Judge Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case 22STCP00849 2023-03-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Mitchell L. Beckloff, Case: 22STCP00849, Date: 2023-03-17 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner, K.M. by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Kathryn Fagerquist, requests the court relieve her of the claim presentation requirement of Government Code[1] section 945.4. Respondents, the County of Los Angeles, ABC Unified School District (ABCUSD), Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), California Department of Health Care Services and the California Department of Social Services, oppose the petition.[2]

The petition for relief from the claim presentation requirement is DENIED. As explained herein, the court does not adjudicate whether Petitioner’s government claims were timely submitted to Respondents.

LAUSD’s objections to the Declaration of Alex Rodriguez are all sustained except numbers 5 (as to paragraph 8, lines 2 to 3) and 6 (as to paragraph 5, lines 20 to 22) which are overruled.

LAUSD’s objections to the Declaration of Julie Stromberg are all sustained.[3]

Government Code section 911.2, in the Government Tort Claims Act, provides a “claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) The date of accrual for the purpose of presentation of a claim is the date on which the cause of action would have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations. (§ 901.)

Section 946.6 is the ultimate judicial backstop of the claim presentation process. If a claimant fails to file a timely claim, and if the public entity then denies the claimant’s application for permission to file a late claim, the claimant may file a petition for relief from section 945.4’s requirement of timely claim presentation prior to suit. (See also §§ 946.6, subd. (a), 911.2 and 911.4.)

The petition must be filed within six months after the application to the public entity is denied or deemed to be denied. (§ 946.6, subd. (b).) The petition must show: (1) an application was made to the public entity under section 911.4 and was denied or deemed denied; (2) the reason for the failure to timely present the claim to the public entity within the time limit specified in section 911.2; and (3) the information required by section 910. (§ 946.6, subd. (b).)

The court shall grant relief only if it finds (1) the application to the public entity for leave to file a late claim was made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after accrual of the claim as specified in section 911.4, subd. (b); and (2) one or more of the following is applicable:

(a) the failure to timely present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, unless the public entity establishes that it would be prejudiced in the defense of the claim if the court relieves the petitioner from the requirements of section 945.4;

(b) the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was a minor during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim;

(c) the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim and by reason of that disability failed to present a claim during that time; or

(d) the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss died before the expiration of the time specified in section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim.

(§ 946.6, subd. (c); see also Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 474.)

In instances where the petitioner claims the failure to timely present the claim was the product of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, the Court analyzes the petition under the principles applicable to relief from defaults under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). (Han v. City of Pomona (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 552, 557 [citing Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435].) When considering relief under section 946.6, the court should resolve any doubts which may exist in favor of the application, preferring an outcome where the action may be heard on its merits. (Viles v. California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 28-29.)

A petitioner bears the initial burden of demonstrating his or her entitlement to relief. (Renteria v. Juvenile Justice, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 903, 910-911; Toscano v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 775, 784-785.) A petitioner must prove the basis for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. (Toscano v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, 92 Cal.App.3d at 784-785; Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Dzhibinyan) (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.) A respondent has no burden to establish prejudice until the petitioner has satisfied the court that his or her failure to file a timely claim was due to mistake, inadvertence surprise or excusable neglect. (Rivera v. City of Carson (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 718, 726.)

Finally, “[r]emedial statutes such as . . . section 946.6 should be liberally construed.” (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1783.)

As alleged in the petition, Petitioner’s claims arise from her care and supervision by one or more entities: Respondents, South Central Los Angeles Regional Center (SCLARC), and/or College Hospital.[4] (Pet., ¶¶ 19-123.) Petitioner alleges, as a child with disabilities, each of the entities owed her state and federal statutory duties to provide care and support. In addition, as a dependent child with mental health disabilities, the State had responsibility for providing necessary health care services to correct or ameliorate her mental health condition. (Pet., ¶¶ 19-123.)

Petitioner asserts she submitted timely government claims to Respondents.[5] (Opening Brief 1:25-27. [“Therefore, Petitioner’s Tort Claim was timely filed within six months of such appointment when it was filed well before February 10, 2022.”]) Alternatively, Petitioner argues she is entitled to relief from the claims presentation requirement pursuant to section 945.4. (Opening Brief 1:28-2:1. [“Alternatively, to the extent that Petitioner’s Tort Claim was late, Respondents should have granted her Application for a Late Claim . . . .”] Reply 1:12-13.)

