Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case Number: 21STCP02987, Date: 2023-08-16 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 21STCP02987, Date: 2023-08-16 Tentative Ruling

Petitioners, Socorro Magana, Rancho Dominguez Mobile Home Estates Homeowners Association, Leopoldo Guzman, and Benjamin Leon Mendoza (Homeowners), move for an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (Section 1021.5) in the amount of $474,608 against Respondent, the City of Carson. (See Reply 19:22-25.) The City and Petitioner, Carter-Spencer Enterprises, LLC (Carter-Spencer), separately oppose the motion.

Homeowners’ Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) of Exhibits 1 through 3, 19 and 20 is granted.

Homeowners’ objection to the City’s Exhibit H is overruled. Homeowners have not disputed that Exhibit H reflects certified parts of the administrative record from either Socorro Magana v. City of Carson, 21STCP03033 or Carter-Spencer v. City of Carson, 21STCP02987 (or both). These proceedings have been consolidated, and therefore, it is proper for the City to cite to either or both administrative records. Accordingly, to the extent the City “intermingled” the two records, Homeowners have shown no prejudice.

On July 15, 2021, the City adopted Resolution No. 21-070. Through its resolution, the City determined Carter-Spencer sought to close Rancho Dominguez Mobile Estates (the Park), making Carter-Spencer the “person or entity proposing the change in use” under Government Code section 65863.7, subdivision (a). The resolution’s finding necessarily required Carter-Spencer to prepare the required relocation impact report (RIR) for the Park’s closure as well as pay the expenses of mitigating the closure impact on displaced residents. (See Court’s Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandate filed 11-9-22.)[1]

On September 10, 2021, Carter-Spencer filed its verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief in case number 21STCP02987. In that proceeding, Carter-Spencer challenged the City’s decision that Carter-Spencer, and not the City itself, was the responsible party for the Park’s closure pursuant to Government Code section 65863.7, subdivision (i).

On September 14, 2021, in case number 21STCP03033, Homeowners filed a separate writ proceeding challenging the City’s approval of the closure of the Park. On December 1, 2021, Homeowners filed their operative, first amended petition (Homeowners’ FAP). As discussed below, Homeowners challenged the City’s actions on grounds distinct from those in Carter-Spencer’s petition.

On February 2, 2022, the court set both petitions for hearing on September 21, 2022 and provided the parties with a briefing schedule.

Homeowners pursued discovery from Carter-Spender in case number 21STCP03033 and the court conducted an informal discovery conference to resolve discovery disputes with the parties. On June 20, 2022, the court granted Homeowners’ ex parte application to continue the trial on the Homeowners’ FAP to allow Homeowners to complete their discovery. The court vacated the trial date in case number 21STCP03033 and scheduled a trial setting conference for July 1, 2022. Case number 21STCP02987 (Carter-Spencer petition) remained calendared for trial on September 21, 2022.

On July 1, 2022, at a trial setting conference, the court set the Homeowners’ FAP (case number 21STCP03033) for hearing on December 7, 2022. Thus, resolution of the Homeowners’ FAP would necessarily occur after the court resolved Carter-Spencer’s petition (case number 21STCP02987).

On July 25, 2022, Carter-Spencer filed its opening brief in support of its petition in case number 21STCP02987. The City thereafter filed an opposition in that case.

On August 2, 2022, on its own motion, the court continued the hearing on Carter-Spencer’s petition (case number 21STCP02987) from September 21, 2022 to October 7, 2022. On October 4, 2022, on its own motion, the court again continued the hearing to November 9, 2022.

Homeowners filed a motion to compel discovery in case number 21STCP03033 (Homeowner’s FAP), heard by the court on August 5, 2022. The court ordered supplemental briefing at the hearing and continued the matter. On August 29, 2022, the court entered an order denying Homeowners’ motion to compel discovery and for sanctions. In its order, the court noted the issue of responsibility for the park closure under Government section 65863.7 would be litigated in case number 21STCP02987 (Carter-Spencer’s petition), not case number 21STCP03033 (the Homeowners’ FAP).

