Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case 21STCP01537 2023-04-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 21STCP01537, Date: 2023-04-28 Tentative Ruling

In this proceeding, Petitioners, Riverpark Coalition (RPC) and Los Angeles Waterkeeper (LA Waterkeeper) (jointly, Petitioners), requested the court set aside an approval by the City of Long Beach for a project based on a failure to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). Petitioners sought a court order requiring the completion of an environmental impact report (EIR) for the project. The City approved the project with a mitigated negative declaration (MND).

Respondent, the City of Long Beach, and Real Parties Artesia Acquisition Company, InSite Property Group, Paul Brown and the Jeanne Eve McDonald Revocable Trust (collectively, Respondents), opposed the petition.

The court granted the petition, set aside the project approvals and ordered Respondent to comply with CEQA.

Petitioners now seek attorneys’ fees in the amount of $896,664.06. Respondents oppose the motion.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (Section 1021.5) authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees in “public interest” litigation. Section 1021.5 provides in relevant part:

“Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement . . . are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.”

The basic objective of the “private attorney general” doctrine “is to encourage suits enforcing important public policies by providing substantial attorney fees to successful litigants in such cases.” (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1289; Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565.) The statute awards successful public interest litigants with attorney’s fees where the three statutory requirements are established. (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 250-251.) The burden is on the fee claimant to establish each statutory requirement, including that its litigation costs transcend its personal interest in the litigation. (Save Open Space Santa Monica Mountains v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 235, 246.)

“ ‘An award of attorney[] fees under . . . section 1021.5 is an obligation’ if the claimant meets the criteria for such an award. [Citation.]” (Doe v. Westmont College (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 753, 767.)

Petitioners argue they satisfy all the requirements of Section 1021.5 and are therefore entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees. Respondents disagree.

First, the court must determine whether Petitioners were the “successful parties” in the litigation. Respondents argue Petitioners achieved only limited success on the merits of their many claims. Specifically, Respondents argue the “the Opening Brief raised a host of issues, the majority of which were rejected by this Court.” (Opposition 9:22-23.) Respondents therefore assert a “complete and total fee award would be excessive.” (Opposition 10:1-2.)[1]

Section 1021.5 focuses on whether the party to the litigation has “achieve[d] its objectives.” (La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn. of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1149, 1157.) The definition of successful party under the statute—intended to be both “pragmatic” and “broad”—includes “succeed[ing] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” (Maria P. v. Riles, supra, 43 Cal.3d at 1292.)

Accordingly, while Petitioners did not prevail on every claim raised before the court, Petitioners prevailed on multiple significant issues and—most importantly to Section 1021.5—achieved their primary objective in this litigation. They obtained an order setting aside and vacating the project’s approvals and MND based on various violations of CEQA. The court therefore finds Petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating they were the successful parties in this litigation.

Petitioners also argue this proceeding resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest. In particular, Petitioners argue they vindicated an important right because this proceeding resulted in the City preparing an EIR for any subsequent project approval. Respondents dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the results. Respondents contend the court’s order did not require the City to prepare an EIR.

Respondents are correct. The court’s order did not specify an EIR must be completed. Nonetheless, the court did order the City to comply with CEQA for any future project approvals. The court specified the MND it relied upon to approve the project was deficient. Thus, as argued by Petitioners, the litigation secured an important right in the public interest. There can be no question CEQA provides important rights, and such rights benefit the public interest.

§ 1021.5, subd. (a).) When considering the significant benefit factor, the Court must assess the size of the class of persons and significant benefit “in light of all the pertinent circumstances of the gains which have resulted in the particular case.” (Christward Ministry v. Co. of San Diego (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 31, 50.)

“The trial court determines the significance of the benefit, and the group receiving it, from a realistic assessment, in light of all the pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular case. The courts are not required to narrowly construe the significant benefit factor. The extent of the public benefit need not be great to justify an attorney fees award. And fees may not be denied merely because the primary effect of the litigation was to benefit the individual rather than the public.” (Indio Police Command Unit Association v. City of Indio (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 521, 543 [cleaned up].)

A significant benefit may result from the “effectuation of a fundamental constitutional or statutory policy.” (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 939.) “Of course, the public always has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are properly enforced and thus, in a real sense, the public always derives a ‘benefit’ when illegal private or public conduct is rectified.” (Ibid.)

