Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 21STCP03696, Date: 2023-02-17 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 21STCP03696    Hearing Date: February 17, 2023    Dept: 86

SAVE OUR RURAL TOWN v. DEPARTMENT OF THE AUDITOR-CONTROLLER FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY

Case Number: 21STCP03696

Hearing Date: February 17, 2023

 

 

[Tentative]       ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE


 

Petitioner, Save Our Rural Town, seeks an order compelling Respondent, County of Los Angeles,[1] “to immediately deposit with the Court the full amount that is required to satisfy [its] money judgment with interest.” (Pet., Prayer, ¶ 1.)[2] Petitioner also seeks $60,337.37 as “enforcement costs” and “attorneys’ fees that [it] may be entitled to under the law.” (Pet., Prayer, ¶¶ 2, 3.) Petitioner seeks a traditional writ of mandate pursuant to Government Code section 970.2. (Pet., ¶ 40.)

 

Respondent opposes the petition.

 

The petition is granted in the amount of $406,574.91 plus interest pursuant to Government Code section 907.1, subdivision (c).

 

Petitioner’s request for attorneys’ fees shall be brought by separate motion.[3]

 

RELEVANT FACTS

 

In a related action, Save Our Rural Town v. County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Superior Court case number BS166732, the court (Hon. Mary H. Strobel) awarded Petitioner $382,650 in attorneys’ fees. The court issued the order on June 22, 2021 “against the County and the Real Parties” in Interest in that action.[4] (Pet., Ex. 2; Pavlovic Decl., ¶ 5; Opposition 3:1-3. [“On June 22, 2021, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion for attorney fees in part against the County and the Real Parties, and awarded Petitioner $382,650.”])

 

Prior to the referenced award of attorneys’ fees, but after the court entered judgment in the related case, Petitioner filed and served its Memorandum of Costs in the amount of $22,804.58. Neither Respondent nor Real Parties in Interest challenged Petitioner’s Memorandum of Costs. (Pet., Ex. 2; Answer, ¶ 20.)

 

The County and Real Parties challenged the trial court’s decision in the related case in the Court of Appeal. At the conclusion of those proceedings, the Court of Appeal ordered the County and Real Parties in Interest to pay Petitioner’s costs on appeal. On December 29, 2020, Petitioner filed and served its Memorandum of Costs on Appeal in the amount of $1,120.33. Neither Respondent nor Real Parties in Interest challenged Petitioner’s Memorandum of Costs on Appeal. (Pet., Ex. 4; Answer, ¶ 20.)

 

Based on the June 22, 2021 order for attorneys’ fees ($382,650) and the memoranda of costs ($22,804.58 and $1,120.33), the County and Real Parties in Interest are jointly and severally indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $406,574.91.

 

Petitioner, through its counsel, attempted to obtain payment on the obligation from the County. (Taber Decl., ¶¶ 5-11.) The obligation remains unpaid as of today.

 

This proceeding for enforcement of the award of attorneys’ fees and costs ensued.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

Petitioner seeks relief from the court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and Government Code section 970.2. (Pet., ¶¶ 4, 38-44.)[5]

 

“A money judgment against a public entity is not enforceable” by execution under the Enforcement of Judgments Law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 695.050; Gov. Code, § 970.1, subd. (b).) “[E]xecution and other remedies under the Code of Civil Procedure for enforcement of money judgments do not apply to enforcement of a money judgment against a local public entity.” (Barkley v. City of Blue Lake (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1745, 1750.) The judgment creditor must obtain a writ of mandate to compel payment from the County (a local public entity). (Gov. Code, § 970.2; Joseph v. San Francisco Housing Authority (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 78, 81.)

 

“To obtain a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, the petitioner has the burden of proving a clear, present, and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and a clear, present, and beneficial right in the petitioner for the performance of that duty.” (Marquez v. State Dept. of Health Care Services (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 87, 103.)

 

ANALYSIS

 

The facts are straight forward and not disputed.

 

Government Code 970.2 provides:

 

A local public entity shall pay any judgment in the manner provided in this article. A writ of mandate is an appropriate remedy to compel a local public entity to perform any act required by this article.”

 

The undisputed facts establish that (1) Petitioner holds a money judgment establishing the County is jointly and severally liable on the obligation; (2) Petitioner has demanded payment; and (3) the obligation remains unpaid. Moreover, “the Government Code expressly and specifically requires a local public entity to pay the full amount of any judgment, with interest.” (Joseph v. San Francisco Housing Authority, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at 82.) Thus, Petitioner has met its burden of establishing it is entitled to a traditional writ of mandate on the undisputed facts.

 

The County’s opposition is wholly unpersuasive.

 

First, the petition clearly states the basis for Petitioner’s claim for relief—Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and Government Code section 970.2. That Petitioner referenced Code of Civil Procedure section 708.750 in its moving papers is of no consequence. Petitioner provided sufficient notice of the basis for its claim. Petitioner also referenced Government Code section 970.2 in its moving papers. (Memo 5:27.)

 

Second, the County’s indemnity agreement with Real Parties in Interest is also of no consequence here. Petitioner is not bound by the agreement between the County and the Real Parties. The court’s attorneys’ fee order was directed jointly and severally to the County and Real Parties in Interest. That Real Parties in Interest may be required to indemnify the County is a separate issue not involving Petitioner.

 

Third, as Code of Civil Procedure section 708.750 has no application here, any alleged errors about a procedurally deficient filing with the Auditor-Controller is irrelevant.

 

Fourth, whether and to what extent, if at all, the parties attempted to settle the matter does not inform on Petitioner’s entitlement to relief here. The County’s attempts to obtain cooperation from the Real Parties in Interest is also not relevant to this proceeding.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Based on the undisputed facts, the court finds Petitioner is entitled to a traditional writ of mandate requiring the County to pay it $406,574.91 plus interest as computed under Government Code section 970.1, subdivision (c).

 

The court is inclined to order a return on the writ within 60 days.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

February 17, 2023                                                                ________________________________

                                                                                                                   Hon. Mitchell Beckloff

                                                                                                                   Judge of the Superior Court



[1] For ease of reference, the court refers to all named respondents as the County. Petitioner asserts its claims against the Department of the Auditor-Controller for Los Angeles County, Arlene Barrera (in her official capacity only), the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.

[2] The court refers to the Amended Verified Petition for a Peremptory Writ of Mandate Commanding the Department of the Auditor-Controller for Los Angeles County and Arlene Barrera, in her Official Capacity Only, to Immediately Comply with the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 708.750 By Depositing the Money Owed Save Our Rural Town with the Court filed November 16, 2021 as the petition herein. Petitioner initiated this proceeding on November 10, 2021.

[3] The County’s motion to strike filed December 29, 2022 has not been calendared for hearing this date. The parties may advise the court at the hearing whether they wish to have the issue of attorneys’ fees litigated pursuant to the County’s motion, Petitioner’s opposition brief, the County’s reply and Petitioner’s objection thereto. If so, the court will set a date for hearing on the motion at the conclusion of today’s hearing.

[4] In that proceeding, the Real Parties in Interest were Doug Gaudi, Joanna Gaudi, Paul Zerounian and Robert Friedman.

[5] Petitioner also purports to rely on Code of Civil Procedure section 708.750 to require the County to satisfy the obligation by deposit into the court. Code of Civil Procedure section 708.750 has no application here. Petitioner is seeking a traditional writ of mandate commanding the County to pay it; this proceeding does not concern Petitioner as a judgment creditor attempting to collect funds owed by the County to a judgment debtor.