On August 24, 2022, the court granted (Homeowner) Petitioner Magana’s ex parte application to intervene in case number 21STCP02987 (Carter-Spencer’s petition). That same date, Petitioner Magana filed an opposition brief to Carter-Spencer’s petition in case number 21STCP02987. Petitioner Magana limited her briefing to the issue of remedy. Petitioner Magana also filed an answer-in-intervention in case number 21STCP02987 (Carter-Spencer’s petition) asserting two affirmative defenses opposing the remedy sought by Carter-Spencer. In its opposition brief and answer, Petitioner Magana took a neutral position on whether the City or Carter-Spencer was responsible for the park closure under Government Code section 65863.7.[2]

On November 9, 2022, the court held a hearing on Carter-Spencer’s petition in case number 21STCP02987. That same date, the court issued its Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandate (Ruling). The Ruling discusses the relevant facts, applicable law, and the reasons the court granted Carter-Spencer’s petition. That discussion is not repeated here but is incorporated by reference.

On November 22, 2022, the court consolidated case number 21STCP02987 (Carter-Spencer’s petition) and case number 21STCP03033 (Homeowners’ FAP). Pursuant to the oral request of Homeowners’ counsel, the court dismissed the second cause of action in the Homeowners’ FAP without prejudice.

On February 14, 2023, the court entered judgment in favor of Carter-Spencer and against the City. The court dismissed the five other causes of action in Homeowners’ FAP as moot.

On February 17, 2023, the court issued a writ directing the City to set aside Resolutions Nos. 21-2708 and 21-070 (the Resolutions) concerning the application to close the Park. The writ directed the City to file a return by March 30, 2023. It is undisputed “[o]n March 7, 2023, the City passed Resolution 23-050 which repealed Resolution 21-070 and Resolution 21-2708.” (Motion 11:6-7.)

An award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate “to a successful party . . . in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest.” (§ 1021.5.) The three factors necessary to support an award of attorney fees to a successful party pursuant to Section 1021.5 are: “(1) [the] action has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, (2) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons and (3) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.” (In re Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1214.)

“When it comes to section 1021.5, the successful party is ‘the party to litigation that achieves its objectives.’ ” (La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn. of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1149, 1157.) The “critical fact is the impact of the action, not the manner of its resolution.” (Hogar Dulce Hogar v. Community Development Com. of City of Escondido (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1365.) “[A] plaintiff is a ‘successful party’ whenever it obtains the relief sought in its lawsuit, regardless of whether that relief is obtained ‘through a ‘voluntary’ change in the defendant's conduct, through a settlement, or otherwise.’ ” (Ibid.) “[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” (Lyons v. Chinese Hospital Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1346.)

“[I]n order to justify a fee award, there must be a causal connection between the lawsuit and the relief obtained.” (Karuk Tribe of Northern California v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., North Coast Region (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 330, 365-66. Accord Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo (1983) 33 Cal.3d 348, 353. [“Where there is no causal connection between the plaintiff's action and the relief obtained, an attorney fee award is not proper.”])

The causation requirement is express in Section 1021.5. The court has discretion to award fees only if the moving party’s legal action “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest.” (Emphasis added.) “The trial court in its discretion ‘must realistically assess the litigation and determine, from a practical perspective, whether or not the action served to vindicate an important right so as to justify an attorney fee award’ under section 1021.5.” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 566 [emphasis added].)

Homeowners Did Not Prevail on Any Cause of Action; and Homeowners’ Legal Briefing Was Not a Substantial Factor in the Court Granting Carter-Spencer’s Petition

Homeowners contend they are successful parties within the meaning of Section 1021.5 because “the City of Carson enacted Resolution 23-050 that set aside and vacated City Council Resolution 21-070, and set aside and vacated Resolution 21-2708 of the Planning Commission.” (Motion 12:1-8.) Homeowners assert “[t]his is exactly the remedy the Home Owners sought in their Petition.” (Ibid. [citing FAP Prayer ¶ 2.a].)

The City and Carter-Spencer, in contrast, argue Homeowners played no role in the outcome of the litigation because their causes of action were dismissed as moot; the court did not reach the merits of Homeowners’ causes of action; and Homeowners’ legal briefing for the writ petition “was unnecessary and made no difference” to the outcome of the litigation. (City Opposition 11-12; Carter-Spencer Opposition 9-14.) Having adjudicated the case, and being closely familiar with the record, issues and procedural complexities, the court agrees with the City and Carter-Spencer on all three points. For the following reasons, the court finds no causal connection between Homeowners’ action and the relief obtained by Carter-Spencer.

