Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case 21STCP04158 2023-03-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 21STCP04158, Date: 2023-03-15 Tentative Ruling

Respondent, the City of Los Angeles, (through its City Council) designated the Weddington Golf and Tennis Club (the Club) located at 4141 North Whitsett Avenue in the City as an Historical Cultural Monument (HCM). Petitioner, Save Weddington Inc., takes issue with the City’s designation arguing the City abused its discretion and failed to proceed as required by law. More specifically, Petitioner contends the City should not have limited the HCM designation by eliminating the fairways, greens and driving range of the golf course. Petitioner seeks an order requiring the City to reconsider the recommendations and findings of the City’s Cultural Heritage Commission (Commission) and make adequate findings to support the HCM designation.

Petitioner’s request for judicial notice (RNJ) of Exhibit 1 is granted. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (b).)

The City’s RJN of Exhibits A through F is granted as to Exhibits A and B only. (Evid. Code § 452, (b), (c), (h).) The court denies the request as to Exhibits C through F as irrelevant.

The Club is a private recreational facility located on a triangular lot at 4141 North Whitsett Avenue in the Studio City area of the City. (AR 1219.)

In February 2013, SurveyLA identified the Club as a “private recreational facility consisting of a golf course, driving range, tennis courts, tennis clubhouse, and golf clubhouse.” (AR 95.) SurveyLA lists the significance of the site as an “excellent and rare example of a 1950s recreational facility (golf and tennis club) in Studio City” and explains “this property is a rare remaining example of a recreational landscape in Studio City from this period.” (AR 95-97.)

On July 4, 2020, Teresa Austin nominated the Club as an HCM through her application. (AR 51.)

On January 21, 2021, the Commission held an initial hearing to decide whether to consider the Club for historical designation and unanimously voted to do so. (AR 1084-1087, 3018-3023, 3298-3299.)

The City’s Department of Planning thereafter prepared a recommendation report (Staff Report) on the proposed HCM.[2] (AR 1217-1223.) The Staff Report found the Club met two of three required criteria for HCM designation. (AR 1221.) The Staff Report recommended the Commission declare the Club an HCM pursuant to the City’s administrative code (LACC) at Chapter 9, Article I, section 22.171.7 (Section 22.171.7). (AR 1217.)

On April 15, 2021, the Commission conducted a public hearing to consider whether to recommend to the City Council that it designate the Club as an HCM. (AR 3041–3044.) During the hearing, the Commission heard extensive public comment and engaged in lengthy deliberations. Among other things, the Commission considered whether to recommend the entire 16-acre Club be designated an HCM or only five acres. (AR 3131.) In addition, the Commission considered whether any HCM should highlight the golf course or more inclusively reference “open space” and/or a “recreational facility.” (AR 1210-1419, 3047-3181.)[3]

Following its public hearing, the Commission voted to “accept the Staff Report Findings” and recommend the Club be designated as an HCM by “defining the character-defining features as the clubhouse, the golf-ball lights, the putting green, the brick wall, and the primary character-defining feature as recreational open space . . . .” (See AR 3151-3152.) The Commission thereafter issued its (corrected) letter of determination and findings on June 22, 2021. (AR 3530-3535.)

On September 14, 2021, the City Council’s Planning Land Use and Management (PLUM) Committee considered the matter. (AR 3182, 3192 [Item No. 15].) The PLUM committee voted to recommend an HCM designation but with revised findings. The PLUM committee’s revised findings struck the reference to “golf club” and “golf course,” and replaced the terms with “open for public use” and “recreational facility.”[4] (AR 3236-3237.)

On September 29, 2021, the City Council adopted the PLUM committee’s recommendation. (AR 3275, 3536-3539.)

The parties dispute the applicable standard of judicial review here. A party may request the court set aside an agency decision through a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 (Section 1094.5) or a writ of traditional mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 (Section 1085).