Petitioners’ litigation resulted in a significant benefit to the residents of the City as well as the general public. Contrary to Respondents’ position, Section 1021.5 does not require results be “accomplished on a statewide basis” to justify an award of fees. (Opposition 11:4-5.)

The court is also not persuaded the benefit conferred turns on whether any future project includes a warehouse. Instead, the court focuses on what, if anything, the litigation accomplished. The court found the City failed to comply with the state’s environmental laws for multiple reasons. The court set aside the project’s approvals based on an inadequate MND and a showing a fair argument could be made the project would have a significant impact on the environment requiring further study. The court’s decision and order provided significant benefit to the public at large as well as the local population. The public benefits when a significant statutory policy, like CEQA, is enforced.

Section 1021.5 is intended “to provide an incentive for private plaintiffs to bring public

interest suits when their personal stake in the outcome is insufficient to warrant incurring the

costs of litigation.” (Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) It is not intended “as a method for rewarding litigants motivated by their own pecuniary interests who only coincidentally protect the public interest . . . .” (Beach Colony II v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 106, 114.)

“[T]he necessity and financial burden requirement ‘ “really examines two issues: whether private enforcement was necessary [first prong] and whether the financial burden of private enforcement warrants subsidizing the successful party's attorneys [second prong].” ’ [Citations.] The ‘necessity’ of private enforcement “ ‘ “looks to the adequacy of public enforcement and seeks economic equalization of representation in cases where private enforcement is necessary.” ’ [Citations.]” ’ ” (Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1214-1215.)

“The second prong of the inquiry addresses the ‘financial burden of private enforcement.’ In determining the financial burden on litigants, courts have quite logically focused not only on the costs of the litigation but also any offsetting financial benefits that the litigation yields or reasonably could have been expected to yield.” (Id. at 1215.) “ ‘The final step is to place the estimated value of the case beside the actual cost and make the value judgment whether it is desirable to offer the bounty of a court-awarded fee in order to encourage litigation of the sort involved in this case. . . . [A] bounty will be appropriate except where the expected value of the litigant's own monetary award exceeds by a substantial margin the actual litigation costs.’ ” (Id. at 1216.)

As to the first part of the analysis (necessity of private enforcement), Petitioner has demonstrated private enforcement was necessary here. The City is a governmental agency with its ordinance under challenge. Where litigation is against the government, the necessity of private enforcement is “obvious.” (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1299 [citation omitted].) “In such situations private citizens alone must ‘guard the guardians' and the disparity in legal resources is likely to be greatest.” (Ibid. See also Boatworks, LLC v. City of Alameda [Boatworks] (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 290, 309.)

As to the second part of the analysis (financial burden of private enforcement warrants a subsidizing Petitioners’ attorneys), the evidence demonstrates Petitioners had no pecuniary interest in the litigation. Petitioner Riverpark Coalition is a community-based coalition that works in partnership with the community to expand access to recreational green space and other nature-based amenities in Long Beach. (Pet., ¶ 7.) Petitioner LA Waterkeeper is a non-profit organization whose mission is, in part, to promote and protect the health of all coastal and inland water resources in the Los Angeles County region. (Pet.,¶ 8.) Petitioners contend they brought the litigation to benefit the public, not for any individual benefit. (Surfrider Foundation v. Martins Beach 1, LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 238, 278.) Petitioners received no financial benefit from the litigation. (Supekar Decl. ¶ 13.)

Respondents do not contest Petitioners’ evidence and arguments about the financial burden.

Based on the foregoing, the court finds Petitioners have established their entitlement to an award of attorneys’ fees in this proceeding.

Petitioners request attorneys’ fees of $442,823.02, enhanced by a multiplier of 2.0, fees incurred in pursuing its attorneys’ fees through this motion ($39,862.35), as well as costs, for a total award of $922,612.57. Respondents suggest $323,782.75 is a reasonable attorneys’ fees award, and that no multiplier is warranted here. Respondents concede if the court were to adopt a multiplier it should not exceed .5.[3] (Opposition 6:19-22.) The court notes Petitioners reduced their attorneys’ fee request (“Petitioners self-imposed a 10% billing judgment deduction”) includes a 10 percent reduction of hours actually incurred. (Reply 10:25.)

When assessing the amount of any attorneys’ fee award, whether made under Section 1021.5 or otherwise, courts ordinarily determine what is reasonable through the application of the “lodestar” method with adjustments for what hours and rates are reasonable given the expertise of counsel and difficulty of the matter presented. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1136.)