On November 22, 2022, pursuant to the oral request of Homeowners, the court dismissed without prejudice the second cause of action in Homeowners’ FAP. On February 14, 2023, the court entered judgment in favor of Carter-Spencer and against the City. The court dismissed the other causes of action in Homeowners’ FAP as moot. The court did not rule on the merits of any of Homeowners’ causes of action and did not grant Homeowners any relief based on those causes of action. “A decision that a matter is moot is not a decision on the merits.” (Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304, 322.)

Rather, the court granted Carter-Spencer’s writ petition based on arguments raised only raised by Carter-Spencer. Thus, in its Ruling, the court agreed with Carter-Spencer’s contention the City was “the person or entity proposing the change in use” because “it is the failure to renew a zoning variance that renders the public agency liable.” Specifically, in 1977 “[b]y rendering the Park’s use illegal, through Ordinance 77-413, announcing the same to the world on title to the property by Recording a Notice of Non-Conforming Use and its 2012 expiration of the legal, non-conforming use, and further by refusing and failing to extend or renew the zoning variance, City put Petitioner and the Park’s residents in untenable situations.” (Ruling at 5-6 [citing Carter-Spender’s Opening Brief in Support of the Petition].) Based on Carter-Spencer’s arguments, the court concluded the City “made a zoning decision changing the use of the Park and requiring the Park’s closure,” and therefore, the City was the responsible party pursuant to Government Code section 65863.7, subdivision (i). (Ruling at 6.)

In analyzing the merits of Carter-Spencer’s petition and resolving the Government Code section 65863.7, subdivision (i) issue, the court relied on arguments made by Carter-Spencer, not by Homeowners. Indeed, in Petitioner Magana’s opposition brief filed August 24, 2022, Magana addressed only the appropriate remedy “[i]f the Court determines that the City is the entity legally responsible for the closure of” the Park. (Opposition filed 8-24-22 at 3:7-8.) Petitioner Magana did not develop any argument concerning responsible party pursuant to Government Code section 65863.7, subdivision (i).[3] In fact, the first sentence of Petitioner Magana’s brief states: “Intervenor Socorro Magana provides this Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Mandate by [Carter-Spencer], for the purposes of addressing the remedy requested.” (Opposition filed 8-24-22 3:2-4.)

Homeowners suggest they prevailed on their fourth cause of action for a writ of mandate. (Motion 7:11-14 and 10:8-11.) Relatedly, Homeowners point out in their Homeowners’ FAP they sought, among other relief, a writ directing the City to set aside the Resolutions. (Motion 12:7-8.) Homeowner’s entitled their fourth cause of action “Carson Failed to File its Own Impact Report,” and alleged “[i]n the alternative, if the evidence shows that Respondent was indeed the entity proposing closure of Rancho Dominguez as defined by Government Code, then it was required to prepare the impact report and propose mitigation measures in the exercise of its own discretion.” (FAP ¶ 96 [emphasis added].)

However, like their opposition to Carter-Spencer’s petition filed August 24, 2022, the fourth cause of action in the Homeowners’ FAP did not allege any legal theory to deem the City the responsible party pursuant to Government Code section 65863.7, subdivision (i). Rather, the fourth cause of action in the Homeowners’ FAP addressed the legal consequences to the City and the appropriate remedy should the court find the City is the responsible party for the Park’s closure.

Homeowners do not argue their first, second, third, fifth, and sixth causes of action have any relevance to the legal theory upon which the court granted Carter-Spencer’s petition. Indeed, any such contention would be meritless. As shown in Carter-Spencer’s briefing, those causes of action had nothing to do with the legal theory upon which the court granted Carter-Spencer’s petition. (Carter-Spencer Opposition 7-8.)

For example, the second cause of action sought a writ of mandate finding the City violated the Dymally Alatorre Bilingual Services Act in purportedly not making certain accommodation for Spanish language speakers. (FAP ¶¶ 72-79.) Homeowners dismissed that cause of action and the court did never ruled on the claim. Homeowners did not prevail on the first, second, third, fifth, and sixth causes of action in their Homeowners’ FAP and Homeowners’ attorneys’ legal work related to such causes of action (including the writ briefing and discovery in case number 21STCP03033) had no causal connection to the judgment and the writ relief obtained by Carter-Spencer.

The court acknowledges Homeowners’ opposition filed August 24, 2022 argued for the remedy the court ultimately granted, an order compelling the City to set aside the Resolutions. (Ruling 9-10; Motion 10:15-17.) In contrast, Carter-Spencer sought a writ directing the City to amend the Resolutions to become the responsible party under Government Code section 65863.7 requiring it to preparing the RIR and take steps to mitigate the adverse impact of closure of the Park. The writ sought by Carter-Spencer may or may not have avoided closure of the Park. (Ruling 9.)

