Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 21STCP04249, Date: 2023-09-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCP04249 Hearing Date: November 8, 2023 Dept: 86
IN THE MATTER
OF THE CLAIM OF BROOKLYN DIXON
Case
Number: 21STCP04249
Hearing
Date: November 8, 2023
[Tentative] ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM
THE CLAIMS PRESENTATION
REQUIREMENT
Petitioner,
Wonda L. Hale, as guardian ad litem for minor, Brooklyn Dixon (Claimant),
requests the court relieve her of the claim presentation requirement of
Government Code[1]
section 945.4.
Respondent,
the City of Compton, has opposed the petition.
Respondent,
the City of Los Angeles, has opposed the petition.[2]
The
petition for relief from the claim presentation requirement is DENIED. The
court finds Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proof on the petition.
APPLICABLE
LAW
Government Code section 911.2, in the Government Tort Claims Act,
provides a “claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury to person . .
. shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual
of the cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) The date of accrual for the purpose
of presentation of a claim is the date on which the cause of action would have
accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations. (§ 901.)
Section 946.6 is the ultimate judicial backstop of the claim
presentation process. If a claimant fails to file a timely claim and if the
public entity then denies the claimant’s application for permission to file a
late claim, the claimant may file a petition for relief from section 945.4’s
requirement of timely claim presentation prior to suit. (See also §§ 946.6,
subd. (a), 911.2 and 911.4.)
The petition must be filed within six months after the application
to the public entity is denied or deemed to be denied. (§ 946.6, subd. (b).)
The petition must show: (1) an application was made to the public entity under
section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied; (2) the reason for the failure
to timely present the claim to the public entity within the time limit
specified in section 911.2; and (3) the information required by section 910. (§
946.6, subd. (b).)
The court shall grant relief only if it finds (1) the application
to the public entity for leave to file a late claim was made within a
reasonable time not to exceed one year after accrual of the claim as specified
in section 911.4, subd. (b); and (2) one or more of the following is
applicable:
(a)
the failure to timely present the claim was through
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, unless the public entity
establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the
court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of section 945.4;
(b)
the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or
loss was a minor during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for the
presentation of the claim;
(c)
the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or
loss was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified
in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim and by reason of that
disability failed to present a claim during that time; or
(d)
the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or
loss died before the expiration of the time specified in section 911.2 for the
presentation of the claim.
(§ 946.6, subd. (c); see also Tammen v. County of San Diego
(1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 474.)
In instances where the petitioner claims the failure to timely
present the claim was the product of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect, the court analyzes the petition under principles applicable
to relief from defaults under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision
(b). (Han v. City of Pomona (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 552, 557 [citing Ebersol
v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435].) When considering relief under section
946.6, the court should resolve any doubts which may exist in favor of the
application, preferring an outcome where the action may be heard on its merits.
(Viles v. California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 28-29.)
A petitioner bears the initial burden of demonstrating his or her
entitlement to relief. (Renteria v. Juvenile Justice, Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 903, 910-911; Toscano
v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 775,
784-785.) A petitioner must prove the basis for relief by a preponderance of
the evidence. (Toscano v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, 92
Cal.App.3d at 784-785; Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County (Dzhibinyan) (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.) A
respondent has no burden to establish prejudice until the petitioner has
satisfied the court that his or her failure to file a timely claim was due to
mistake, inadvertence surprise or excusable neglect. (Rivera v. City of
Carson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 718, 726.)
Finally, “[r]emedial statutes such as . . . section 946.6 should
be liberally construed.” (Munoz v. State
of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1783.)
///
ANALYSIS
Petitioner
argues the court should relieve her of the claim presentation requirement based
on excusable neglect. (Pet. 10:12-13.)
As
noted earlier, pursuant to section 911.2, a “claim relating to a cause of
action . . . for injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than
six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Emphasis added.)
The date of accrual for the purpose of presentation of a claim is the date on
which the cause of action would have accrued within the meaning of the statute
of limitations. (§ 901.)
On
May 30, 2020, Claimant’s mother died as a result of a traffic accident that
occurred in the City of Compton, County of Los Angeles. (See Pet., Exh. H,
Blumenthal Decl., ¶ 2.)
Petitioner
concedes the time for Claimant to have presented her government claim “expired
on or about November 30, 2020.” (See Pet., Exh. H, Blumenthal Decl., ¶ 5.)