Judicial review under Section 1094.5 is limited to the record compiled by the administrative agency, and generally the agency's findings of fact must be upheld if supported by “substantial evidence.” (State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court (2009) 45 Cal.4th 963, 977.) “Writ review under [Section] 1085 is even more deferential; the agency's findings must be upheld unless arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking evidentiary support.” (Ibid.)

“The nature of the administrative action or decision to be reviewed determines the applicable type of mandate.” (Bunnett v. Regents of University of California (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 843, 848.)

A petition for a writ of administrative mandate under Section 1094.5 may be brought only “for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer.” (§ 1094.5, subd. (a) [emphasis added].)

Petitioner argues the City’s designation of the Club as an HCM was quasi-judicial subjecting the decision to Section 1094.5 review “because the action by the City involved no formulation of rules to be applied to future cases, but rather it involved a hearing to determine facts to allow the application of established statutory standards to a specific parcel of real property.” (Reply 1:6-10.) Petitioner further notes the legal process of historic designation requires a hearing and therefore review is properly conducted pursuant to Section 1094.5.

The City argues Petitioner’s characterization of the City Council’s decision as quasi-judicial is wrong. The City argues the decision constitutes a quasi-legislative action. Such actions, the City argues, involve the interpretation and application of legislative policy—the City made a policy decision when it considered HCM status for the Club.

The court agrees with the City. The City’s decision about the Club’s designation as an HCM was a quasi-legislative action.[5]

First, Section 1094.5 applies where the agency is required by law to conduct a hearing, take evidence and determine facts. (§ 1094.5, subd. (a).) The process for the designation of an HCM does not require the Commission to conduct the kind of hearing contemplated by Section 1094.5, and the process does not require any hearing by the decisionmaker, the City Council.

LAAC section 22.171 provides the Commission “shall perform those functions relating to historic and cultural preservation of sites, buildings or structures that embody the heritage, history and culture of the City.” A “site, building or structure” may be designated as an HCM by way of application and through the process in LAAC section 22.171.10 which specifies at subdivision (c)(4):

“After receipt of the Director’s report and recommendation and conducting its inspection and investigation, the Commission shall hold a public hearing regarding the proposed designation and determine whether the site, building or structure conforms with the definition of a Monument as set forth in Section 22.171.7 of this article.” (Emphasis added.)

The hearing required of the Commission is one for public comment. The hearing is not a fact-finding event where evidence is taken. LAAC section 22.171.10, subdivision (e)(1)’s requirement of a public hearing does not suggest the Commission must take evidence. (See, e.g., American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 258, 294-295. [“Indeed, [the Supreme Court] cited Education Code section 47607, subdivision (e), which requires a public hearing to consider whether evidence exists to revoke the charter.”)

Importantly, the LAAC does not require the decisionmaker, the City Council, to conduct any hearing when it considers whether a site or building should be designated as an HCM.[6] LAAC section 22.171.10, subdivision (c)(4) continues:

“If the Commission recommends approval of an application for a proposed designation, the Commission shall submit a report and recommendation to the City Council. The City Council may consider the matter and may adopt the designation by a majority vote.” (Emphasis added.)

LAAC, section 22.171.10, subd. (f) clarifies the City Council is not required to conduct a hearing on the Commission’s recommendation where the City Council does not intend to adopt the Commission’s recommendation:

“The City Council may approve or disapprove in whole or in part an application or initiation for a proposed designation of a Monument. The City Council shall act within 90 days of the public hearing held before the Commission on the proposed designation. . . . If the City Council does not act on the application . . . within the specified time limit, the application . . . to designate a Monument shall be deemed to have been denied. . . .” (Emphasis added.)

Accordingly, nothing in the applicable provisions of the LACC suggests the City Council is required by law to conduct a hearing, receive evidence and act as a fact finder.[7] Review of the decisionmaker’s HCM decision is not by Section 1094.5. There is no set of facts that will lead to a particular result—whether a site or building is designated as an HCM is completely within the discretion of the City Council.