Based on its familiarity with this consolidated action and its experience at trial, the court makes a factual finding Homeowners’ opposition filed August 24, 2022 was not a substantial factor in the remedy selected by the court. Notably, the City argued for the exact same remedy as Homeowners in its opposition brief to Carter-Spencer’s petition. (Ruling 9; City Opposition filed 8-22-22 at 14.) City cited Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (f) and case law holding that mandamus “will not lie to control discretion within the area lawfully entrusted to the administrative agency.” (Ruling 9; see Faulkner v. California Toll Bridge Authority (1953) 40 Cal.2d 317, 326.)

The court views the principle of agency autonomy to be well settled. Stated succinctly, the court has “limited authority . . . to intrude on the City’s discretion.” (Ruling 9.) Without any briefing from Homeowners, the court would have been disinclined to grant the remedy requested by Carter-Spencer as the relief requested by Carter-Spencer would necessarily have intruded upon the City’s discretion about how to proceed in the face of the court’s order. The City’s opposition, filed before the Homeowners’ opposition, was sufficient for the court to reach the result it did on remedy.[4] Thus, while Homeowners’ additional briefing was consistent with the court’s ruling on remedy, the court cannot conclude that it played a sufficient role in the litigation to justify a fee award under Section 1021.5.[5] That is, the court would have reached the same result without any participation by Petitioner Magana.

Realistically assessing the litigation, the court finds Homeowners’ FAP (case number 21STCP03033) and opposition filed August 24, 2022 to Carter-Spencer’s petition (case number 21STCP02987), did not “result[] in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest.” (§ 1021.5; Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., supra, 34 Cal.4th at 566.) Because there is “no causal connection between the plaintiff's action and the relief obtained, an attorney fee award is not proper.” (Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo, supra, 33 Cal.3d at 353.) While the writ granted by the court may have benefitted Homeowners and was consistent with their litigation objectives, the result occurred based on the litigation efforts of Carter-Spencer—not Homeowners. The court would have entered the judgment and writ in favor of Carter-Spencer even if Homeowners had not filed their writ petition or opposition dated August 24, 2022. Accordingly, Homeowners were not successful parties.[6]

Based on the court’s finding Homeowners were not successful parties in the litigation, the motion is denied.

“The ‘catalyst theory’ permits an award of attorney fees even when the litigation does not result in a judicial resolution if the defendant changes its behavior substantially because of, and in the manner sought by, the litigation. [Citation.] To obtain attorney fees under this theory, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought; (2) the lawsuit had merit and achieved its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of expense; and (3) the plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit.” (California Public Records Research, Inc. v. County of Yolo (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 150, 191 (CPRR).)

Homeowners do not argue they are successful parties pursuant to the catalyst theory. (See Motion 11-12; Reply 10-11.) They also do not address all three elements of the catalyst theory. Accordingly, they necessarily do not prove they were successful parties under the catalyst theory. (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862-863 [argument waived if not raised or adequately briefed].)

Moreover, “to satisfy the causation prong of the catalyst theory, the plaintiff [must show] . . . that it was a substantial factor contributing to defendant's action.” (Coalition for a Sustainable Future in Yucaipa v. City of Yucaipa (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 513, 522.) For the same reasons discussed above, Homeowners do not prove the causation element of the catalyst theory.

Homeowners’ Writ Petition Did Not Cause City’s Adoption of the MHP Overlay

In their motion, Homeowners contend “this Court’s decision resulted in the City adopting the MHP Overlay zoning that will continue mobile home use at the Park in the future.” (Motion 13:27-28.)[7] However, in reply, Homeowners clarify “Home Owners do not claim that this litigation caused the City to adopt the MHP Overlay, only that it caused the City to apply that Overlay to this Park.” (Reply 12:6-8.)[8] Homeowners elaborate stating:

Prior to the ruling in this action, and continuing as late as August 2022, the City’s proposed MHP Overlay did not include the Park but explicitly excluded “parks zoned industrial” from its application on grounds that “parks located in industrial zones are prohibited as a planned use under Section 9141.1 of the City’s Municipal Code.” . . . . But when the City adopted the MHP Overlay on May 2, 2023, after the Judgment, there was no limitation on industrial zoned parks, instead covering all mobile home parks that “were improved or operating” as of April 4, 2023. . . . The fiscal implication of the Court’s determination that City is the entity responsible for closure of the Park was that the City would be responsible for the relocation payments required under Government Code section 65863.7, including payments for the in-place market value of the homes. To avoid this expense, the City amended its MHP Overlay proposal to include the Park, allowing the Park to remain open indefinitely, in turn expanding the practical impact of the Judgment for the Park, its residents, and the City. (Reply 12:8-21 [emphasis added].)

