Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case 20STCP03529 2023-03-24 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 20STCP03529, Date: 2023-03-24 Tentative Ruling

On May 19, 2020, Respondent, the City of Los Angeles (and its planning commission) approved a 10-unit residential housing project proposed by Real Parties in Interest, 530 North Francisca, LLC and Banarsi Agarwal. Through its petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, Petitioner, Fix the City, Inc., challenged the City’s action and sought an order requiring the City to set aside its approvals of the project.

On May 24, 2022, this court granted Petitioner relief in its Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandate and ordered a judgment be prepared. The court has not yet entered judgment.

On August 23, 2022, the court granted the City’s motion for reconsideration. The court ordered additional briefing and calendared argument for October 12, 2022.

Prior to argument on the issue raised by the City’s motion for reconsideration, on September 11, 2022, Real Parties advised the City they would not proceed with the project as were “abandoning the Entitlements for the Property.” (City’s Ex Parte Application filed 1/24/23, Ex. B.) As a result, on October 28, 2022, the City voided all approvals of the project. (Id. at Ex. C.)

The City now moves for judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094 (Section 1094). The City claims—based on having rescinded all of its project approvals—the matter is now moot.

“If no return be made, the case may be heard on the papers of the applicant. If the return raises only questions of law, or puts in issue immaterial statements, not affecting the substantial rights of the parties, the court must proceed to hear or fix a day for hearing the argument of the case.

If a petition for a writ of mandate filed pursuant to Section 1088.5 presents no triable issue of fact or is based solely on an administrative record, the matter may be determined by the court by noticed motion of any party for a judgment on the peremptory writ.” (§ 1094.)

When applicable, “the motion for judgment provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 1094 is the proper, and exclusive, procedural means for seeking a streamlined review of an agency's decision.” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal. App. 4th 1281, 1293.)

As an initial matter, Petitioner challenges the procedural propriety of Petitioner’s motion. Petitioner contends a motion under Section 1094 does not provide a mechanism for the court to dismiss a petition for administrative mandate for mootness.

The City contends Pereria v. Wallace (1900) 129 Cal. 397 supports its use of Section 1094 here. This more-than-a-century-old Supreme Court precedent, however, merely authorizes judgment “on the papers of the applicant” if “no return be made.” Thus, Pereria v. Wallace stands for the unremarkable proposition that a motion for judgment is proper where there is no answer by a respondent to a verified petition such that respondent has conceded the true of the facts alleged and the facts do not otherwise require proof. (Id. at 400.) A more recent Court of Appeal decision explained, “if there is no issue of fact but only questions of law the hearing referred to in these sections is a hearing on the admitted factual allegations contained in the petition and the arguments of counsel. In this posture the hearing mentioned in [Code of Civil Procedure sections] 1088 and 1094 is not one to try issues of fact but only questions of law.” (Rodriguez v. Municipal Court (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 521, 526.)

Petitioner correctly notes the City relies on evidence both outside the scope of the pleadings and the administrative record. As noted earlier, the City relies on evidence of the project has been abandoned, and the City has vacated all approvals related to the project. (City’s Ex Parte Application, Exs. B and C.)

The City concedes it is providing evidence in support of its Section 1094 motion. The City asserts, however, the court may take judicial notice of the evidence. Assuming the City’s statement is a request for judicial notice, judicial notice of the fact the City rescinded its approvals for the project is proper.[1] (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); Washington v. County of Contra Costa (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 890, 895, 901 [judicial notice of County documents related to its regulation of chemical company].) The facts contained in the City’s October 28, 2022 letter, however, would not be entitled to judicial notice. (See Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 [truth of matters asserted in documents not judicially noticeable].)

The court recognizes the procedural posture of this proceeding does not readily lend itself to resolution under Section 1094. Nonetheless, assuming there is no factual dispute (an issue not conceded by Petitioner), it appears the proceeding may be resolved on the pleadings, undisputed facts and the argument of counsel. Section 1094 would allow the court to resolve a question of law—the justiciability of the controversy. To avoid reaching the merits of the City’s mootness claim is to exalt form over substance. (Civ. Code, § 3528.)

Moreover, Petitioner’s proposed writ lodged with the court on July 7, 2022 reflects there is no longer a need for a writ to issue. Approvals for the project no longer exist such that there is nothing for the City to set aside and vacate. Any command from the court to the City by way of writ is unnecessary given that approvals for the project have been set aside—there is nothing for the City to do in response to a writ. Issuance and service of a writ is an idle act.

As noted, Petitioner contends this proceeding is not moot even though the City has rescinded its project approvals. Petitioner asserts nothing prevents Real Parties from obtaining the project entitlements in the future.[2] Petitioner argues “there is no evidence that Real Party is precluded from taking future actions that would raise identical legal issues as those that have already been fully litigated in this action.” (Opposition 7:20-22.)

“A case is moot when any ruling by this court can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief.” (Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 880, 888.) “An issue becomes moot when some event has occurred which ‘deprive[s] the controversy of its life.’ ” (Giraldo v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 231, 257; Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 804, 808.) “The policy behind a mootness dismissal is that ‘courts decide justiciable controversies and will normally not render advisory opinions.’” (Giraldo v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at 257; Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1179.)

Petitioner argues nothing prevents Real Parties from renewing their efforts to obtain entitlements for the project if this matter is dismissed without a judgment.[3] While that may be true, whether Petitioner would take such action—seemingly in an effort to avoid a judgment in this matter—is speculative. The City’s position on such an application given this litigation is also speculative.

Thus, the court finds Petitioner’s answer to the City’s claim of mootness unpersuasive.

As the cause of action seeking a writ of administrative mandate is moot, so too is the derivative declaratory relief cause of action. The petition’s request for declaratory relief is project specific—“the Court can and should issue declaratory relief that is consistent with the scope of the Court’s May 24, 2022 Order.” (Opposition 12:5-6.) Specifically, Petitioner sought a judicial declaration the incentives “awarded to applicants [i.e., Real Parties]” were improperly awarded. Petitioner also sought a declaration the project is inconsistent with various laws. As there is no longer a project, declarations related to Real Parties, incentives awarded and the project’s inconsistencies with various laws is moot. That Petitioner speculates declaratory relief may assist the parties with future actions “concerning this property and project,” the project no longer exists. (Opposition 14:21-22.) Speculating about facts does not avoid the mootness issue.

For the foregoing reasons, the City’s motion is well taken. The motion is granted.

[1] There is no dispute the City rescinded the project’s approvals. In fact, Petitioner acknowledges in its opposition that Real Parties have abandoned the project.

[2] To be clear, the court may not take judicial notice of Real Parties’ hearsay statements they have abandoned the project. Nonetheless, Petitioner acknowledges Real Parties abandoned the project: “The case has not become moot simply because Real Party unilaterally abandoned the project, because nothing prevents Real Party from making the same request in the future, absent issuance of a judgment in this action.” (Opposition 7:26-28.)

[3] Petitioner argues authorities have generally recognized the impropriety of allowing a party affected by a court’s judgment to unilaterally take actions during the pendency of litigation to deprive a court of jurisdiction—citing Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1203 (sale of land to third parties beyond control of plaintiff and did “not immunize defective land use approvals”). There is no evidence Real Parties’ actions subsequent to this court’s ruling on the petition were intended to circumvent the court’s authority. In fact, Real Parties’ action provide the relief originally sought by Petitioner herein.