The City Council, as decisionmaker, when considering whether to designate a site, building or structure as an HCM, exercises its policymaking authority. This is true even where the HCM designation is as to a single site, building or structure because the City Council has determined for all the world the site, building or structure is an HCM. The City Council’s HCM decisions are entwined with issues of fact, policy and discretion. Moreover, any member of the public—not merely the site or building owner—to request the Commission consider HCM status.

The City Council’s HCM decision reflects discretion and consideration of the City’s longstanding policy considerations about general development within the City (here, Council District 2). (See City RJN Ex. B [Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC), § 12.36[8] [“A. Definitions. . . . Legislative Approval. Any approval that requires an action by the City Council, such as those as set forth in Sections 11.5.6 [general plan consistency], 11.5.7 G. [specific plan amendment], 12.20.3 F. [historic preservation overlay zone: “It is hereby declared as a matter of public policy that the recognition, preservation, enhancement, and use of buildings, structures, Landscaping, Natural Features, and areas within the City of Los Angeles having Historic, architectural, cultural or aesthetic significance are required in the interest of the health, economic prosperity, cultural enrichment and general welfare of the people.”], and 12.32 [land use ordinances] of this Code.”]; see also LAAC, § 12.20.3A [language identical to LAMC § 12.20.3 F]; Pet.’s RJN Ex. 1 [LAAC, § 22.171. [“The [Commission] shall perform those functions relating to historic and cultural preservation of sites, buildings or structures that embody the heritage, history and culture of the City.”]) There is no specific set of facts requiring the City Council to designate a site or building as an HCM—the decision is discretionary and vested in the City Council. (See LAAC, §§ 22.171.17 (“may be designated”), 22.171.10, subd. (f) (“City Council may approve or disapprove”).)

That designation as an HCM relates to policy considerations about general development within the City is also reflected by the building restrictions placed on an HCM. Once designated as an HCM, the Commission oversees alterations of it:

“No permit for the demolition, substantial alteration or relocation of any Monument shall be issued, and no Monument shall be demolished, substantially altered or relocated without first referring the matter to the Commission, except where the Superintendent of Building or the City Engineer determines that demolition, relocation or substantial alteration of any Monument is immediately necessary in the interest of the public health, safety or general welfare.”

The LACC also provides specific requirements for consideration by the Commission for an owner of an HCM to obtain a permit to substantially alter, relocate or demolish the HCM. (Ibid.)

The City Council’s decision to designate the Club (or part of it) as an HCM reflects the exercise of the City Council’s discretion; the relevant ordinance does not compel the City Council to take any particular action. (See LAAC, § 22.171.7. [“For purposes of this article, a Historic-Cultural Monument (Monument) is any site (including significant trees or other plant life located on the site), building or structure of particular historic or cultural significance to the City of Los Angeles. A proposed Monument may be designated by the City Council upon the recommendation of the Commission if it meets at least one of the following criteria . . . .”] See also LAAC, § 22.171.10, subdivision (f). [“The City Council may approve or disapprove in whole or in part an application or initiation for a proposed designation of a Monument.”]) Whether a site or building should be designated an HCM is a policy decision directed toward the general public—a legislative process—rather than the City Council weighing particular information and arriving at a decision directed at the rights of a specific individual or individuals—an adjudicatory process.[9]

The court therefore finds review of the City Council’s decision here is by Section 1085. (See Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 567-568 [quasi-legislative actions are properly challenged in traditional mandamus action under Section 1085, even when agency is required to hold a hearing and take evidence]; Langsam v. City of Sausalito (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 871, 879 [“where an agency is exercising a quasi-legislative function, judicial review must proceed under ordinary or traditional mandamus”].) “The courts may rely upon mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 to review the validity of a quasi-legislative action.” (Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 801, 809.)

“may be issued by any court to any . . . board . . . to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, . . . .” (§ 1085, subd. (a).)