As the emphasized language demonstrates, Homeowners’ (apparent) argument they caused the City to apply the overlay to the Park is premised on their assumption Homeowners’ acts resulted in the ruling that “City is the entity responsible for closure of the Park.” However, as discussed above, Homeowners do not show a causal connection between the Homeowner’s FAP, their participation in Carter-Spencer’s proceeding, the court’s Ruling, and the remedy ordered. Accordingly, it follows that Homeowners do not show they caused any change in how the City applies the MHP Overlay to the Park—any causal connection arose from Carter-Spencer’s efforts.

Even assuming Homeowners were successful parties in this litigation for purposes of Section 1021.5, the court finds they have not met their burden of demonstrating “the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.” (In re Conservatorship of Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 1214.)

The necessity and financial burden requirement “‘examines two issues: whether private enforcement was necessary and whether the financial burden of private enforcement warrants subsidizing the successful party's attorneys.’” (Lyons v. Chinese Hosp. Ass'n, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at 1348.)

With respect to financial burden, “[a]n award on the ‘private attorney general’ theory is appropriate when the cost of the claimant’s legal victory transcends his personal interest, that is, when the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff ‘out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.’ ” (Woodland Hills Residents’ Ass’n, Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 941.) “An attorney fee award under section 1021.5 is proper unless the [successful litigant’s] reasonably expected financial benefits exceed by a substantial margin the [litigant’s] actual litigation costs.” (Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “The successful litigant’s reasonably expected financial benefits are determined by discounting the monetary value of the benefits that the successful litigant reasonably expected at the time the vital litigation decisions were made by the probability of success at that time.” (Id. at 155.)

A litigant’s nonpecuniary interests do not affect eligibility for Section 1021.5 fees. (In re Conservatorship of Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 1217.) However, “ ‘the absence of a monetary award, or of precise amounts attached to financial incentives, does not prevent a court from determining whether the plaintiff's financial burden in pursuing the lawsuit is out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.’” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary School Dist. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 970, 992.)

Significantly, “it is the party seeking private attorney general fees who ‘bears the burden of establishing that its litigation costs transcend its personal interest.’ ” (Norberg v. California Coastal Commission (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 535, 545-46.)

“ ‘[N]ecessity . . . of private enforcement’ has long been understood to mean simply that public enforcement is not available, or not sufficiently available.” (Conservatorship of Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 1217.) Given the actions complained of related to the Resolutions adopted by the City, the need for private enforcement is clear. The action complained of is that of the government agency.

To evaluate the element of financial burden, “the inquiry before the trial court [is] whether there were insufficient financial incentives to justify the litigation in economic terms.” (Summit Media LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 171, 193.)

Beach Colony II v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 106 (Beach Colony), cited by the City, is instructive. (See City Opposition 14:3-10.) In Beach Colony, a real estate development partnership sought to void a permit condition that would have increased its costs for a condominium development by $300,000. (Id. at 109, 114.) The partnership ultimately prevailed and obtained an award of attorneys’ fees. (Id. at 109, 111–112.) The Court of Appeal reversed the award because the partnership made “no attempt to compare its litigation costs to the immediate economic benefit it personally received from judicially establishing its right to restore its property, or to the commercial economic gain it anticipates from the renewed ability to build its housing development.” (Id. at 113, fn. 5.) The administrative record showed “Colony II admitted before the Commission that if the contested special permit conditions were imposed, its offsite improvement costs would rise from $500,000 to approximately $800,000. According to Colony II, such costs put the ‘project out of the realm of economic reality.’ ” (Id. at 114.) The Court of Appeal found “[t]he public benefit from the lawsuit was wholly coincidental to Colony II's personal profit-making goals.” (Ibid.)