Pursuant to section 911.2, subdivision (a), a “claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) The date of accrual for the purpose of presentation of a claim is the date on which the cause of action would have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations. (§ 901.)

Here, Petitioner presented her government claims on August 25, 2021 and October 1, 2021. (Pet., Stromberg Decl., ¶¶ 6, 8, 9.) She filed this proceeding on March 9, 2022.

Although Petitioner alleges she filed an application for leave to present a late claim (Pet., ¶¶ 133-134, 136-18, Exs. D-I; Opening Brief 1:28-2:1), based on the evidence submitted, the court finds Petitioner’s characterization of her filings is incorrect. The letters and corresponding denials in evidence demonstrate Petitioner’s filings (claims presentment) were simply initial claim presentments and their denials—not applications to Respondents for leave to file a late claim.

For example, Exhibit D to Petitioner’s Opening Brief is a “Claim for Damages Pursuant to Cal. Govt. Code § 910” filed with the County. The claim, in the form of correspondence, sets forth the general background of the claim (a factual history dating back nearly 20 years to 2004), the specific claims against the County, relevant witnesses, a request for damages exceeding $10,000, and an explanation for why the statute of limitations for Petitioner’s claims had been tolled. (Opening Brief, Ex. D.) Exhibits E, F, G and H are similar claims submitted to LAUSD, ABCUSD, and the State, respectively. Nothing in Exhibits D, E, F, G and/or H suggests Petitioner requested leave from those government entities to file a late claim. (See § 911.4, subd. (a).) In fact, Respondents (except for the State) all advised Petitioner her claim was denied “because it was not presented within six months after the event or occurrence as required by law.” (Opening Brief, Ex. H [LAUSD rejection]. See also Opening Brief, Ex. I [ABCUSD rejection], J [County rejection], Ex. J [State rejection for lack of fee].)

Respondents’ denial letters (except for the State) all advised Petitioner for consideration of her claim she would have to file for leave to present a late claim. For example, ABCUSD advised Petitioner, “With respect to any claims related to the events that took place prior to February 25, 2021, your only recourse at this time is to apply without delay to the ABC Unified School District for leave to present a late claim. See Sections 911.4 to 912.2, inclusive, and Section 946.6 of the Government Code. Under some circumstances, leave to present a late claim will be granted.” (Opening Brief, Ex. I. See also Opening Brief, Ex. H [LAUSD], Ex. J [County], Ex. K [State advising if claim late sections 911.2 through 911.4 and 946.6 apply].)

Petitioner presents no evidence she sought to file late claims with Respondents. In fact, Petitioner concedes the issue—“Petitioner did Not Need to File An Application For Leave to Present a Late Claim Because Petitioner’s Government Tort Claims were Timely.” (Reply 1:16-17 [LAUSD and ABCUSD], 7:3-9 [County], 7:18-19, 8:10-11, 8:26-27, 9:5-7 [State].) Petitioner contends she submitted timely claims to Respondents.

Petitioner’s failure to submit an application to Respondents for leave to file a late claim is fatal to Petitioner’s request here for relief under section 946.6. The court cannot grant her relief where she did not apply for leave from Respondents to file a late claim.

Section 946.6, subdivision (a) allows a petition to be filed with the court for relief from the claims presentation requirement where “an application for leave to present a late claim is denied or deemed to have been denied . . . .” A petitioner is not entitled to relief under section 946.6 unless an “application was made to the board under Section 911.4 and was denied or deem denied.” (§ 946.6, subd. (b)(1).)

Filing a late-claim application within one year after the accrual of a cause of action is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a claim-relief petition. (Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 713.) When the underlying application to file a late claim is filed more than one year after the accrual of the cause of action, the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under section 946.6. (Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County of Santa Clara (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 480, 488.)

Accordingly, the court finds it has no jurisdiction to determine whether Petitioner is entitled to relief from the claim presentation requirement of section 911.2. The petition is therefore denied.