Under the lodestar method, a base amount is calculated from a compilation of (1) time reasonably spent and (2) the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48; see also Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 448-449.) The court is vested with discretion to determine whether claimed hours were reasonably spent as well as an attorney’s reasonable hourly rate. (Dover Mobile Estates v. Fiber Form Products, Inc. (1998) 220 Cal.App.3d 1494, 1501.)

Normally, a “reasonable” hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community for similar work. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) That amount may then be adjusted through consideration of various factors, including “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1132.) The court may also rely on its own knowledge of reasonable attorney fees in the community to determine whether hourly rates are reasonable. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 1096 [explaining trial court has its own expertise in determining value of legal services and may make its own determination without necessity of expert testimony].)

First, Petitioners seek attorneys’ fees at an hourly rate of $775 for attorney Douglas P. Carstens; $525 for attorney Michelle Black; $500 for attorney Kelly Clark; $500 for attorney Barak Kamelgard; $480 for attorney Benjamin Harris; $460 for attorney Sunjana Supekar; and $350 for attorney Kathryn Pettit. (Supekar Decl., Ex. A.) Petitioners also seek fees for paralegals and law clerks at an hourly rate of $180.[4] (Supekar Decl., Ex. A.)

In support, Petitioners contend the rates are reasonable and based on each practitioners’ experience and qualifications. Petitioners also report the hourly rates are similar to those charged in the legal community for this type of litigation and are the rates charged three years ago. (Supekar Decl., ¶¶ 5-11.)

Respondents do not challenge the hourly rates charged. Respondents argue, however, the significant hourly rates requested undermine Petitioners’ claim for a multiplier.

While the hourly rates charged are significant, the court finds the rates reasonable and consistent with legal fees charged in Southern California.

Respondents challenge the hours incurred as unreasonable.[5] In large part, many of the objections are too brief and generalized to find meritorious.

Time preparing the Administrative Record: Respondents argue Petitioners spent an excessive number of hours (53) preparing an incomplete and inefficient administrative record. Specifically, Respondents note Petitioners spent 53 hours preparing an inadequate record. (Supekar Decl., Exhibit A; see also, Riley Decl., ¶ 3, Exhibit 1.) Respondents report ultimately they had to assist with the record’s preparation,[6] and it was only through Respondents help that the court had a complete administrative record. As with many CEQA cases, preparation of the administrative record is a time consuming and exacting task. The court notes Petitioners’ attorneys delegated much of this task to paralegals and law clerks at $180 per hour. To the extent attorney time is involved, Petitioners’ attorneys used an attorney with a lower billing rate. Given the size of the administrative record (approximately 21,000 pages) and the actual time incurred, the court cannot find 53 hours of time expended (both paralegals/law clerks and attorneys) unreasonable. As a practical matter, to the extent Respondents’ efforts contributed to an efficient and organized record, the time expended by attorneys in brief preparation and preparing for argument (at higher billing rates) had to have been reduced thereby likely resulting in reduced overall time expended by those attorneys.

Times incurred on the Opening Brief and Reply: Petitioners request compensation for 136.1 hours of attorney time ($66,687.64) related to preparation of the Opening Brief and an additional 170.9 hours of attorney time ($83,739.29) for the Reply Brief. (Supekar Decl., Exhibit A; Riley Decl., ¶¶ 2-4, 6, Exhibit 1.) Without identifying any specific billing entries or the complexity of the legal issues briefed, Respondents argue: “Those numbers appear excessive, particularly since a substantial number of hours were incurred by Mr. Carstens at a very high billing rate.” (Opposition 13:10-11.) Respondents provide no further specificity or argument.

The generalized nature of Respondents’ argument is insufficient to challenge this category of attorney fees. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488. [“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.”] See Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564. [“General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.”] See also Sonoma Land Trust v. Thompson (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 978, 985 [explaining vague objections insufficient to establish abuse of discretion].)

Time incurred on this motion: Petitioners identify 24.7 hours of attorney time, plus some unknown amount of fees for a reply brief. (Supekar Decl., Ex. A.) Petitioners clarify in their reply brief that they seek a total of $39,862.35 as compensation for bringing this motion. Supekar Reply Decl., ¶ 5.) Respondents’ objection to the time expended on the motion for attorneys’ fees is the same as that for brief drafting: “These numbers appear excessive, particularly since a substantial number of hours were incurred by Mr. Carstens at a very high billing rate.” (Opposition 13:10-11.)