Here, Beach Colony is analogous in two important ways. First, like the partnership in Beach Colony, Homeowners made “no attempt to compare [their] litigation costs to the immediate economic benefit [they] personally received” from the judgment and writ. In their motion, Homeowners address the financial burden prong in only two sentences:

The “financial burden” criterion is met when the “cost of the claimant’s legal victory transcends his personal interest, that is, when the necessity of pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the [fee applicant] out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.” Id. The hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney time incurred to protect the interests of all Park Residents certainly transcend petitioners’ individual interests. (Motion 15:12-16.)

The court finds Homeowners’ analysis conclusory and wholly insufficient to meet Homeowners’ burden and obligation under California Rules of Court (CRC), Rule 3.1113 to file a memorandum in support of their motion addressing all material issues. Homeowners do not identify their obvious financial interests as “homeowners” in challenging the Resolutions or compare those financial interests to their reasonable litigation costs. Accordingly, Homeowners do not meet their burden of proof. (See Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 549, 588. [“When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ ”])[9]

Accordingly, Homeowners have failed to meet their burden of proof on financial burden in their moving papers, and their Section 1021.5 motion is properly denied.

Second, also similar to Beach Colony, the court finds from the pleadings and record evidence Homeowners had sufficient “financial incentives to justify the litigation in economic terms.” (Summit Media LLC v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at 193.) Specifically, in the Homeowners’ FAP, Homeowners made the following relevant judicial admissions:

49. To determine the appropriate “on-site value” of the mobilehomes, Respondent hired an appraiser, Anderson & Brabant, Inc. (Brabant), to conduct an appraisal of each resident-owned mobilehome in Rancho Dominguez. However, the appraisal methodology employed by Brabant was fundamentally flawed in that did not “assume the continuation of the mobilehome park” as required by Government Code section 65863.7(2)(A) . . . .

50. Many mobilehome owners within Rancho Dominguez later hired their own appraiser, Babken Azizyan, to determine the “in-place value” of their homes and found a difference of as much as $ 117,000 in the assessed value of a single mobilehome. Petitioner Socorro Magana was one of these residents. The value assigned to her mobilehome by Brabant was $ 31,000; the value assigned by her own appraiser was $130,000. Petitioners Benjamin Leon Mendoza and Leopoldo Guzman saw a similar variance in their appraisals. The value assigned by Brabant to Mr. Mendoza’s mobilehome was $36,000 and $29,000 to Mr. Guzman’s mobilehome, whereas Mr. Mendoza and Mr. Guzman were given values by their appraiser, Azizyan, of $140,000 and $110,000, respectively.

64. Second, Government Code section 65863.7 requires that when a local government approves the closure of a mobilehome park, and a resident in a mobilehome park is not able to find adequate replacement housing, the entity proposing the closure must pay the resident the “in-place market value” of the resident’s mobilehome, which is calculated based on the assumed “continuation of the mobilehome park.” (Gov. Code, § 65863.7(2)(A).) Nevertheless, the value that Respondent approved for the mobilehomes in Rancho Dominguez were based on an inadequate and incomplete appraisal. They were further not based on the mobilehome park continuing its use, but were instead explicitly based on the seemingly inevitable closure of the mobilehome park due to its being out of compliance with Respondent’s zoning scheme. Compared to appraisals conducted by many of the residents, these defects resulted in differences of $99,000, $104,000, and $89,000 in the appraised values of Petitioners Socorro Magaña, Benjamin Leon Mendoza, and Leopoldo Guzman’s mobilehomes respectively, all to their detriment. Upon information and belief, members of the Rancho Dominguez HOA have suffered similar deficits in appraised value. (FAP ¶¶ 49-50, 64.)

The administrative record and Homeowners’ declarations filed in support of Homeowners’ motion also contain evidence supporting a conclusion the individual Petitioners stood to gain financially from the litigation related to the appraisals of their homes if the Park closure was avoided. (See City Opposition 14-15, citing AR 1044-1226, 964-991; see also Zuniga Decl. ¶ 4 [“The Brabant appraisals did not use this new state standard for the Rancho Dominguez mobile homes and consequently they were grossly undervalued.”].)

