Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 21STCP03696, Date: 2023-02-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCP03696 Hearing Date: February 17, 2023 Dept: 86
SAVE OUR
RURAL TOWN v. DEPARTMENT OF THE AUDITOR-CONTROLLER FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY
Case
Number: 21STCP03696
Hearing
Date: February 17, 2023
[Tentative]       ORDER GRANTING
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
Petitioner,
Save Our Rural Town, seeks an order compelling Respondent, County of Los
Angeles,[1]
“to immediately deposit with the Court the full amount that is required to
satisfy [its] money judgment with interest.” (Pet., Prayer, ¶ 1.)[2]
Petitioner also seeks $60,337.37 as “enforcement costs” and “attorneys’ fees
that [it] may be entitled to under the law.” (Pet., Prayer, ¶¶ 2, 3.)
Petitioner seeks a traditional writ of mandate pursuant to Government Code
section 970.2. (Pet., ¶ 40.)
Respondent
opposes the petition.
The
petition is granted in the amount of $406,574.91 plus interest pursuant to
Government Code section 907.1, subdivision (c).
Petitioner’s
request for attorneys’ fees shall be brought by separate motion.[3]
RELEVANT
FACTS
In
a related action, Save Our Rural Town v. County of Los Angeles, Los
Angeles Superior Court case number BS166732, the court (Hon. Mary H. Strobel)
awarded Petitioner $382,650 in attorneys’ fees. The court issued the order on
June 22, 2021 “against the County and the Real Parties” in Interest in that action.[4]
(Pet., Ex. 2; Pavlovic Decl., ¶ 5; Opposition 3:1-3. [“On June 22, 2021, the
Court granted Petitioner’s motion for attorney fees in part against the County
and the Real Parties, and awarded Petitioner $382,650.”])
Prior
to the referenced award of attorneys’ fees, but after the court entered
judgment in the related case, Petitioner filed and served its Memorandum of
Costs in the amount of $22,804.58. Neither Respondent nor Real Parties in
Interest challenged Petitioner’s Memorandum of Costs. (Pet., Ex. 2; Answer, ¶
20.)
The
County and Real Parties challenged the trial court’s decision in the related
case in the Court of Appeal. At the conclusion of those proceedings, the Court
of Appeal ordered the County and Real Parties in Interest to pay Petitioner’s
costs on appeal. On December 29, 2020, Petitioner filed and served its
Memorandum of Costs on Appeal in the amount of $1,120.33. Neither Respondent
nor Real Parties in Interest challenged Petitioner’s Memorandum of Costs on
Appeal. (Pet., Ex. 4; Answer, ¶ 20.)
Based
on the June 22, 2021 order for attorneys’ fees ($382,650) and the memoranda of
costs ($22,804.58 and $1,120.33), the County and Real Parties in Interest are jointly
and severally indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $406,574.91.
Petitioner,
through its counsel, attempted to obtain payment on the obligation from the
County. (Taber Decl., ¶¶ 5-11.) The obligation remains unpaid as of today.
This
proceeding for enforcement of the award of attorneys’ fees and costs ensued.
STANDARD OF
REVIEW
Petitioner
seeks relief from the court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085
and Government Code section 970.2. (Pet., ¶¶ 4, 38-44.)[5]
“A
money judgment against a public entity is not enforceable” by execution under
the Enforcement of Judgments Law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 695.050; Gov. Code, §
970.1, subd. (b).) “[E]xecution and other remedies under the Code of Civil
Procedure for enforcement of money judgments do not apply to enforcement of a
money judgment against a local public entity.” (Barkley v. City of Blue Lake
(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1745, 1750.) The judgment creditor must obtain a writ
of mandate to compel payment from the County (a local public entity). (Gov.
Code, § 970.2; Joseph v. San Francisco Housing Authority (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 78, 81.)
“To
obtain a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, the
petitioner has the burden of proving a clear, present, and usually ministerial
duty on the part of the respondent, and a clear, present, and beneficial right
in the petitioner for the performance of that duty.” (Marquez v. State Dept.
of Health Care Services (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 87, 103.)