Petitioner
retained her current attorneys “on January 7, 2021 which was after the six
month period” to present a government claim. (See Pet., Exh. H, Blumenthal
Decl., ¶ 5.)
More
than four months later and just days prior to one year after the accident,
Petitioner submitted applications to submit a late claim to the City of Compton
and the County of Los Angeles (on May 24, 2021) and the City of Los Angeles (on
May 26, 2021). (Pet., Exh. H, Blumenthal Decl., ¶ 6.)
The
City of Los Angeles denied Petitioner’s application to submit a late claim on
June 30, 2021. (Pet., Exh. H, Blumenthal Decl., ¶ 7.)
The
City of Compton denied Petitioner’s application to submit a late claim on July
6, 2021. (Pet., Exh. H, Blumenthal Decl., ¶ 7.)
Petitioner
filed her petition to excuse the claim presentation requirement on December 30,
2021.
Excusable Neglect
Through
the petition, Petitioner seeks relief from the claim presentation requirement
based upon excusable neglect. (Memo 10:12-13. [“Petitioner’s Failure to Serve a
Notice of Claim was Due to Excusable Neglect.”]) Subdivision (a) of section
946.6 requires a petitioner to demonstrate excusable neglect for the failure to
make a timely claim.[3] To show
excusable neglect, a petitioner must provide evidence. The evidence provides a
factual basis for the court to determine whether a petitioner’s neglect is
excusable.
"The
mere recital of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is not
sufficient to warrant relief. Relief on grounds of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect is available only on a showing that the
claimant's failure to timely present a claim was reasonable when tested by the
objective ‘reasonably prudent person’ standard.” (Department of Water &
Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.)
Excusable
neglect is defined as “neglect that might have been the act or omission of a
reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Ebersol
v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435.) Under the reasonably prudent
person standard, “[e]xcusable neglect is that neglect which might have been the
act of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.” (Department of
Water & Power v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at 1296.)
“When
relief is sought based on mistake, because of the reasonably prudent person
standard ‘it is not every mistake that will excuse a default, the determining
factor being the reasonableness of the misconception.’ ” (N.G. v.
County of San Diego (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 63, 74.)
Petitioner
has submitted two declarations to provide the evidentiary basis for his request
for relief: the Declaration of John A. Sheehan and the Declaration of Howard S.
Blumenthal.[4]
The
Sheehan Declaration attests to Petitioner’s age and address. (Sheehan Decl., ¶
2.) It also authenticates 13 exhibits—a traffic collision report, late claim
applications, application denials, and various proofs of service.
The
Blumenthal Declaration, dated December 28, 2021, provides some factual
background to support the petitions. For example, Blumenthal describes the
underlying accident. He also attests after Petitioner retained his law firm
(after the six month claims presentation period had run) the law firm “conducted
an investigation and contacted the Los Angeles Sheriffs Department to obtain a
copy of the completed traffic collision report.” (Pet., Exhi. H, Blumenthal
Decl., ¶ 5.) Blumenthal explains Petitioner “had tried to obtain it during the
first six months and it was not completed. We were further advised it had not
been completed and could not be given to us and to this day we have not
received the completed report nor are we aware that it has been completed.”
(Pet., Exh. H, Blumenthal Decl., ¶ 5.)
As
a preliminary matter, Blumenthal’s statements about the traffic report are
inaccurate. Attached to the petition as Exhibit A is the first page of a
seven-page traffic collision report dated August 4, 2020. Petitioner submitted
the first page of the report with her late claim application in May 2021. (The
single page submitted with the application indicates it is page 1 of 7.) In
fact, the Sheehan Declaration includes all seven pages of the August 4, 2020
report. Given that the face page of the report indicates the report consists of
seven pages, the California Highway Patrol completed its traffic collision
report on August 4, 2020. Blumenthal’s cursory statement about the availability
of the report provides no detail to support his statement the law firm could
not obtain the report or that the report had not been completed. Blumenthal’s
statement about Petitioner attempting to obtain the report is unsupported with
any foundation.
Nonetheless,
the issue about a completed traffic collision report is somewhat of a red
herring. Nothing required Petitioner to include such a report with any claim
presented to the City of Compton or the City of Los Angeles. That is, the traffic
collision report does not justify (or excuse) a failure to present the claim
within six months of the injury to either city. Even assuming the City of
Compton or the City of Los Angeles required such a report, the California
Highway Patrol completed the report well within the six-month claims
presentation period.