Ordinary mandate under Section 1085 is generally used to review an agency’s ministerial acts, quasi-legislative acts, and quasi-judicial decisions which do not meet the requirements for review under Section 1094.5. (Bunnett v. Regents of University of California, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at 848; Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1264-1265.) In such cases, the appropriate standard of judicial review is whether the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or failed to follow the procedure required by law. (Citizens for Improved Sorrento Access, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 808, 814; Heist v. County of Colusa (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 841, 846.) A petitioner is entitled to relief when he/she can “ ‘show the official acted arbitrarily, beyond the bounds of reason or in derogation of the applicable legal standards.’ ” (Ochoa v. Anaheim City School Dist. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 209, 223 fn. 3.)

Petitioner challenges the adequacy of the findings underlying the City Council’s designation of the Club as an HCM. Specifically, Petitioner argues the City Council abused its discretion by failing to make “legally adequate findings” for the “revised” HCM designation. Petitioner complains the City Council adopted revised findings for the HCM designation deviating from those adopted by the Commission. (Opening Brief 14:25-15:15. See Petition, ¶¶ 31 [failure to make necessary findings], 32 [City Council findings conflict with Commission’s], 34-36 [Topanga requirements], 38 [failure to comply with Topanga] and 39 [Section 1094.5 analysis].)

“The question is whether the revised findings - which removed ‘golf club’ and ‘golf course’ from the scope of the designation – adequately explain how the City progressed from the facts through established policies to the decision (i.e. why the City opted to revise the findings).” (Reply 10:17-20.)

Petitioner’s challenge is expressly one under Topanga: Petitioner claims the City Council’s decision is inadequate because the HCM decision does not “bridge the analytical gap between raw evidence” and the City’s ultimate decision. (Opening Brief 14:25-17:27; Reply 11:25-12:25.) According to Petitioner, “[t]he City Council’s revised finding narrowing the property’s distinctive characteristics . . . does not meet the legal standards outlined in Topanga.” (Opening Brief 16:25-28.)

In Topanga, the Supreme Court discussed Section 1094.5's application in the context of a county's decision to authorize the development of a 23-acre mobile home park in an area zoned for light agriculture and single-family residences. The Court explained “to facilitate orderly analysis” (Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at 516) which “bridge[s] the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision” (id. at 515), and to avoid forcing courts to engage in “unguided and resource-consuming explorations” (id. at 516), a “[agency’s] board . . . must render findings sufficient both to enable the parties to determine whether and on what basis they should seek review and, in the event of review, to apprise a reviewing court of the basis for the board's action.” (Id. at 514.) While the agency's findings “must expose [its] mode of analysis to an extent sufficient to serve the purposes stated” above, the “findings ‘need not be stated with formality required in judicial proceedings’ [citation].” (Id. at 517, fn. 16.)

Given the quasi-legislative nature of the decision at issue here and the corresponding use of Section 1085 for judicial review, Petitioner’s reliance on Topanga is misplaced; the City Council is not required to make any specific findings under LAAC section 22.171.10 such that there can be no analytical gap to bridge in order to support the findings. (City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 381, 391; Board of Supervisors v. California Highway Commission (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 952, 961. [“Since the plaintiff erred in seeking administrative mandamus, his reliance on the Topanga case is misplaced. The decision involved here is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature and thus no findings are required.”])[10]

“Written findings of fact are customarily required in judicial proceedings, or those of a quasi-judicial administrative agency, for in such contexts the rights of persons are involved. However, no statute or authority known to us requires such findings in quasi-legislative determinations.” (City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 76 Cal.App.3d at 389.) Petitioner has identified nothing in the LAAC requiring the City Council make specific findings when considering whether to designate a site or building as an HCM—or that a particular result must follow certain findings. Accordingly, Petitioner’s challenge to the City Council’s HCM decision under Topanga is unavailing.

While the City argues its decision is supported by substantial evidence (in the event the court finds Section 1094.5 applies), the court elects not to address the claim as Petitioner does not make such a challenge. As noted, Petitioner’s solitary claim here is that the City Council’s findings are inadequate under Topanga. As the court finds Section 1085 is the applicable standard of review and Topanga does not apply, Petitioner’s challenge fails.