The court finds the time incurred for preparation of Petitioners’ motion excessive and unreasonable. Attorney Supekar expended nearly two full weeks of time on the motion, including time expended on the reply. The court finds the motion somewhat generalized without categorizing hours expended on tasks performed or total hours expended by specific timekeeper for such tasks to facilitate court review. Petitioners indicated their counsel expended 26.8 hours to prepare the motion. (Supekar Decl., Ex. A.) By the time Petitioners filed their reply, the time expended had ballooned into 89.6 hours. The time expended, given the generalized nature of Respondents’ opposition, was unreasonable. In addition, the law concerning attorneys’ fees under Section 1021.5 and multipliers is well established. Information concerning timekeeper experience and rates is also readily available. (Supekar Decl., ¶¶ 1-2, 5-11, 16-33 [general information].)

Noting that Petitioners’ have reduced their attorneys’ fees by 10 percent voluntarily, the court finds a further reduction of $15,000 is warranted. Such a reduction results in reasonable compensation for this motion of nearly $25,000.

Time incurred by “transitory billers”: Respondents request the court eliminate the fees sought for “transitory billers” (Michelle Black [5.1 hours], Kelly Clark [6.4 hours] and Barak Kamelgard [5.4 hours]). (Supekar Dec., Exhibit A, Exhibit E (Minute Order), p. 5; Riley Dec., ¶¶ 2-4, 6, Exhibit 1.) Respondents suggest courts have found that transitory billers are "suggestive of inefficiency.” (Opposition 13, fn. 2.) Respondents request that the court strike the transitory biller fees as arbitrary.

That the identified timekeepers had limited billing entries does not ipso facto demonstrate the time expended was unreasonable and the fees are per se unrecoverable. Respondent does not provide precedent to support their position. Moreover, the reply evidence suggests such fees were reasonably incurred in furtherance of this litigation. (Supekar Reply Decl., ¶ 15; Harris Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.)

Miscellaneous fees: Respondents argue Petitioners fail to explain why they are entitled to fees for time expended related to the Department of Toxic and Substance Control (DPSC); an online rally; funding opportunities; or fees incurred by unnamed staff: CPK (10.7 hours), SLD (1.2 hours), and ACM (0.5 hours). (Supekar Decl., Ex. A; Riley Decl., ¶¶ 3-4, 6-7, Ex. 1.) In reply, Petitioners note they did not include the fees for ACM and SLD, and CPK refers to CBM office manager Cynthia Kellman, who performed administrative and paralegal tasks on this matter. (Supekar Decl., ¶ 21.) Petitioners argues paralegal time is recoverable. (Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 286, 312 [“[P]aralegal fees may be awarded as attorney's fees if the trial court deems it appropriate.”].) With respect to DTSC related fees, Petitioner argues the fees are recoverable because this was the responsible agency which relied on the at-issue MND for its environmental review.

The court finds the attorney time expended related to DTSC reasonable given DTSC’s involvement in the project.

The court agrees with Respondents concerning time expended to attend an online rally and funding opportunities. The court finds it not credible that attendance at the online rally for 1.5 hours “was necessary to understanding the issues in this case.” (Reply 13:15.) The issues were numerous and complex. A reduction of $621 is warranted as unreasonable. (That is, 1.5 hours at $460 per hour less the 10 percent voluntary reduction.) As for a reduction for services related to funding opportunities, that other services were billed with such services (i.e. block billing) does not justify the expense. (Reply 13:13-18.) Therefore, a reduction of $693 is warranted as unreasonable. (That is, 2.2 hours at $350 per hour less the 10 percent voluntary reduction.)

Accordingly, the court reduces the lodestar requested from $482,685.37 to $466,371.37. (That is, 442,823.02 plus 39,862.35 less 15,000 less 621 less 693.)

Petitioners request a 2.0 multiplier. Specifically, Petitioners argue they are entitled to a 2.0 multiplier because: (1) they engaged in the pending representation on a contingent basis;

(2) the outcome of this case was uncertain and the legal issues presented were complex;

(3) litigating in this case precluded Petitioners' counsel from representing other potential clients; and (4) they achieved "excellent results" for the public. (Motion 19:6-21:11.)