Petitioner
has provided no evidence concerning the six months following the accident—the
claims presentation period. There is no evidence before the court from
which the court could determine Petitioner’s neglect was excusable. The
evidentiary record is devoid of any facts about what occurred between May 30,
2020 and November 30, 2020. The lack of evidence necessarily requires the
petitions be denied based on Petitioner’s failure to demonstrate her failure to
file claims with the City of Compton and/or the City of Los Angeles resulted
from her excusable neglect. (See El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. Superior
Court (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 57, 62.)
Based
on the lack of any evidence addressing Petitioner’s claim of excusable neglect,
the court has no grounds for granting Petitioner relief.
In
a single sentence, Petitioner does argue—without any evidence—she “was . . . unaware
of her granddaughters[’] claims for wrongful death[.]” (Memo 10:19-21.)[5] Even
assuming the statement is true, it is well established that “a mere lack of
knowledge of the claim-filing requirements and its time limitation is
insufficient.” (El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 98
Cal.App.3d at 62. See also Tammen v. San Diego County, supra, 66 Cal.2d
at 476.)
“California
cases are uniformly clear that ‘a petitioner may not successfully argue
excusable neglect when he or she fails to take any action in pursuit of the
claim within the six-month period. The claimant must, at a minimum, make
a diligent effort to obtain legal counsel within six months after the accrual
of the cause of action.’ ” (People ex rel. Dep’t of Transportation v.
Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 39, 44-45.)
Petitioner’s
reliance on Barragan v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
1373 (see Memo 11:5-24), Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427 and Syzemore
v. County of Sacramento (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 517 is unhelpful. As a
preliminary matter, none of the cases suggest the court can find excusable
neglect where no evidence concerning a petitioner’s actions has not been
proffered to the court.
Barragan
v. County of Los Angeles has no application here. In fact, the case notes “lack of
knowledge alone is not considered a sufficient basis for relief, when the
claimant did not make an effort to obtain counsel.” (Barragan v. County of
Los Angeles, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at 1383.) While the Court later
explains such rule is not absolute, the Court makes clear “the failure to
obtain legal advice will be excused when a different course of action is
reasonably prudent.” (Id. at 1384 [quoting Bertorelli v. City of
Tulare (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 432, 439].)[6] As
Petitioner has offered no evidence suggesting she acted as a reasonably prudent
person when she failed to obtain counsel within the six months
claims-presentation period, Barragan v. County of Los Angeles is
unhelpful to her position.
Syzemore
v. County of Sacramento is also unhelpful to Petitioner. The case concerned the claims
presentation requirement with a claimant on active military duty. The Court
permitted a claimant to proceed with a late claim finding the time within which
the claimant was required to present his claim had been tolled under the
Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C. App. § 501 et seq.) (Syzemore v. County of Sacramento,
supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at 524.) The court also briefly noted the
“undisputed facts” of the case “establish mistake and excusable neglect beyond
any doubt.” (Ibid.) The undisputed facts included the number of days the
claimant was hospitalized and his ongoing medical care. (Id. at 520.)
Ebersol
v. Cowan actually
supports the results here. After sustaining an injury, the claimant in Ebersol
v. Cowan contacted and spoke with up to nine attorneys during the (then)
100-day claim-presentation period.[7]
Throughout the claim period, the claimant diligently pursued legal
representation and could not locate an attorney who was willing to represent
her. The Supreme Court noted the claimant
acted swiftly
to place her case in the hands of an attorney on the very day she was injured.
Thereafter, despite repeated rebuffs by attorneys she contacted, [the claimant]
continued to seek legal advice and assistance. Despite her physical pain, and
progressive deformity of her left hand, her frequent and prolonged admissions
to the hospital, and her frequent outpatient medical treatments, [the claimant]
continued her search. Clearly, [the claimant’s] efforts to obtain counsel
during the 100-day limitation period were both tenacious and diligent. (Ebersol
v. Cowan, supra, 35 Cal.3d at 437.)
Unlike
Ebersol v. Cowan, there is no evidence before the court addressing
Petitioner’s actions during the six-month claims presentation period. There is
no factual basis for the court to find Petitioner’s neglect was excusable.