In the alternative, Petitioner has requested the court find she timely filed her claims with Respondents; Petitioner argues she timely presented her claims. She argues she was a non-minor dependent of the juvenile court without a guardian ad litem or conservator. She contends due to the tolling of the statute of limitations and the continuing violation doctrine she presented her claims to Respondents within six months of the last incident constituting her claim. She argues she timely presented her claims within six months of the appointment of counsel. Therefore, Petitioner asserts she is not required to obtain any relief from this court pursuant to section 946.6.

LAUSD, ABCUSD and the County all object to the court considering the timeliness of Petitioner’s claims presentation to them. They contend a petition under section 946.6 is not the proper forum to litigate the issue involving tolling and the continuing violation doctrine. The County asserts the “timeliness of claims can not be considered in this proceeding.” (County Opposition 3:2.)

The Courts of Appeal have reached different results on the issue. The appellate courts have differing views of whether a petitioner under section 946.6 may alternatively request a determination he or she presented a timely claim or must wait until the action where her or she may allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement. (Compare, e.g., Ngo v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 946, 951-952 [Ngo] [must be raised in a complaint alleging compliance] and Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 817, 827-828 [same] with Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 711 [Santee] [may be addressed in a claim-relief proceeding] and Reyes v. County of Los Angeles (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 584, 593-594.)

Most recently, in Simms v. Bear Valley Community Healthcare District (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 391 [Simms], the Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District noted a preference for resolving the timeliness issue on a petition under section 946.6. However, the resolution of the issue in Simms turned on whether a single letter constituted presentment of a claim under section 910—a legal issue. Simms did not resolve whether a petitioner filed a timely claim on disputed facts with an extensive history.

Petitioner relies on Santee, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d 702, for support this court should address the timeliness of the presentation of her claims. The court finds Santee similar to Simms. In Santee, the court resolved the issue by reviewing a letter to determine whether it substantially complied with claim presentment requirements. (Id. at 712-714.) Again, Santee resolved the legal issue on uncontested facts.

“Of course, this is not to say that the question of timely filing must be determined in a claim-relief proceeding or that the court in all cases may make factual determinations regarding compliance with the claim presentation requirements. We can envision certain cases, such as where the date of the accrual of the cause of action is disputed . . . .” (Santee, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at 711.)

In contrast to the discrete legal issues related to claim timeliness in Simms and Santee, Petitioner requests the court resolve Petitioner’s claims of tolling and the continuing violation doctrine with a complicated factual history (about which there has been no discovery). Petitioner’s claims extend nearly two decades with Respondents, five government entities, and two private entities, College Hospital and SCLARC. To wit, Petitioner specifically argues “[t]he statute of limitations did not begin to run on Petitioner’s claims until the course of discriminatory and negligent conduct was complete, and there was the appointment of an individual with the legal authority or capacity to assert claims on the Petitioner’s behalf outside of the Juvenile Court.” (Reply 6:4-7.)

Unwinding the accrual of Petitioner’s claims as well as her specific injuries and the potential liability as to specific acts underlying Petitioner’s multiple claims is factually complex. Under the circumstances, this department (tasked with hearing matters involving writs and receivers) is not the court best situated to resolve these fact specific issues. As argued by the State, “the issue of statute of limitations relating to continuing violations should be addressed in the trial court with K.M.’s complaint because discovery will be needed.” (State Opposition 15:24-16:5.) Further, the Court in Ngo explained: “Were petitioners proceeding against a nongovernmental defendant, the issue of the statute of limitations would, of course, be a jury question.” (Ngo, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at 950.) Under the circumstances here, the court finds resolution of the timeliness of Petitioner’s claims is more appropriate in the trial courtroom where (if necessary) a jury can consider and resolve disputed factual issues.

The court therefore elects to follow Ngo and its instruction based on the circumstances here.

To be clear, the court has not addressed and has no opinion about whether Petitioner timely presented her claims to Respondents. The parties may raise the issue in the assigned trial court.

[1] All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise noted.

[2] The California Department of Health Care Services and the California Department of Social Services (jointly, the State) filed a joint opposition.

[3] In the future, all objections should be separately numbered for clarity.

[4] As SCLARC and College Hospital are private entities, the issues before this department do not involve them.

[5] Petitioner merely requested relief under Government Code section 946.6, however, in the prayer of her petition.