Based on Homeowners’ judicial admissions, as corroborated by the administrative record, the court finds the three individuals (Magana, Benjamin Leon Mendoza and Leopoldo Guzman) had a combined financial stake in the litigation of approximately $292,000. Further, Homeowners admitted that “members of the Rancho Dominguez HOA have suffered similar deficits in appraised value.” (FAP ¶64.) Since the Rancho Dominguez Mobile Home Estates Homeowners Association was also a petitioner in the Homeowners’ action, and since the associations is comprised of multiple mobilehome owners (approximately 58) who reside in the Park (FAP ¶¶ 6, 22 and Mot. 16:26-28), the court conservatively concludes the association had a financial stake well exceeding another $292,000.[10] (“Upon information and belief, members of the Rancho Dominguez HOA have suffered similar deficits in appraised value.” FAP ¶ 64.) Thus, Homeowners as a whole had a financial stake substantially exceeding their requested attorneys’ fees of $474,608. Discounting this financial stake by Homeowners’ probability of success (which was reasonable as shown in the Ruling) by (a generous) 50 percent, the evidence shows that Homeowners’ legal costs did not “transcend” and was not “out of proportion” to their financial motivation in challenging the Park closure.

The conclusion is even stronger if the court assesses the fee to which Homeowners would be entitled if they had been prevailing parties. Significantly, “the extent of a party's success is a key factor in determining the reasonable amount of attorney fees to be awarded under section 1021.5. . . .” (Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185.) “[A] reduced fee award ‘is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole. . . .’ ” (Ibid.)

As discussed earlier, Homeowners’ attorneys’ legal work in case number 21STCP03033 (Carter-Spencer petition)—including the discovery proceedings, motion to compel, FAP, and writ briefing for that action—had no role in obtaining the judgment and writ. While Homeowners state they have eliminated some hours from their fee request, it appears they still seek substantial hours from work on case number 21STCP03033 (Carter-Spencer petition). (See e.g., Zuniga Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, Exh. 13; Castellanet Decl. Exh. 18; Novasky Decl. Exh. 11.) Homeowners’ attorneys’ primary legal work that could be compensable includes the application to intervene; answer in intervention; opposition brief filed August 24, 2022 (which only addressed remedy); various ex parte hearings; and oral argument at the hearings. The court finds that the principal fees requested in the motion ($437,185) far exceed the reasonable lodestar value of Homeowners’ attorneys’ legal work related to the Carter-Spencer petition. Based on the court’s knowledge of the proceeding and legal market in Los Angeles, the court conservatively finds the reasonable lodestar value of Homeowners’ compensable legal work, considering the limited impact it had on the litigation, would be no more than $125,000. As noted, the three individual Homeowners alone had financial stakes related to the appraisals of their homes ($292,000) far exceeding $125,000. Thus, a lodestar analysis confirms Homeowners had sufficient financial motivation in challenging the Park closure without an award of fees pursuant to Section 1021.5.

In reply, Homeowners argue: “Home Owners did not seek or recover a monetary award that could have been used to offset the costs of litigation. . . . Individual Home Owners’ personal stake in the value of their homes—or in potential future relocation benefits—does not foreclose an award of fees pursuant to section 1012.5. . . . Even though the value of Home Owners’ homes is, in most cases their greatest asset, none of Home Owners could afford to retain counsel in the face of the loss of those homes and, indeed, were not represented until after the Planning Commission recommended closing the Park on April 27, 2021.” (Reply 15:8-20.)

Homeowners’ arguments are unpersuasive. While Homeowners did not seek to recover a monetary award, they did seek a writ setting aside the Resolutions, halting closure of the Park. Indeed, as Homeowners suggest, the writ issued by the court may have resulted in the Park remaining open indefinitely. Homeowners also admit in the Homeowners’ FAP that “the appraisal methodology employed by Brabant was fundamentally flawed in that did not ‘assume the continuation of the mobilehome park’ as required by Government Code section 65863.7(2)(A),” and that Homeowners’ appraisals – which assumed continuation of the Park—“found a difference of as much as $ 117,000 in the assessed value of a single mobilehome.” (FAP ¶¶ 49-50.) These admissions show a concrete financial motivation for Homeowners to prosecute their claims.

The authorities cited by Homeowners do not support a different conclusion. (See Reply 15, citing Wilson v. San Luis Obispo County Central Democratic Com. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 918, 927 and Press v. Lucky Stores, 34 Cal.3d at 321, fn. 11.) Homeowners’ interests in preserving and increasing the appraised value of their homes is pecuniary in nature. While Homeowners other “personal nonpecuniary motives” are not relevant (see Wilson v. San Luis Obispo County Central Democratic Com., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at 927), their financial stake in the monetary value of their homes is relevant.