A lodestar amount “ ‘may be adjusted by the court based on factors including . . . (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.’ ” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579.) Courts have explained that “[t]he question to be answered is whether the litigation required extraordinary legal skill or whether there are other factors justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 784.)

First, Petitioners argue their attorneys took a substantial risk by accepting this case on contingency fee basis—absent success Petitioners would have received no attorneys’ fees. “[T]he purpose of a fee enhancement is primarily to compensate the attorney for the prevailing party at a rate reflecting the risk of nonpayment in contingency cases as a class.” (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1138.)

“[A]lthough taking a case on a contingent fee basis may support an award of a multiplier, it does not compel it. Rather, that is a decision left up to the trial court's discretion.” (Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1188.) In determining whether a multiplier is warranted on a contingency fee case, court may consider “the extent to which taking the case on a contingent fee basis has precluded the attorney from taking other fee-generating work.” (Ibid.) Petitioners submit largely vague and conclusory evidence that their attorneys turned down other work that it might otherwise have been able to accept in order to devote the necessary hours to this case. (Supekar Decl., ¶ 4 [“Due to our firm’s representation of the Petitioners in this case, and so that our firm did not take on a higher workload than we could handle, our firm declined to represent paying clients.”]; see also Supekar Reply Decl., ¶ 28. [“ . . . DBM had to turn away a number of potential clients because of limited time and limits on our ability to take on more financial risk with contingent matters.”]) The evidence to support having been unable to take on other paying work because of this contingent fee matter is not particularly compelling because of its lack of specificity.

Petitioners also argue the uncertainty of the outcome and difficulty of the issue presented both warrant an upward adjustment of the lodestar. Specifically, Petitioners argue “the applicant’s unusual pre-approval surcharge activities on the site required Petitioners’ counsel to understand the scope and timing of such activities and how they impacted the environmental analysis.” (Motion 20:10-12.) The evidence shows Petitioners are highly experienced CEQA attorneys and while the surcharge issue does not appear commonplace, the court is not inclined to find that it is so unique or complex a multiplier is warranted. While every CEQA case is unique, the pre-approval activities here (given their unusual nature) provided Petitioners with more material to support their claims the City violated CEQA. In fact, from the court’s perspective, such pre-approval activities may have demonstrated the litigation would be at least partially successful.

Lastly, the court acknowledges that Petitioners obtained a positive result for the public in so far as Petitioners enforced an important public right that benefited a large class of people. Nevertheless, the court finds that Petitioners’ significant billing rates adequately compensated Petitioners’ attorneys for their time and expertise in achieving this result.

Therefore, the court finds that the use of 2 multiplier is not justified under the circumstances.

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Petitioners’ motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of $469,267.19. (That is, reasonable attorneys’ fees of $466,371.37 plus costs of $2,895.82.)[7]

[1] Respondents’ argument seemingly concedes Petitioners’ status as the successful party by suggesting Petitioners are entitled to a reduced fee award.

[2] The significant benefit and important right requirements are similar and “dovetail” to some extent. (La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn. Of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at 1158.)

[3] The court assumes Respondents’ suggestion is intended to be 1.5.

[4] Alison Hahm billed 50 hours within this category of timekeeper.

[5] Petitioners do not provide a breakdown of tasks performed and attorneys’ hours incurred. Respondents have taken the time to prepare that information for the court. (See Riley Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1.)

[6] Respondents report: “The initial draft of the administrative record [] that Petitioners’ counsel forwarded contained more than 260 portable document format (‘PDF’) files. Seven PDFs were a ‘data dump’ of emails with embedded attachments totaling over 12,000 pages (‘Emails’). Petitioners’ attorneys did not realize that attachments were embedded within these emails.” (Akerblom Decl., ¶ 2.) According to Respondents: “The Emails provided by Petitioners were not in chronological order; many were irrelevant, duplicative, and/or outside the applicable timeframe; and the attachments were not bates stamped.” (Akerblom Decl., ¶ 3.)

[7] Respondents objected to Petitioners’ claimed costs. (Opposition 13.) Petitioners did include a list of costs in Supekar’s initial declaration on pages 40-42. Petitioners have subsequently reviewed and reduced their request for costs to $2,895.82. Petitioners provide an itemized list of these reduced costs in Exhibit K to the Supekar reply declaration. (Reply Decl. ¶¶23-24.) Respondents shall advise the court, given the reduction, whether they continue to object to the claimed costs.