ordinary definition of establish is “to bring into existence.” (www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/establish.) A charter school is established—brought into existence—only once. While it may require charter renewals, such charter renewals occur in the context of an existing charter school.[4]

Former section 47605, subdivision (a)(5) also requires notice to the district where the charter school “proposes to operate” before the charter school “commences operations . . . .” In the context of a renewal petition, a charter school that has been established is already operating and has been doing so for some time based on the term of its charter.

The statute also ties establishing its location and commencing operations to the unable to locate exception. Former section 47605, subdivision (a)(5) provides notification is required “before [the charter school] commences operations and either of the following circumstances exist . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the unable to locate exception is related to commencing operations.

The court requests counsel focus their argument on this issue. The court is inclined to find former section 47605, subdivision (a)(5)’s provisions are not criteria and standards and do not apply to petitions to renew a charter.

[1] All undesignated statutory references are to this code.

[2] Petitioner also initially sought relief pursuant to the California Public Records Act (CPRA), Government Code section 6250 et seq. Petitioner advises the substance of the CPRA claim is now moot. Petitioner advises it “remains entitled to recover its attorney fees pursuant to Government Code section 6259.” (Opening Brief 12:25-28.)

[3] The charter renewal petition is undated, and the parties do not otherwise identify when Century submitted it to Lennox.

[4] The court acknowledges Petitioner’s argument based on the use of “establishment” in sections 47605, subdivision (b) and 47605, subdivision (j)(1). (Reply 9:3-22.) The court does not find the argument particularly persuasive. In context—whether for an initial petition to establish a charter or a renewal petition—the issue is whether the petition should be granted. That is, should a charter school be established or should a charter school’s charter be renewed.