Based on the foregoing, the court finds Homeowners’ legal costs do not “transcend” their personal financial interests in challenging the Resolutions; and their writ petition did not impose a burden “out of proportion” to their financial stake. (Woodland Hills Residents’ Ass’n, Inc. . v. City Council, supra, 23 Cal.3d at 941.) Under Section 1021.5, “attorneys fees are awarded when a significant public benefit is conferred through litigation pursued by one whose personal stake is insufficient to otherwise encourage the action. Section 1021.5 was not designed as a method for rewarding litigants motivated by their own pecuniary interests . . . .” (Beach Colony, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at 114.) Accordingly, the purposes of a fee award under Section 1021.5 are not present here; Homeowners have not met their burden of demonstrating “there were insufficient financial incentives to justify the litigation in economic terms.” (Summit Media LLC v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at 193.)

The motion is therefore denied on grounds Homeowners failed to demonstrate they had “insufficient financial incentives to justify the litigation in economic terms.” (Summit Media LLC v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at 193.)

Significant Public Benefit Conferred on General Public or a Large Class of Persons

To obtain an award under Section 1021.5, a party must also show its action conferred a significant public benefit on the general public or on a large class of persons. A significant benefit may be pecuniary or non-pecuniary and need not be concrete to support a fee award. (Braude v. Automobile Club of Southern California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 994, 1013.)

The court acknowledges Carter-Spencer’s proceeding may have conferred significant public benefits relating to housing generally and affordable housing at the Park in particular. (See Motion 12-15 for discussion of relevant housing policies.) A fee award under section 1021.5, however, cannot be based solely on a determination of the benefit conferred.

Based on the foregoing, the court finds Homeowners were not “successful parties” and they have not satisfied the financial burden requirement of Section 1021.5. Therefore, Homeowners are not entitled to fees under Section 1021.5. The motion is DENIED.

[1] The resolution followed Resolution No. 21-2708, adopted by the City’s planning commission on April 27, 2021. (Motion 9:19-25.)

[2] Petitioner Magana’s need to intervene related to remedy and not the substance of whether the City or Carter-Spencer were responsible for the Park’s closure.

[3] In fact, as the court recalls, Petitioner Magana requested to intervene solely to be heard on the issue of remedy. Petitioner Magana without intervention her “ability to protect her rights to adequate compensation and due process in her pending writ case” would be compromised. (See Socorro Magana’s Ex Parte Application for an Order Permitting Her to Intervene filed August 19, 2022 4:19-20.)

[4] As the court recalls, the court discussed the issue of the City’s discretion and the relief sought by Carter-Spencer at length with the City and Carter-Spencer.

[5] The only purpose for Petitioner Magana’s intervention was to protect her interests concerning compensation she would be paid upon closure of the Park.

[6] The court has given no weight to Carter-Spencer’s assertion the “City asserts that Carter-Spencer is liable to reimburse it for any award of attorney fees to Homeowners, pursuant to an indemnity agreement Carter-Spencer signed as a requirement of filing City’s ‘development application’ to close the Park.” (Carter-Spencer Opposition 6:19-24.) Carter-Spencer does not cite evidence or the record to support that statement. The issue is not before the court and the court expresses no opinion about it.

[7] The MHP Overlay refers to City Council’s resolution, enacted on April 18, 2023, establishing a Mobilehome Parks Overlay District. (Motion 11 and RJN Exh. 20.)

[8] To the extent Homeowners nonetheless imply in their Opening Brief their litigation played a role in City’s adoption of the MHP Overlay, the City has soundly refuted such contention in opposition. (City Opposition 8-10 and 12-13; City RJN Exh. A-G.) In reply, Homeowners do not respond to City’s arguments on this issue and, in fact, expressly concede them. (Reply 12:6-8; Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is “equivalent to a concession”].)

[9] Homeowners cannot correct such defects for the first time in reply, as they have not shown good cause to make new reply arguments. (Balboa Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010.) Moreover, the reply still fails to compare Homeowners’ financial interest in the proceeding to their litigation costs. Homeowners also concede “the value of Home Owners’ homes is, in most cases their greatest asset.” (Reply 15:17-18.)

[10] The individually named homeowner litigants had a financial stake in the litigation of approximately $100,000. The Homeowners’ FAP suggests as many as 58 homeowners “suffered similar [valuation] deficits . . . .” (FAP ¶ 64.) Given the valuation issues and the number of homeowners and each homeowner’s membership in the Rancho Dominguez Homeowners Association, the financial stake in the litigation was quite high and much more than $292,000.