As
Petitioner has failed to meet hier burden of demonstrating excusable neglect,
the petition is denied.
Reasonable Time
Additionally,
and independent of Petitioner’s failure to show excusable neglect, the court
finds Petitioner is not entitled to relief because she has not demonstrated she
filed her application for leave to present a late claim with the City of
Compton and/or the City of Los Angeles “within a reasonable time” as required
by section 946.6, subdivision (c). While Petitioner filed her application
within one year of the May 30, 2020 accrual of Claimant’s claims—May 24, 2021
(City of Compton) and May 26, 2021 (City of Los Angeles)—to obtain relief,
Petitioner must have filed her late claim applications with the cities “within
a reasonable time.” (§ 946.6, subd. (c).) Petitioner has provided no evidence
to suggest her delay was reasonable or that her counsel “was otherwise diligent
in investigating and pursuing the claim.” (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community
College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 276.)
The
evidence proffered by Petitioner on this issue is scant at best. As noted
earlier, Petitioner’s counsel advises the California Highway Patrol’s traffic
collision report “had not been completed and could not be given to [the law
firm] and to this day [the law firm had] not received the completed report nor
[was the law firm] aware that it has been completed.” (Pet., Blumenthal Decl., Exh.
H, ¶ 5.) Petitioner presents nothing further to explain why she needed nearly
an entire year to submit her application to file a late claim with the cities.
As
discussed earlier, the representation a traffic collision report had not been
completed by November 30, 2020 is inaccurate. The seven-page report is dated August
4, 2020. Moreover, it is unclear why Petitioner (or her counsel) believed she
could not file a claim more quickly without the report.
Petitioner
has provided no evidence to justify her close to five-month delay from hiring
counsel and submitting her applications to a file late claim with the cities.
The court cannot find Petitioner proceeded with her application “within a
reasonable time” as required by section 946.6, subdivision (c).
Petitioner
failed to present evidence in reply.[8] (The
court is not suggesting such late-filed evidence would have been appropriate.)
Thus, the lack of evidence to support Petitioner’s petitions remains.
Petitioner’s
reliance on Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 976 is
unhelpful to her position. In Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles, the petitioner
presented evidence to explain the reason for her late claim—a calendaring error
by her counsel. The Court noted, “While not every mistake of an attorney
constitutes excusable neglect . . ., calendar entries by an attorney or a
member of his staff are, under appropriate circumstances, excusable.” (Id. at
980.)[9]
Finally, the court need not address the issue of
prejudice to the cities given that Petitioner has not made her showing of
excusable neglect.
CONCLUSION
Based
on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.
IT IS SO
ORDERED.
November
8, 2023 ________________________________
Hon.
Mitchell Beckloff
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
All
further undesignated statutory references are to this code.
[2]
Petitioner
dismissed the County of Los Angeles from this proceeding on August 15, 2023.
[3]
Mistake,
inadvertence and/or surprise also serve as grounds to relieve a petitioner from
timely presentation of a claim.
[4]
The
Blumenthal declaration is actually attached to the petition (Exhibit H) as part
of late claim application submitted to the cities and county.
[5]
There
is no evidence before the court about Petitioner’s understanding. The petition
is unverified so it has no evidentiary value.
[6]
As
noted by the City of Compton, “In finding that petitioner had demonstrated
excusable neglect, the court noted that the petitioner ‘spent the first three
months in the hospital, and the remainder of the six-month period confined to
her bed at home. Depressed, in pain, and under the influence of medication,
[petitioner’s] attention was directed toward learning the basis tasks of
everyday life, such as eating, hold a toothbrush, and controlling her
elimination of waste. During that six-month period, she was unable to even sit
up without assistance, and did not so much as leave her bedroom to watch
television.’ ” (City of Compton Opposition 12:17-24.)
[7]
The
exact number of attorneys with whom the claimant consulted within the 100-day
period is not entirely clear.
[8]
Accordingly,
the court disregards the unsupported claim of what Petitioner may have been
feeling based on the accident. The
court cannot determine whether Petitioner acted as a reasonably prudent person
in her situation without evidence of her situation.
[9]
Nilsson
v. City of Los Angeles discussed Viles v. State of
California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24 in its decision. The petitioner in Viles
v. State of California supported his request of the court with evidence to
explain his delay. (Id. at 27, 29.)