[1] Real Party in Interest, 4141 Whitsett LLC, has not appeared. Petitioner caused the real party to be personally served with the petition on December 28, 2022. Petitioner also provided notice of the trial and briefing schedule to the real party by first-class mail on August 18, 2022.

[2] LACC section 22.171.8 specifies the “Commission, its sub-committee or the staff of the Department” of Planning may prepare the required report.

[3] The City contends the controversy on the designation is related the Commission’s review in the future. The Commission would have review of future applications for permits (substantial alteration, demolition or relocation of buildings) only where an HCM has been designated.

(Opposition 10:7-12 [citing AR 3313-3314 [LAAC § 22.171.14-15].)

[4] Specifically, the modifications were as follows:

HCM Designation Criteria Number 1: from “exemplifies significant contributions to the broad cultural, economic or social history of the . . . city or community as an excellent example of a 1950s private recreational facility and golf club” to “exemplifies significant contributions to the broad cultural, economic or social history of the . . . city or community as an excellent example of a 1950s private recreational facility open for public use”; and

HCM Designation Criteria Number 3: from “embodies the distinctive characteristics of a style, type, period, or method of construction’ as an excellent example of a 1950s community golf course” to “embodies the distinctive characteristics of a style, type, period or method of construction, including . . . the clubhouse, golf ball light standards, putting green, and brick wall with weeping mortar surrounding the front lawn at the northeast edge of the property, as an excellent example of a 1950s community recreational facility.” (Compare AR 3532 to AR 3538.)

[5] In any event, the standard of review would not be determinative to the outcome of this case. (See Martis Camp Community Association v. County of Placer (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 569, 595. [It is unnecessary for us to enter this debate as we conclude that the outcome of this appeal would be the same under either standard of review. Although the ‘arbitrary or capricious’ standard is not synonymous with the ‘substantial evidence’ test [citation], there are only subtle differences between them.”]) Importantly, Petitioner’s challenge here is not about the sufficiency of the evidence. Instead, Petitioner challenges the City Council’s decision as “unsubstantiated” and takes issue with the City Council’s revised findings. (Opening Brief 5:4-7.) Petitioner’s challenge is based on Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506 [Topanga] and the City Council’s allegedly legally inadequate findings. (Opening Brief 14:25-26. Petition, ¶¶ 30-39.)

[6] The decision challenged here is that of the City Council, not the Commission. The court acknowledges the PLUM committee and the City Council conducted a public hearing and heard comment. (See AR 3199-3236.)

[7] Indeed, an agency’s consideration of evidence does not necessarily create a quasi-adjudicative decision. (See Citizens for Improved Sorrento Access, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 808, 814, fn. 3. [“The fact that a local entity conducts a hearing at which evidence is presented ‘does not detract from the [fundamental] legislative nature of the action.’ ”])

[8] Petitioner takes issue with the City’s reliance on the LAMC to demonstrate “general plan amendments, zone changes, or zoning reclassifications, such as the formation of a historic preservation overlay zone” are quasi-legislative decisions implementing policy. (Opposition 13:10-11.) The provisions do, however, inform on the types of decisions the City considers legislative in nature.

[9] Petitioner’s reliance on Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa (1980) 28 Cal.3d 511 [Arnel] is in apposite. Arnel noted long-standing precedent that zoning decisions “are legislative acts.” (Id. at 514.) 20^th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216, 275 is also inapposite as it labels promulgation of administrative regulations as quasi-legislative. Finally, Mountain Defense League v. Board of Supervisors (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 723, 728-729 considered a general plan amendment along with a private development plan reviewed the agency action “by the more stringent standard.” (Id. at 729.)

[10] Petitioner acknowledges Topanga is relevant “whenever a city acts in a quasi-judicial capacity (also known as an adjudicative or administrative capacity).” (Petition, ¶ 37.)