ANALYSIS
The
facts are straight forward and not disputed.
Government
Code 970.2 provides:
“A local public entity shall pay any
judgment in the manner provided in this article. A writ of mandate is an
appropriate remedy to compel a local public entity to perform any act required
by this article.”
The
undisputed facts establish that (1) Petitioner holds a money judgment
establishing the County is jointly and severally liable on the obligation; (2)
Petitioner has demanded payment; and (3) the obligation remains unpaid. Moreover,
“the Government Code expressly and specifically requires a local public entity
to pay the full amount of any judgment, with interest.” (Joseph v. San
Francisco Housing Authority, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at 82.) Thus, Petitioner
has met its burden of establishing it is entitled to a traditional writ of
mandate on the undisputed facts.
The County’s opposition is wholly unpersuasive.
First, the petition clearly states the basis for Petitioner’s
claim for relief—Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and Government Code
section 970.2. That Petitioner referenced Code of Civil Procedure section
708.750 in its moving papers is of no consequence. Petitioner provided
sufficient notice of the basis for its claim. Petitioner also referenced Government
Code section 970.2 in its moving papers. (Memo 5:27.)
Second,
the County’s indemnity agreement with Real Parties in Interest is also of no
consequence here. Petitioner is not bound by the agreement between the County
and the Real Parties. The court’s attorneys’ fee order was directed jointly and
severally to the County and Real Parties in Interest. That Real Parties in
Interest may be required to indemnify the County is a separate issue not involving
Petitioner.
Third,
as Code of Civil Procedure section 708.750 has no application here, any alleged
errors about a procedurally deficient filing with the Auditor-Controller is
irrelevant.
Fourth,
whether and to what extent, if at all, the parties attempted to settle the
matter does not inform on Petitioner’s entitlement to relief here. The County’s
attempts to obtain cooperation from the Real Parties in Interest is also not
relevant to this proceeding.
CONCLUSION
Based
on the undisputed facts, the court finds Petitioner is entitled to a
traditional writ of mandate requiring the County to pay it $406,574.91 plus
interest as computed under Government Code section 970.1, subdivision (c).
The
court is inclined to order a return on the writ within 60 days.
IT IS SO
ORDERED.
February
17, 2023                                                                ________________________________
                                                                                                                   Hon. Mitchell
Beckloff 
                                                                                                                   Judge of the
Superior Court
[1] For
ease of reference, the court refers to all named respondents as the County.
Petitioner asserts its claims against the Department of the Auditor-Controller
for Los Angeles County, Arlene Barrera (in her official capacity only), the
County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.
[2] The
court refers to the Amended Verified Petition for a Peremptory Writ of Mandate
Commanding the Department of the Auditor-Controller for Los Angeles County and
Arlene Barrera, in her Official Capacity Only, to Immediately Comply with the
Code of Civil Procedure, Section 708.750 By Depositing the Money Owed Save Our
Rural Town with the Court filed November 16, 2021 as the petition herein.
Petitioner initiated this proceeding on November 10, 2021.
[3] The
County’s motion to strike filed December 29, 2022 has not been calendared for
hearing this date. The parties may advise the court at the hearing whether they
wish to have the issue of attorneys’ fees litigated pursuant to the County’s
motion, Petitioner’s opposition brief, the County’s reply and Petitioner’s
objection thereto. If so, the court will set a date for hearing on the motion
at the conclusion of today’s hearing.
[4] In
that proceeding, the Real Parties in Interest were Doug Gaudi, Joanna Gaudi,
Paul Zerounian and Robert Friedman. 
[5] Petitioner
also purports to rely on Code of Civil Procedure section 708.750 to require the
County to satisfy the obligation by deposit into the court. Code of Civil
Procedure section 708.750 has no application here. Petitioner is seeking a
traditional writ of mandate commanding the County to pay it; this proceeding
does not concern Petitioner as a judgment creditor attempting to collect funds
owed by the County to a judgment debtor.